Files
selfpost/internal/web/auth/session.go
T
mixandClaude Opus 5.5 b2fbe91de9 panel-redesign: security review of 2.0 - sessions belong to a user by id
Stage 3, step 2. Reviewed by Fable (read-only), fixed by Sonnet with a
failing test before each fix, checked by Opus. No Critical or High
finding: route authorization, tenant isolation by id, the /server/
subtree guard, output encoding and the origin check were found sound.

Fixed
  - M1: a session was keyed by user name and had no link to the user. A
    deleted or renamed user's cookie stayed alive (renewed on every hit,
    before the user was looked up) and became a session of whoever was
    later created under that name, with that account's role. The
    baseline now has sessions.user_id REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE
    CASCADE; the principal is resolved by id and a session is renewed
    only after its user was found. RenameSession is gone.
  - M2: any user's password change deleted every other user's sessions.
    It ends that user's other sessions only.
  - L1: a password set on the user form ends that user's sessions (an
    administrator editing their own account keeps the current one).
  - L2: store, saslpasswd2 and Postfix reload errors were shown verbatim
    on the application form, the inbound upstream / recipients forms and
    the limit recalculation - pages a domain administrator reaches.
    Validation errors (app.ValidationError, inbound.ValidationError,
    store.ErrNotAutoRateLimit) keep their text; anything else is logged
    and shown as "Could not save ... Check the logs and try again."
  - L3: store.ListDMARCReports treated an empty domain list as "all". It
    takes a scope now (AllDomains or a list; an empty list is no rows),
    and the DMARC hub is open to the domain role as the plan says: the
    reports of the assigned domains, without the instance-wide ingest
    box. The menu entry was already shown to them and led to a 404.
  - I1: /static/ answered with a listing of the embedded assets. A path
    that is not a known asset is a 404.

Consequences
  - The global DMARC hub lists reports of domains that were deleted
    since, too.
  - dev/migrate1x (not in the tree) no longer carries sessions over:
    everyone signs in again after the transfer.
  - docs/schema-migrations.md: the sessions row.

Recorded, not changed - for the owner:
  - L4: the report-address select names the followed user and their
    address to every administrator of the domain, by default the global
    administrator's login name. The plan asks for it.
  - L5: a delegated inbound upstream may be any host and port, loopback
    and private ranges included - within the trusted-operator model; to
    be listed among the accepted risks in security.md.
  - L6: Account's profile is saved without the password; becomes a
    requirement once password-reset mails to users.email.
  - Still echoing an error's text: backup and domain import (global
    only), the domain form's validation messages.

Not checked by the review: anything needing the container (e2e, real
Postfix / DNS), CSP behaviour in a live browser.

  go test -count=1 ./internal/web/... ./internal/store/... ./internal/app/...
    ./internal/inbound/... ./internal/dmarc/... ./cmd/panel
      ok  (all eleven packages; dev/migrate1x also ok)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-10 03:04:02 +03:00

130 lines
4.1 KiB
Go

package auth
import (
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
"time"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/store"
)
// renewThreshold bounds how often an active session's expiry is written back
// to the database. Renewing on every request would mean a write (and a new
// Set-Cookie) per click; renewing at most once an hour keeps that cost low
// while still keeping a busy admin's session alive indefinitely (plan B.1).
const renewThreshold = time.Hour
// sessionStore persists login sessions in the database (plan B.1): a login
// survives a container restart or redeploy. Only the SHA-256 of the token is
// stored, never the token itself (security.md's crypto-random bearer token), so
// a stolen database file or backup archive cannot be replayed as a session —
// it only extends the login of whichever browser still holds the original
// cookie.
type sessionStore struct {
store *store.Store
idle time.Duration
}
func newSessionStore(st *store.Store, idle time.Duration) *sessionStore {
return &sessionStore{store: st, idle: idle}
}
// MaxAge is the session cookie's Max-Age in seconds, kept equal to the
// sliding idle window so the browser drops the cookie no later than the
// server would have expired it anyway.
func (s *sessionStore) MaxAge() int {
return int(s.idle.Seconds())
}
func hashToken(token string) string {
sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(token))
return hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
}
// Create issues a new session for the user and returns its token. It fails
// closed: if the row cannot be written the caller gets an error and must not
// hand out a cookie, because a token that is not in the database looks like a
// signed-in browser while every request it makes bounces back to /login.
func (s *sessionStore) Create(userID int64) (string, error) {
token := randomToken(32)
now := time.Now()
if err := s.store.CreateSession(hashToken(token), userID, now.Add(s.idle)); err != nil {
return "", err
}
// Pruning is housekeeping: the new session is already valid, so a failure
// here is logged and does not fail the login.
if _, err := s.store.DeleteExpiredSessions(now); err != nil {
logf("panel: session: prune expired failed: %v", err)
}
return token, nil
}
// Lookup returns the id of the user a token's session belongs to, if the
// session exists and is unexpired.
func (s *sessionStore) Lookup(token string) (int64, bool) {
if token == "" {
return 0, false
}
hash := hashToken(token)
row, found, err := s.store.LookupSession(hash)
if err != nil {
logf("panel: session: lookup failed: %v", err)
return 0, false
}
if !found {
return 0, false
}
if time.Now().After(row.ExpiresAt) {
if err := s.store.DeleteSession(hash); err != nil {
logf("panel: session: delete expired failed: %v", err)
}
return 0, false
}
return row.UserID, true
}
// Touch extends a session's sliding expiry if it has been at least
// renewThreshold since the last extension, and reports whether it did so.
func (s *sessionStore) Touch(token string) bool {
hash := hashToken(token)
row, found, err := s.store.LookupSession(hash)
if err != nil {
logf("panel: session: touch lookup failed: %v", err)
return false
}
if !found {
return false
}
lastRenewal := row.ExpiresAt.Add(-s.idle)
now := time.Now()
if now.Sub(lastRenewal) < renewThreshold {
return false
}
if err := s.store.RenewSession(hash, now.Add(s.idle)); err != nil {
logf("panel: session: renew failed: %v", err)
return false
}
return true
}
// DestroyOthers invalidates every session of the user except keep.
func (s *sessionStore) DestroyOthers(userID int64, keep string) {
if err := s.store.DeleteOtherSessions(userID, hashToken(keep)); err != nil {
logf("panel: session: destroy others failed: %v", err)
}
}
// DestroyAll invalidates every session of the user.
func (s *sessionStore) DestroyAll(userID int64) {
if err := s.store.DeleteUserSessions(userID); err != nil {
logf("panel: session: destroy all failed: %v", err)
}
}
// Destroy invalidates a session token (logout).
func (s *sessionStore) Destroy(token string) {
if err := s.store.DeleteSession(hashToken(token)); err != nil {
logf("panel: session: destroy failed: %v", err)
}
}