Files
selfpost/internal/web/auth/ratelimit.go
T
mixandClaude Opus 5 ab2cd885c4
test / test (push) Has been cancelled
review follow-up: close the gaps left by the phase1-6 pass
Verified the tree against docs/plans/code-review-2026-08.md and finished the
tasks that were only partly done, plus two defects the pass introduced.

- bcrypt: the setup account was still hashed at DefaultCost (10). The work
  factor now has one definition, auth.BcryptCost = 12, used everywhere.
- rate limiter: protecting blocked buckets from eviction was unbounded — an
  attacker with many source addresses could grow the map by making each one
  fail its way to blocked. Blocked buckets are now evicted past
  maxBuckets * 4, nearest expiry first, logged once per window. Tests cover
  both halves.
- postqueue: the 5s timeout left the output size unbounded; reads are now
  capped at 4 MiB and report truncation.
- spec references: the ~76 `spec N` citations CHANGELOG [0.5.0] claimed were
  gone are removed from build/, deploy/, the first two migrations and the
  release workflow, with the affected comment paragraphs re-wrapped. Comments
  only; shell/YAML/SQL syntax re-checked.
- schema-migrations.md: schema section was headed v9 with the chain at v10,
  and three links pointed at deleted plan files.
- internal/configsafe: the shared empty/forbidden-character check behind the
  OpenDKIM and Postfix config writers; each writer keeps its own forbidden set.
- dropped the parseDomainRateLimitForm/parseAppRateLimitForm pass-throughs
  left behind by the parser merge (only their own tests still called them).
- plan doc now carries a status table: what shipped, what was already in
  place, what was declined (//go:build linux for the /proc reader) and the
  open CSRF-token question.

Not done, each its own phase: typed template data structs, log/slog, DMARC
service and handler tests, error-page/corrupted-backup tests, backup re-auth.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-19 20:03:05 +03:00

136 lines
3.4 KiB
Go

package auth
import (
"sync"
"time"
)
const defaultMaxBuckets = 4096
// blockedBucketCeiling is how far past maxBuckets the map may grow while every
// bucket in it is blocked. Blocked buckets are normally protected from
// eviction (see evictNearest), but protecting them unconditionally would let
// an attacker with many source addresses grow the map without bound — each
// address only has to fail max times. Past the ceiling blocked buckets are
// evicted too, nearest expiry first: bounded memory wins over holding every
// block, and the addresses that lose their bucket have to spend max attempts
// again to get back to blocked.
const blockedBucketCeiling = 4
// rateLimiter is a simple fixed-window per-key counter used to throttle the
// setup and login routes (security.md). Keys are client IPs.
type rateLimiter struct {
max int
window time.Duration
maxBuckets int
mu sync.Mutex
buckets map[string]*rlBucket
lastOverflow time.Time
}
type rlBucket struct {
count int
windowEnds time.Time
}
func newRateLimiter(max int, window time.Duration) *rateLimiter {
return &rateLimiter{
max: max,
window: window,
maxBuckets: defaultMaxBuckets,
buckets: make(map[string]*rlBucket),
}
}
func (r *rateLimiter) startSweeper() {
go func() {
ticker := time.NewTicker(r.window)
defer ticker.Stop()
for range ticker.C {
r.mu.Lock()
r.sweep(time.Now())
r.mu.Unlock()
}
}()
}
func (r *rateLimiter) Allow(key string) bool {
now := time.Now()
r.mu.Lock()
defer r.mu.Unlock()
b := r.buckets[key]
if b == nil || now.After(b.windowEnds) {
r.makeRoom(now)
r.buckets[key] = &rlBucket{count: 1, windowEnds: now.Add(r.window)}
r.sweep(now)
return true
}
if b.count >= r.max {
return false
}
b.count++
return true
}
func (r *rateLimiter) makeRoom(now time.Time) {
if r.maxBuckets <= 0 || len(r.buckets) < r.maxBuckets {
return
}
r.sweep(now)
hardCap := r.maxBuckets * blockedBucketCeiling
for len(r.buckets) >= r.maxBuckets {
if r.evictNearest(false) {
continue
}
// Nothing evictable is left: every remaining bucket is blocked. Hold
// them until the map reaches the hard ceiling, then start evicting
// blocked buckets as well so memory stays bounded.
if len(r.buckets) < hardCap {
break
}
if !r.evictNearest(true) {
break
}
if now.Sub(r.lastOverflow) >= r.window {
r.lastOverflow = now
logf("panel: login rate limiter holds %d blocked buckets (cap %d) — evicting blocked entries; "+
"this means many distinct client addresses are failing authentication", len(r.buckets), r.maxBuckets)
}
}
}
// evictNearest removes the bucket whose window ends soonest and reports whether
// it removed one. Blocked buckets (count >= max) are skipped unless evictBlocked
// is set, so an attacker cannot flush active rate-limit state by filling the map
// with new keys.
func (r *rateLimiter) evictNearest(evictBlocked bool) bool {
var bestKey string
var bestEnds time.Time
first := true
for k, b := range r.buckets {
if !evictBlocked && b.count >= r.max {
continue
}
if first || b.windowEnds.Before(bestEnds) {
bestKey = k
bestEnds = b.windowEnds
first = false
}
}
if bestKey == "" {
return false
}
delete(r.buckets, bestKey)
return true
}
func (r *rateLimiter) sweep(now time.Time) {
for k, b := range r.buckets {
if now.After(b.windowEnds) {
delete(r.buckets, k)
}
}
}