Files
selfpost/deploy/caddy/docker-compose.caddy.yml
T
mixandClaude Opus 5 ab2cd885c4
test / test (push) Has been cancelled
review follow-up: close the gaps left by the phase1-6 pass
Verified the tree against docs/plans/code-review-2026-08.md and finished the
tasks that were only partly done, plus two defects the pass introduced.

- bcrypt: the setup account was still hashed at DefaultCost (10). The work
  factor now has one definition, auth.BcryptCost = 12, used everywhere.
- rate limiter: protecting blocked buckets from eviction was unbounded — an
  attacker with many source addresses could grow the map by making each one
  fail its way to blocked. Blocked buckets are now evicted past
  maxBuckets * 4, nearest expiry first, logged once per window. Tests cover
  both halves.
- postqueue: the 5s timeout left the output size unbounded; reads are now
  capped at 4 MiB and report truncation.
- spec references: the ~76 `spec N` citations CHANGELOG [0.5.0] claimed were
  gone are removed from build/, deploy/, the first two migrations and the
  release workflow, with the affected comment paragraphs re-wrapped. Comments
  only; shell/YAML/SQL syntax re-checked.
- schema-migrations.md: schema section was headed v9 with the chain at v10,
  and three links pointed at deleted plan files.
- internal/configsafe: the shared empty/forbidden-character check behind the
  OpenDKIM and Postfix config writers; each writer keeps its own forbidden set.
- dropped the parseDomainRateLimitForm/parseAppRateLimitForm pass-throughs
  left behind by the parser merge (only their own tests still called them).
- plan doc now carries a status table: what shipped, what was already in
  place, what was declined (//go:build linux for the /proc reader) and the
  open CSRF-token question.

Not done, each its own phase: typed template data structs, log/slog, DMARC
service and handler tests, error-page/corrupted-backup tests, backup re-auth.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-19 20:03:05 +03:00

52 lines
2.0 KiB
YAML

# Alternative reverse-proxy: Caddy — the simplest option, fully automatic ACME
# with no separate certbot container. Caddy writes certificates as plain PEM
# under its own data directory, which this fragment bind-mounts to the host so
# SelfPost can read the same files.
#
# NOTE: Caddy's on-disk cert path includes
# the ACME CA's name as a path segment, e.g.
# <data>/caddy/certificates/acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org-directory/<hostname>/<hostname>.crt
# This has been stable across recent Caddy releases but is an internal
# storage detail, not a documented public API — VERIFY the exact path against
# the Caddy version you deploy (`docker compose exec caddy find /data/caddy/certificates -name '*.crt'`)
# before wiring it into the volume mount below.
#
# Merge with the base file — run this from the deploy/ directory (Compose
# resolves every relative path in both files against the directory of the
# FIRST -f file, i.e. deploy/, which is why paths below are ./caddy/...):
#
# docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f caddy/docker-compose.caddy.yml up -d
services:
selfpost:
ports: !override
- "465:465"
- "587:587"
- "25:25"
environment:
# Caddy names certificate files after the hostname, not
# fullchain.pem/privkey.pem like certbot — override the base file's
# paths to match.
TLS_CERT_FILE: /etc/postfix/tls/<hostname>.crt
TLS_KEY_FILE: /etc/postfix/tls/<hostname>.key
volumes: !override
- ./data:/data
- .:/selfpost-deploy:ro
# Replace <hostname> with your actual mail/panel hostname, matching
# the Caddyfile below and SELFPOST_HOSTNAME.
- ./caddy/caddy-data/caddy/certificates/acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org-directory/<hostname>:/etc/postfix/tls:ro
caddy:
image: caddy:2
restart: unless-stopped
depends_on:
- selfpost
ports:
- "80:80"
- "443:443"
volumes:
- ./caddy/Caddyfile:/etc/caddy/Caddyfile:ro
- ./caddy/caddy-data:/data
- ./caddy/caddy-config:/config