Files
selfpost/internal/web/auth/ratelimit_test.go
T
mixandClaude Opus 5 ab2cd885c4
test / test (push) Has been cancelled
review follow-up: close the gaps left by the phase1-6 pass
Verified the tree against docs/plans/code-review-2026-08.md and finished the
tasks that were only partly done, plus two defects the pass introduced.

- bcrypt: the setup account was still hashed at DefaultCost (10). The work
  factor now has one definition, auth.BcryptCost = 12, used everywhere.
- rate limiter: protecting blocked buckets from eviction was unbounded — an
  attacker with many source addresses could grow the map by making each one
  fail its way to blocked. Blocked buckets are now evicted past
  maxBuckets * 4, nearest expiry first, logged once per window. Tests cover
  both halves.
- postqueue: the 5s timeout left the output size unbounded; reads are now
  capped at 4 MiB and report truncation.
- spec references: the ~76 `spec N` citations CHANGELOG [0.5.0] claimed were
  gone are removed from build/, deploy/, the first two migrations and the
  release workflow, with the affected comment paragraphs re-wrapped. Comments
  only; shell/YAML/SQL syntax re-checked.
- schema-migrations.md: schema section was headed v9 with the chain at v10,
  and three links pointed at deleted plan files.
- internal/configsafe: the shared empty/forbidden-character check behind the
  OpenDKIM and Postfix config writers; each writer keeps its own forbidden set.
- dropped the parseDomainRateLimitForm/parseAppRateLimitForm pass-throughs
  left behind by the parser merge (only their own tests still called them).
- plan doc now carries a status table: what shipped, what was already in
  place, what was declined (//go:build linux for the /proc reader) and the
  open CSRF-token question.

Not done, each its own phase: typed template data structs, log/slog, DMARC
service and handler tests, error-page/corrupted-backup tests, backup re-auth.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-19 20:03:05 +03:00

177 lines
5.2 KiB
Go

package auth
import (
"fmt"
"testing"
"time"
)
// The limiter is what stands between the public login form and an unlimited
// guessing rate (security.md), so the ceiling has to be exact: the configured
// number of attempts go through and the next one does not, however often it is
// repeated.
func TestRateLimiterStopsAtTheCeiling(t *testing.T) {
r := newRateLimiter(3, time.Minute)
for i := 1; i <= 3; i++ {
if !r.Allow("203.0.113.7") {
t.Fatalf("attempt %d of 3 was refused before the ceiling", i)
}
}
for i := 4; i <= 6; i++ {
if r.Allow("203.0.113.7") {
t.Fatalf("attempt %d passed after the ceiling of 3", i)
}
}
}
// Buckets are per key, so one locked-out address must not lock out the rest of
// the internet — a shared counter would turn a single guesser into a denial of
// service against every operator.
func TestRateLimiterKeepsKeysApart(t *testing.T) {
r := newRateLimiter(1, time.Minute)
if !r.Allow("203.0.113.7") || r.Allow("203.0.113.7") {
t.Fatal("the first key did not use up its single attempt")
}
if !r.Allow("198.51.100.9") {
t.Fatal("a second address was refused because another one was locked out")
}
}
// The window is fixed, not sliding: once it has elapsed the count starts again
// from zero rather than being carried over. Time is moved by ageing the bucket
// instead of sleeping, so the test states the boundary rather than approaching
// it.
func TestRateLimiterReopensAfterTheWindow(t *testing.T) {
r := newRateLimiter(2, time.Minute)
r.Allow("203.0.113.7")
r.Allow("203.0.113.7")
if r.Allow("203.0.113.7") {
t.Fatal("the ceiling was not reached")
}
expire(r, "203.0.113.7")
if !r.Allow("203.0.113.7") {
t.Fatal("the key is still locked out after its window ended")
}
if !r.Allow("203.0.113.7") {
t.Fatal("the new window did not start from an empty count")
}
if r.Allow("203.0.113.7") {
t.Fatal("the new window allowed more than the ceiling")
}
}
// Every address that ever tried to sign in gets a bucket, and the only thing
// that removes the finished ones is the sweep on a new window. It runs on the
// key that triggered it as well as on the others, so a long-running panel does
// not accumulate a bucket per source address for ever.
func TestRateLimiterSweepsFinishedBuckets(t *testing.T) {
r := newRateLimiter(2, time.Minute)
for _, key := range []string{"203.0.113.7", "198.51.100.9"} {
r.Allow(key)
expire(r, key)
}
r.Allow("192.0.2.5") // still inside its window
r.Allow("203.0.113.7") // new window for this key: sweeps the rest
r.mu.Lock()
defer r.mu.Unlock()
if _, ok := r.buckets["198.51.100.9"]; ok {
t.Error("a bucket whose window ended is still held")
}
for _, key := range []string{"203.0.113.7", "192.0.2.5"} {
if _, ok := r.buckets[key]; !ok {
t.Errorf("the sweep dropped %s, whose window is still open", key)
}
}
}
// expire moves a key's window into the past, the same state it would reach by
// waiting for the window to elapse.
func expire(r *rateLimiter, key string) {
r.mu.Lock()
defer r.mu.Unlock()
if b := r.buckets[key]; b != nil {
b.windowEnds = time.Now().Add(-time.Second)
}
}
// A long-running panel can see many unique client addresses. Finished buckets
// are swept on every new window, and a hard cap evicts the oldest when the map
// would otherwise grow without bound.
func TestRateLimiterCapsBucketCount(t *testing.T) {
r := newRateLimiter(1, time.Minute)
r.maxBuckets = 3
for i, key := range []string{"203.0.113.7", "198.51.100.9", "192.0.2.5"} {
if !r.Allow(key) {
t.Fatalf("attempt %d for %s was refused under the cap", i+1, key)
}
expire(r, key)
}
if !r.Allow("203.0.113.8") {
t.Fatal("a fourth address was refused even though room was made")
}
r.mu.Lock()
defer r.mu.Unlock()
if len(r.buckets) > 3 {
t.Fatalf("bucket count = %d, want at most 3", len(r.buckets))
}
}
// A flood of new addresses must not be able to reset the limiter for an address
// that is already blocked: below the hard ceiling, blocked buckets survive
// eviction even though the map is over its soft cap.
func TestRateLimiterKeepsBlockedBucketsUnderPressure(t *testing.T) {
r := newRateLimiter(2, time.Minute)
r.maxBuckets = 3
blocked := []string{"203.0.113.7", "198.51.100.9", "192.0.2.5"}
for _, key := range blocked {
for i := 0; i < 2; i++ {
if !r.Allow(key) {
t.Fatalf("%s refused before reaching the limit", key)
}
}
if r.Allow(key) {
t.Fatalf("%s was not blocked after 2 attempts", key)
}
}
// Fresh addresses arrive and find nothing evictable.
for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
r.Allow(fmt.Sprintf("198.51.100.%d", 100+i))
}
for _, key := range blocked {
if r.Allow(key) {
t.Fatalf("%s lost its block after new addresses arrived", key)
}
}
}
// Protecting blocked buckets is bounded: past maxBuckets * blockedBucketCeiling
// they are evicted too, so an attacker cannot grow the map without limit by
// burning through source addresses.
func TestRateLimiterBoundsBlockedBuckets(t *testing.T) {
r := newRateLimiter(1, time.Minute)
r.maxBuckets = 2
hardCap := r.maxBuckets * blockedBucketCeiling
for i := 0; i < 100; i++ {
r.Allow(fmt.Sprintf("192.0.2.%d", i))
}
r.mu.Lock()
defer r.mu.Unlock()
if len(r.buckets) > hardCap {
t.Fatalf("bucket count = %d, want at most the hard cap %d", len(r.buckets), hardCap)
}
}