Files
selfpost/internal/milter/inbound.go
T
mixandClaude Opus 5.5 d398f488e2
test / test (push) Canceled after 0s
inbound-antispam-panel: the filter signs what it judged
Closes what the security review left as an accepted risk: with the
spam filter down - it is attached fail-open - nothing removes verdict
headers a sender wrote himself, and the inbound journal recorded his
verdict as the filter's. The owner asked whether rspamd could add a
header that proves the others are ours (2026-10-12) and agreed to a
signature: a fixed mark could be written by a sender as easily as the
verdict.

  - inbound.FilterKey: a key of 32 random bytes, 64 hex characters, in
    /data/antispam/filter.key, made on the first start with the relay
    on. 0644 like the list files beside it: the filter is another user
    in another container.
  - deploy/antispam/rspamd/milter_headers.conf: a custom routine reads
    the key through the directory the sidecar already mounts and adds
    X-SelfPost-Filter, the HMAC-SHA256 of the message's queue id, hex;
    a header of that name from the sender is removed.
  - internal/milter/inbound.go: the verdict headers are kept as they
    are read, and at end-of-message - when the queue id is known - they
    count only if the signature fits (FilterSignature, hmac.Equal). No
    key, no queue id, no signature or a wrong one: the row is that of
    mail nobody judged (accept, selfpost, no detail).

The signature goes on to the upstream with the mail and is of no use
there: it fits one queue id.

Tried in a throwaway rspamd 3.11 container on the test server before
the Go side was written: the routine loads, signs
(2aa1ca6d... for key 0123...cdef and queue id 4A1B2C3D5E, the value
python's hmac gives and TestFilterSignatureIsWhatTheFilterWrites
pins), removes a sender's header of the same name, and adds nothing
without a queue id.

Tests: signed, unsigned, made-up, another message's, another key's,
the sender's followed by the real one, the next message on the
connection, no queue id; the key made once, read after, replaced when
damaged, left alone by the lists. e2e: filter.key is there, 644, 65
bytes.

docs/security.md: the accepted risk is replaced by a narrower one (the
key is readable on the host); Mail path describes the signature.

Checked on the test server, uncommitted tree: go vet ./... ok,
go test ./... ok (22 packages), make e2e ok.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-12 08:34:29 +03:00

291 lines
9.4 KiB
Go

package milter
import (
"context"
"crypto/hmac"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
"log"
"net"
"net/textproto"
"regexp"
"strings"
"github.com/emersion/go-milter"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/mailhdr"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/store"
)
// InboundStore is what the inbound journal milter needs: the journal itself
// and the list of inbound domains, since port 25 also takes mail that is not
// the relay's. *store.Store satisfies it; tests substitute a fake.
type InboundStore interface {
InsertInboundSpam(e store.InboundSpamEntry) error
IsInboundDomain(name string) (bool, error)
}
// inboundSession is the inbound journal milter: the last milter on port 25,
// after the optional external filter. It writes one journal row per recipient
// of a message that reached end-of-message - that is, one the filter did not
// refuse; refusals never get this far and are read from mail.log instead.
//
// Like the send-log milter it only watches: every callback continues, and
// Postfix attaches the socket with default_action=accept, so
// neither an error here nor the panel being down holds up inbound mail.
type inboundSession struct {
milter.NoOpMilter
rec InboundStore
// key is what the filter signs each message with (FilterSignature), or
// empty when no filter is attached. A verdict is read only next to a
// signature that fits: the filter is attached so that mail flows when it is
// down, and then the verdict headers of a message are whatever its sender
// wrote.
key string
// clientIP is taken at Connect and again from {client_addr} with every
// MAIL FROM: a session the library made after a non-continue reply never
// sees Connect (see session.MailFrom in milter.go).
clientIP string
from string
rcpts []string
subject string
action string // X-Rspamd-Action
result string // X-Spamd-Result
seen bool // any verdict header of the filter
sig string // X-SelfPost-Filter
}
func (s *inboundSession) Connect(host, family string, port uint16, addr net.IP, m *milter.Modifier) (milter.Response, error) {
if addr != nil {
s.clientIP = addr.String()
}
return milter.RespContinue, nil
}
// MailFrom starts a message: a connection may carry several.
func (s *inboundSession) MailFrom(from string, m *milter.Modifier) (milter.Response, error) {
s.reset()
if ip := clientAddr(m); ip != "" {
s.clientIP = ip
}
s.from = cleanAddress(from)
return milter.RespContinue, nil
}
func (s *inboundSession) RcptTo(rcpt string, m *milter.Modifier) (milter.Response, error) {
s.rcpts = append(s.rcpts, cleanAddress(rcpt))
return milter.RespContinue, nil
}
// Header keeps the first Subject, the filter's verdict and its signature.
// Postfix hands the message to its milters one after another at
// end-of-message, each seeing what the one before added, which is how the
// filter's headers arrive here. The filter replaces headers of these names, so
// the last one read is its own - when it is up. Whether it was is decided at
// end-of-message, by the signature.
func (s *inboundSession) Header(name, value string, m *milter.Modifier) (milter.Response, error) {
switch textproto.CanonicalMIMEHeaderKey(name) {
case "Subject":
if s.subject == "" {
s.subject = mailhdr.DecodeSubject(value)
}
case "X-Rspamd-Action":
s.action, s.seen = value, true
case "X-Spamd-Result":
s.result, s.seen = value, true
case signatureHeader:
s.sig = strings.TrimSpace(value)
}
return milter.RespContinue, nil
}
// SignatureHeader is the header the filter signs a message in
// (deploy/antispam/rspamd/milter_headers.conf writes it).
const SignatureHeader = "X-SelfPost-Filter"
var signatureHeader = textproto.CanonicalMIMEHeaderKey(SignatureHeader)
// FilterSignature is what the filter writes into SignatureHeader for a message:
// the HMAC-SHA256 of its queue id under the key SelfPost shares with the
// filter, in hex. The key is used as the text it is stored as. A signature
// fits one queue id, so the header going on to the upstream with the mail
// gives nothing to whoever reads it there.
func FilterSignature(key, queueID string) string {
mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, []byte(key))
mac.Write([]byte(queueID))
return hex.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil))
}
// signed reports whether the message carries the filter's signature for its
// queue id. No key, no queue id or no signature is "no".
func (s *inboundSession) signed(queueID string) bool {
if s.key == "" || queueID == "" || s.sig == "" {
return false
}
return hmac.Equal([]byte(strings.ToLower(s.sig)), []byte(FilterSignature(s.key, queueID)))
}
// Body fires at end-of-message: the message is about to be queued for its
// upstream. "Continue" lets it through as "accept" would, and keeps this
// session for the connection's next message.
func (s *inboundSession) Body(m *milter.Modifier) (milter.Response, error) {
// The queue id is known only now, and with it whether the verdict headers
// read on the way here are the filter's.
if !s.signed(macro(m, "i")) {
s.seen = false
}
s.record()
s.reset()
return milter.RespContinue, nil
}
func (s *inboundSession) Abort(m *milter.Modifier) error {
s.reset()
return nil
}
func (s *inboundSession) reset() {
s.from, s.rcpts, s.subject = "", nil, ""
s.action, s.result, s.seen, s.sig = "", "", false, ""
}
// record writes one row per recipient at an inbound domain. Other recipients
// of port 25 (a DMARC report address at the server's own name) are not the
// relay's mail and get no row. Failures are logged, never propagated.
func (s *inboundSession) record() {
e := store.InboundSpamEntry{
ClientIP: s.clientIP,
From: s.from,
Subject: s.subject,
Decision: store.SpamDecisionAccept,
Engine: store.SpamEngineSelfPost,
}
if s.seen {
action, detail := rspamdVerdict(s.action, s.result)
e.Engine, e.Detail = store.SpamEngineRspamd, detail
if action == "quarantine" {
e.Decision = store.SpamDecisionQuarantine
}
}
for _, to := range s.rcpts {
domain := domainOf(to)
ok, err := s.rec.IsInboundDomain(domain)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("inbound-journal: look up %s: %v", domain, err)
continue
}
if !ok {
continue
}
e.InboundDomain, e.To = domain, to
if err := s.rec.InsertInboundSpam(e); err != nil {
log.Printf("inbound-journal: record %s -> %s: %v", s.from, to, err)
}
}
}
// What the journal keeps of a verdict: enough to see why, on one line.
const (
verdictMaxSymbols = 6
verdictMaxBytes = 255
)
// ListSymbolPrefix starts the names of the symbols the filter lists' rules add
// (deploy/antispam/rspamd/multimap.conf): SELFPOST_ALLOW_IP, _FROM, _DOMAIN.
const ListSymbolPrefix = "SELFPOST_"
var (
// "default: False [7.20 / 15.00]" - the score and the reject threshold.
rspamdScore = regexp.MustCompile(`\[(-?[0-9]+(?:\.[0-9]+)?) / (-?[0-9]+(?:\.[0-9]+)?)\]`)
// "BAYES_SPAM(5.10)[100.00%]" - a symbol and its weight.
rspamdSymbol = regexp.MustCompile(`([A-Z][A-Z0-9_]{1,63})\((-?[0-9]+(?:\.[0-9]+)?)\)`)
)
// rspamdVerdict reduces the filter's headers to an action and a one-line
// summary: the action, the score against the threshold, and the first few
// symbols that carried weight. It reads only what it recognises - the headers
// are read only next to the filter's signature, and even so nothing of them is
// kept verbatim except through these patterns.
func rspamdVerdict(actionHeader, resultHeader string) (action, detail string) {
action = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(actionHeader))
for _, r := range action {
if (r < 'a' || r > 'z') && r != ' ' {
action = ""
break
}
}
if len(action) > 32 {
action = ""
}
var parts []string
if action != "" {
parts = append(parts, action)
}
if m := rspamdScore.FindStringSubmatch(resultHeader); m != nil {
parts = append(parts, "score "+m[1]+" / "+m[2])
}
detail = strings.Join(parts, ", ")
// The filter lists' own symbols come first and are kept whatever else there
// is: Filter lists counts how often an entry decided by finding them here,
// and rspamd writes symbols heaviest first, which puts an allow entry's
// -100 last, behind any six others.
var symbols, rest []string
for _, m := range rspamdSymbol.FindAllStringSubmatch(resultHeader, -1) {
if strings.Trim(m[2], "-0.") == "" { // weight zero: informational
continue
}
if strings.HasPrefix(m[1], ListSymbolPrefix) {
if len(symbols) < verdictMaxSymbols {
symbols = append(symbols, m[1]+"("+m[2]+")")
}
continue
}
rest = append(rest, m[1]+"("+m[2]+")")
}
for _, sym := range rest {
if len(symbols) == verdictMaxSymbols {
break
}
symbols = append(symbols, sym)
}
if len(symbols) > 0 {
if detail != "" {
detail += "; "
}
detail += strings.Join(symbols, " ")
}
if len(detail) > verdictMaxBytes {
detail = detail[:verdictMaxBytes]
}
return action, detail
}
// ServeInbound runs the inbound journal milter on ln until ctx is cancelled.
// key is what the external filter in front of it signs messages with, or
// empty when none is attached (INBOUND_ANTISPAM_MILTER): no verdict is then
// read at all. It returns nil on a clean shutdown.
func ServeInbound(ctx context.Context, ln net.Listener, rec InboundStore, key string) error {
srv := &milter.Server{
NewMilter: func() milter.Milter { return &inboundSession{rec: rec, key: key} },
Actions: 0, // read-only
Protocol: milter.OptNoBody, // headers and end-of-message, not the body
}
go func() {
<-ctx.Done()
_ = srv.Close()
}()
if err := srv.Serve(ln); err != nil {
if ctx.Err() != nil {
return nil
}
return err
}
return nil
}