A bounce could be recorded as a successful delivery. The log-tailer's Fixed: - A bounce could be recorded as a successful delivery. The log-tailer's - Log-tailer resumes where it stopped instead of jumping to end-of-file on - Level-2 rate limit no longer overshoots under concurrency: messages that Changed: - The project has a single public home: `github.com/mixeme/selfpost`. Codeberg - Code comments no longer cite the archived specification. References like - `docs/code-review.md` is gone. Its plan is finished — phases 0 (bar the - `docs/architecture.md` gained a *Code layers* section: a diagram of - Phase 1 doc/code hygiene (`docs/code-review.md`): removed ~30 stale … (1 more in CHANGELOG) Security: - Pre-release security review (plan § D, model Fable, 2026-08-06): full pass - `saslpasswd2` argv: the application login is now passed after a `--` Added: - Optional password encryption for the two secret-bearing downloads (plan - Domain import accepts an encrypted export: the envelope is detected by its - `selfpost-backup` writes encrypted archives and reads them back: - `TestParseDelivery` covers the exotic mail.log shapes the review asked for - docs: README *Encrypting a backup or export*; `docs/security.md` § … (14 more in CHANGELOG) Removed: - docs: `security.md` — accepted risk «restore old backup revives session rows» Changed: - docs: `implementation-plan.md` trimmed to the sole open v1.x gate — pre-release - docs: `architecture.md` — sessions (SQLite, idle renew, password change), - docs: `development.md` — expanded e2e stack and `release.yml` matrix workflow. - docs: `security.md` — accepted risk for send-log rows stuck at `queued` after - docs: `roadmap.md` — optional send-log / `mail.log` follow-ups under v1.x tail. … (10 more in CHANGELOG) Full detail: CHANGELOG.md (0.5.0).
159 lines
5.2 KiB
Go
159 lines
5.2 KiB
Go
package web
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"fmt"
|
|
"net"
|
|
"net/http"
|
|
"strconv"
|
|
"strings"
|
|
|
|
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/store"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// defaultRateLimitWindowSeconds is the sliding-window length used when an
|
|
// admin sets a message ceiling but leaves the window blank (README § Rate
|
|
// limiting, matching the level-1 default hour; README § Environment variables:
|
|
// RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS).
|
|
const defaultRateLimitWindowSeconds = 3600
|
|
|
|
// rateLimitInput is the validated result of a rate-limit form submission.
|
|
// clear means "remove the differentiated limit" (README § Rate limiting: an
|
|
// empty IP binding leaves only level 1).
|
|
type rateLimitInput struct {
|
|
clear bool
|
|
ips []string
|
|
maxMessages int
|
|
windowSeconds int
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// parseRateLimitForm validates a rate-limit submission on the server
|
|
// (security.md). It returns clear=true when the admin removes the limit or
|
|
// leaves the IP binding empty; otherwise it requires a positive ceiling and
|
|
// window. The returned error's message is safe to show to the admin.
|
|
func parseRateLimitForm(r *http.Request) (rateLimitInput, error) {
|
|
if err := r.ParseForm(); err != nil {
|
|
return rateLimitInput{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid form submission")
|
|
}
|
|
if r.PostFormValue("clear") != "" {
|
|
return rateLimitInput{clear: true}, nil
|
|
}
|
|
ips, err := parseIPList(r.PostFormValue("allowed_ips"))
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return rateLimitInput{}, err
|
|
}
|
|
if len(ips) == 0 {
|
|
// No IP binding: the differentiated limit does not apply (README § Rate
|
|
// limiting).
|
|
return rateLimitInput{clear: true}, nil
|
|
}
|
|
maxMessages, err := parsePositiveInt(r.PostFormValue("max_messages"), 0)
|
|
if err != nil || maxMessages <= 0 {
|
|
return rateLimitInput{}, fmt.Errorf("enter a message limit greater than zero")
|
|
}
|
|
windowSeconds, err := parsePositiveInt(r.PostFormValue("window_seconds"), defaultRateLimitWindowSeconds)
|
|
if err != nil || windowSeconds <= 0 {
|
|
return rateLimitInput{}, fmt.Errorf("enter a time window greater than zero seconds")
|
|
}
|
|
return rateLimitInput{ips: ips, maxMessages: maxMessages, windowSeconds: windowSeconds}, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// parseIPList parses the allowed-IP field (IPs separated by newlines, commas or
|
|
// whitespace) into a deduplicated list of canonical addresses, rejecting any
|
|
// token that is not a valid IP (security.md). The values are only ever stored as
|
|
// SQLite parameters and compared in the milter, never written to a config file.
|
|
func parseIPList(raw string) ([]string, error) {
|
|
fields := strings.FieldsFunc(raw, func(r rune) bool {
|
|
return r == '\n' || r == '\r' || r == ',' || r == ' ' || r == '\t' || r == ';'
|
|
})
|
|
var out []string
|
|
seen := make(map[string]bool)
|
|
for _, f := range fields {
|
|
ip := net.ParseIP(f)
|
|
if ip == nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q is not a valid IP address", f)
|
|
}
|
|
c := ip.String()
|
|
if !seen[c] {
|
|
seen[c] = true
|
|
out = append(out, c)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return out, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// parsePositiveInt parses a trimmed integer field, returning def when it is
|
|
// blank. A non-numeric value returns an error.
|
|
func parsePositiveInt(raw string, def int) (int, error) {
|
|
raw = strings.TrimSpace(raw)
|
|
if raw == "" {
|
|
return def, nil
|
|
}
|
|
return strconv.Atoi(raw)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// handleDomainRateLimit saves or clears a domain-level differentiated rate
|
|
// limit (README § Rate limiting). No reload is needed — the milter reads the
|
|
// row live.
|
|
func (s *Server) handleDomainRateLimit(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
d, ok := s.lookupDomain(w, r)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
in, err := parseRateLimitForm(r)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
s.renderDomainDetail(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, d, detailView{
|
|
FormMode: store.AddressModeWildcard,
|
|
RateLimitErr: err.Error(),
|
|
})
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if err := s.applyRateLimit(in, s.domains.SaveRateLimit, s.domains.ClearRateLimit, d.ID); err != nil {
|
|
logf("panel: domain %d: save rate limit: %v", d.ID, err)
|
|
http.Error(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
http.Redirect(w, r, fmt.Sprintf("/domains/%d?ratelimit=1", d.ID), http.StatusSeeOther)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// handleAppRateLimit saves or clears an application-level differentiated rate
|
|
// limit (README § Rate limiting).
|
|
func (s *Server) handleAppRateLimit(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
a, ok := s.lookupApplication(w, r)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
d, err := s.domains.Get(a.DomainID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
http.Error(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
in, err := parseRateLimitForm(r)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
s.renderDomainDetail(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, d, detailView{
|
|
FormMode: store.AddressModeWildcard,
|
|
RateLimitErr: fmt.Sprintf("%s: %s", a.Login, err.Error()),
|
|
})
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if err := s.applyRateLimit(in, s.apps.SaveRateLimit, s.apps.ClearRateLimit, a.ID); err != nil {
|
|
logf("panel: application %d: save rate limit: %v", a.ID, err)
|
|
http.Error(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
http.Redirect(w, r, fmt.Sprintf("/domains/%d?ratelimit=1", a.DomainID), http.StatusSeeOther)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// applyRateLimit dispatches a validated input to the save or clear method of the
|
|
// relevant service, keyed by the domain or application id.
|
|
func (s *Server) applyRateLimit(
|
|
in rateLimitInput,
|
|
save func(id int64, ips []string, maxMessages, windowSeconds int) error,
|
|
clear func(id int64) error,
|
|
id int64,
|
|
) error {
|
|
if in.clear {
|
|
return clear(id)
|
|
}
|
|
return save(id, in.ips, in.maxMessages, in.windowSeconds)
|
|
}
|