Files
selfpost/internal/dnscheck/spf.go
T
mix e6910c2c2d panel: show the SPF and DMARC records the domain page expects
The domain page generated and displayed the DKIM record but said only
"also configure SPF and DMARC for the domain (see the documentation)".
The concrete example existed — buried in the check's remediation text,
and only visible once the check had already failed. Show both records up
front, host and value with a Copy button, the way the DKIM record is
shown, plus the two things that actually bite: a domain may carry only
one SPF record (add the mechanism to the existing one rather than
publishing a second), and p=none is safe to publish immediately.

The SPF value names the addresses SELFPOST_HOSTNAME resolves to, taken
from the hostname check the page already runs, and falls back to an "a:"
mechanism when it does not resolve. New dnscheck.SPFExample/DMARCExample
are the single source for both the page and the checks' advice, so the
two cannot drift into recommending different records; dnscheck.Query
gains Hostname for the fallback.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-03 16:08:48 +03:00

286 lines
8.3 KiB
Go

package dnscheck
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"net"
"strings"
"codeberg.org/mix/selfpost/internal/health"
)
// spfLookupBudget caps how many DNS lookups one SPF evaluation may spend on
// a/mx mechanisms. RFC 7208 allows a receiver ten; staying under the same
// ceiling keeps a hostile or careless record from turning a page view into a
// long chain of queries.
const spfLookupBudget = 10
// checkSPF reports whether the domain's SPF record authorises this server.
//
// This is deliberately a shallow check (documented as such in the README): it
// looks for a mechanism that literally covers the server's address —
// ip4:/ip6:, or a/mx resolving to it — and does not recurse into include: or
// redirect=, nor evaluate the record the way a receiver would. That is why a
// record which does not obviously cover us but does use include: is reported as
// a warning ("cannot tell") rather than a failure.
func (c *Checker) checkSPF(ctx context.Context, q Query) Result {
ips := parseIPs(q.ServerIPs)
if len(ips) == 0 {
return Result{
Status: health.StatusUnknown,
Detail: "The server's own address is not known (its hostname does not resolve), so SPF coverage cannot be checked. Fix the hostname/PTR check first.",
}
}
txt, found, err := c.lookupTXT(ctx, q.Name)
if err != nil {
return lookupFailed("the SPF record", err)
}
var records []string
for _, rec := range txt {
if isSPF(rec) {
records = append(records, strings.TrimSpace(rec))
}
}
switch {
case !found || len(records) == 0:
return Result{
Status: health.StatusError,
Detail: fmt.Sprintf("No SPF record is published for %s. Publish a TXT record such as %q — without it receivers have nothing authorising this server to send as the domain.", q.Name, SPFExample(q.Hostname, q.ServerIPs)),
}
case len(records) > 1:
return Result{
Status: health.StatusError,
Detail: fmt.Sprintf("More than one SPF record is published for %s. RFC 7208 allows exactly one; receivers treat several as a permanent error and the domain gets no SPF pass at all. Merge them into a single record.", q.Name),
Records: records,
}
}
matched, unfollowed := c.evaluateSPF(ctx, records[0], q.Name, ips)
switch {
case matched == "+all" || matched == "all":
return Result{
Status: health.StatusWarn,
Detail: "The SPF record ends with \"+all\", which authorises every server on the internet to send as this domain. Replace it with an explicit ip4:/ip6: or a mechanism plus \"-all\".",
Records: records,
}
case matched != "":
return Result{
Status: health.StatusOK,
Detail: fmt.Sprintf("The SPF record authorises this server through its %q mechanism.", matched),
Records: records,
}
case len(unfollowed) > 0:
return Result{
Status: health.StatusWarn,
Detail: fmt.Sprintf("No mechanism in the SPF record lists %s directly, but the record uses %s, which this check does not follow — the server may still be authorised through it. Verify with an external SPF validator, or add \"ip4:%s\" to be sure.",
ips[0], strings.Join(unfollowed, ", "), ips[0]),
Records: records,
}
default:
return Result{
Status: health.StatusError,
Detail: fmt.Sprintf("The SPF record does not authorise %s, so mail sent from this server fails SPF. Add \"ip4:%s\" (or an \"a\" mechanism resolving here) to the record.", ips[0], ips[0]),
Records: records,
}
}
}
// evaluateSPF walks the record's mechanisms, returning the first one that
// covers one of the server's addresses, plus the mechanisms this shallow check
// cannot resolve (include:/redirect=/exists:/ptr and anything past the lookup
// budget) so the caller can say "cannot tell" instead of "fails".
func (c *Checker) evaluateSPF(ctx context.Context, record, domainName string, ips []net.IP) (matched string, unfollowed []string) {
budget := spfLookupBudget
seenUnfollowed := make(map[string]bool)
note := func(kind string) {
if !seenUnfollowed[kind] {
seenUnfollowed[kind] = true
unfollowed = append(unfollowed, kind)
}
}
terms := strings.Fields(record)
if len(terms) > 0 {
terms = terms[1:] // drop the v=spf1 version token
}
for _, term := range terms {
qualifier, mech := splitQualifier(term)
lower := strings.ToLower(mech)
name, hasArg := mechanismArg(mech)
switch {
case strings.HasPrefix(lower, "ip4:"), strings.HasPrefix(lower, "ip6:"):
if qualifier != '+' {
continue
}
if coversAny(mech[4:], ips) {
return term, unfollowed
}
case lower == "a" || strings.HasPrefix(lower, "a:") || strings.HasPrefix(lower, "a/"):
if strings.Contains(mech, "/") { // prefix-length form: not evaluated
note("a/<prefix>")
continue
}
target := domainName
if hasArg {
target = name
}
if budget <= 0 {
note("further lookups")
continue
}
budget--
if qualifier == '+' && c.resolvesTo(ctx, target, ips) {
return term, unfollowed
}
case lower == "mx" || strings.HasPrefix(lower, "mx:") || strings.HasPrefix(lower, "mx/"):
if strings.Contains(mech, "/") {
note("mx/<prefix>")
continue
}
target := domainName
if hasArg {
target = name
}
if budget <= 0 {
note("further lookups")
continue
}
budget--
if qualifier == '+' && c.mxResolvesTo(ctx, target, ips, &budget) {
return term, unfollowed
}
case strings.HasPrefix(lower, "include:"):
note("include:")
case strings.HasPrefix(lower, "redirect="):
note("redirect=")
case strings.HasPrefix(lower, "exists:"):
note("exists:")
case lower == "ptr" || strings.HasPrefix(lower, "ptr:"):
note("ptr")
case lower == "all":
if qualifier == '+' {
return "+all", unfollowed
}
// "-all"/"~all"/"?all" terminates the record: nothing after it is
// evaluated by a receiver either.
return "", unfollowed
}
}
return "", unfollowed
}
// resolvesTo reports whether name resolves to one of the server's addresses.
func (c *Checker) resolvesTo(ctx context.Context, name string, ips []net.IP) bool {
addrs, err := c.resolver.LookupIPAddr(ctx, name)
if err != nil {
return false
}
for _, a := range addrs {
for _, ip := range ips {
if a.IP.Equal(ip) {
return true
}
}
}
return false
}
// mxResolvesTo reports whether any of name's MX hosts resolves to one of the
// server's addresses, spending at most the remaining lookup budget.
func (c *Checker) mxResolvesTo(ctx context.Context, name string, ips []net.IP, budget *int) bool {
mxs, err := c.resolver.LookupMX(ctx, name)
if err != nil {
return false
}
for _, mx := range mxs {
if *budget <= 0 {
return false
}
*budget--
if c.resolvesTo(ctx, strings.TrimSuffix(mx.Host, "."), ips) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// coversAny reports whether an ip4:/ip6: value — a bare address or a CIDR —
// contains one of the server's addresses.
func coversAny(value string, ips []net.IP) bool {
value = strings.TrimSpace(value)
if strings.Contains(value, "/") {
_, network, err := net.ParseCIDR(value)
if err != nil {
return false
}
for _, ip := range ips {
if network.Contains(ip) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
listed := net.ParseIP(value)
if listed == nil {
return false
}
for _, ip := range ips {
if listed.Equal(ip) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// splitQualifier peels the optional +/-/~/? qualifier off a mechanism,
// defaulting to "+" (pass) as RFC 7208 does.
func splitQualifier(term string) (byte, string) {
if term == "" {
return '+', ""
}
switch term[0] {
case '+', '-', '~', '?':
return term[0], term[1:]
default:
return '+', term
}
}
// mechanismArg returns the ":" argument of a mechanism, if it has one.
func mechanismArg(mech string) (string, bool) {
_, arg, found := strings.Cut(mech, ":")
if !found || arg == "" {
return "", false
}
return arg, true
}
// isSPF reports whether a TXT record is an SPF record (the version token must
// be the whole first term, so "v=spf10" is not one).
func isSPF(record string) bool {
rec := strings.TrimSpace(record)
if len(rec) < 6 || !strings.EqualFold(rec[:6], "v=spf1") {
return false
}
return len(rec) == 6 || rec[6] == ' ' || rec[6] == '\t'
}
// parseIPs converts the string addresses carried on a Query back into net.IPs,
// dropping anything unparsable.
func parseIPs(in []string) []net.IP {
var ips []net.IP
for _, s := range in {
if ip := net.ParseIP(s); ip != nil {
ips = append(ips, ip)
}
}
return ips
}