Files
selfpost/cmd/selfpost-backup/main_test.go
T
mix 5e5d157496 release: 0.5.0: Pre-1.0 security review, domain-admin role, doc consolidation
A bounce could be recorded as a successful delivery. The log-tailer's
Fixed:
  - A bounce could be recorded as a successful delivery. The log-tailer's
  - Log-tailer resumes where it stopped instead of jumping to end-of-file on
  - Level-2 rate limit no longer overshoots under concurrency: messages that
Changed:
  - The project has a single public home: `github.com/mixeme/selfpost`. Codeberg
  - Code comments no longer cite the archived specification. References like
  - `docs/code-review.md` is gone. Its plan is finished — phases 0 (bar the
  - `docs/architecture.md` gained a *Code layers* section: a diagram of
  - Phase 1 doc/code hygiene (`docs/code-review.md`): removed ~30 stale
  … (1 more in CHANGELOG)
Security:
  - Pre-release security review (plan § D, model Fable, 2026-08-06): full pass
  - `saslpasswd2` argv: the application login is now passed after a `--`
Added:
  - Optional password encryption for the two secret-bearing downloads (plan
  - Domain import accepts an encrypted export: the envelope is detected by its
  - `selfpost-backup` writes encrypted archives and reads them back:
  - `TestParseDelivery` covers the exotic mail.log shapes the review asked for
  - docs: README *Encrypting a backup or export*; `docs/security.md` §
  … (14 more in CHANGELOG)
Removed:
  - docs: `security.md` — accepted risk «restore old backup revives session rows»
Changed:
  - docs: `implementation-plan.md` trimmed to the sole open v1.x gate — pre-release
  - docs: `architecture.md` — sessions (SQLite, idle renew, password change),
  - docs: `development.md` — expanded e2e stack and `release.yml` matrix workflow.
  - docs: `security.md` — accepted risk for send-log rows stuck at `queued` after
  - docs: `roadmap.md` — optional send-log / `mail.log` follow-ups under v1.x tail.
  … (10 more in CHANGELOG)

Full detail: CHANGELOG.md (0.5.0).
2026-09-22 15:24:51 +03:00

140 lines
3.8 KiB
Go

package main
import (
"archive/tar"
"compress/gzip"
"io"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/store"
)
// seedDataDir builds the minimum /data tree a backup can be taken from.
func seedDataDir(t *testing.T) string {
t.Helper()
dataDir := t.TempDir()
st, err := store.Open(filepath.Join(dataDir, "selfpost.db"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("open store: %v", err)
}
if _, err := st.AddDomain("example.com", "selfpost"); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("add domain: %v", err)
}
if err := st.Close(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("close store: %v", err)
}
t.Setenv("SELFPOST_DATA_DIR", dataDir)
t.Setenv("SELFPOST_DB_PATH", filepath.Join(dataDir, "selfpost.db"))
return dataDir
}
// An encrypted backup is only worth having if the container it came from can
// hand it back as an ordinary archive during a restore, so the two halves of
// the CLI are tested as the one round trip an operator actually performs.
func TestEncryptedBackupRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
seedDataDir(t)
dir := t.TempDir()
encrypted := filepath.Join(dir, "backup.spbk")
plain := filepath.Join(dir, "backup.tar.gz")
const password = "a long enough password"
if err := run(encrypted, password); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create encrypted backup: %v", err)
}
head, err := os.ReadFile(encrypted)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read backup: %v", err)
}
if !strings.HasPrefix(string(head), "SELFPOST") {
t.Fatalf("encrypted backup does not start with the envelope magic")
}
if err := runDecrypt(encrypted, plain, "the wrong password"); err == nil {
t.Fatal("decryption with the wrong password succeeded")
}
if err := runDecrypt(encrypted, plain, password); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decrypt: %v", err)
}
// What comes out must be the same gzip tar the plain path produces.
f, err := os.Open(plain)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("open decrypted archive: %v", err)
}
defer f.Close()
gz, err := gzip.NewReader(f)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("gzip: %v", err)
}
names := map[string]bool{}
tr := tar.NewReader(gz)
for {
hdr, err := tr.Next()
if err == io.EOF {
break
}
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("tar: %v", err)
}
names[hdr.Name] = true
}
for _, want := range []string{"manifest.json", "selfpost.db"} {
if !names[want] {
t.Errorf("decrypted archive has no %s (entries: %v)", want, names)
}
}
}
// Without a password the CLI keeps producing the plain archive that existing
// backup scripts consume.
func TestUnencryptedBackupStaysPlain(t *testing.T) {
seedDataDir(t)
out := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "backup.tar.gz")
if err := run(out, ""); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create backup: %v", err)
}
f, err := os.Open(out)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("open archive: %v", err)
}
defer f.Close()
if _, err := gzip.NewReader(f); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("plain backup is not a gzip archive: %v", err)
}
}
// Decrypting needs a password, and it must come from a file or the environment
// — never an argument, which the process list would expose.
func TestReadPassword(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
pwFile := filepath.Join(dir, "pw")
if err := os.WriteFile(pwFile, []byte("from the file\nignored second line\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write password file: %v", err)
}
t.Setenv(passwordEnv, "from the environment")
got, err := readPassword("")
if err != nil || got != "from the environment" {
t.Errorf("readPassword(\"\") = %q, %v", got, err)
}
got, err = readPassword(pwFile)
if err != nil || got != "from the file" {
t.Errorf("readPassword(file) = %q, %v", got, err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(pwFile, nil, 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("truncate password file: %v", err)
}
if _, err := readPassword(pwFile); err == nil {
t.Error("an empty password file was accepted")
}
os.Unsetenv(passwordEnv)
if err := runDecrypt("", "", ""); err == nil {
t.Error("-decrypt without a password was accepted")
}
}