Files
selfpost/internal/web/web.go
T
mix c6eeb30258 Phase 4: applications + SASL (sasldb2) + sender_login_maps
Adds application accounts bound to domains: a SASL login/password in
sasldb2, a per-application address mode (wildcard @domain or an explicit
list), and matching smtpd_sender_login_maps bindings — with create,
list, edit-mode, delete and password regeneration (spec 4.1, 5.1,
7.2.5-9). Generated passwords are shown exactly once and never stored in
plaintext (7.6.1).

- internal/store/applications.go: transactional CRUD; globally unique
  login; ListBindings (address->login) as the map source; logins-by-
  domain for pre-cascade SASL cleanup.
- internal/app: saslpasswd2 wrapper (password via stdin, login as a
  whitelisted argv element, no shell — 7.6.3); strong base64url password;
  address validation that enforces domain ownership before any config
  write (7.6.2); service orchestrating store + sasldb2 + map with full
  rollback on partial failure.
- internal/postfix: sender_login_maps regenerated as a pure function of
  the registry (many-to-one logins merged per address), atomic write,
  injection backstop (7.6.4).
- Postfix reload, corrected: `postfix start-fg` forks a separate master,
  so signalling the supervised process never reaches it. Reload now runs
  the canonical `postfix reload` via a one-shot supervisord program the
  unprivileged panel triggers over the group control socket. Verified in
  mail.log.
- domain.Service.Delete purges the domain's SASL accounts, then cascades,
  then rebuilds the sender map and reloads; manual reload now covers both
  OpenDKIM and Postfix.
- web: application management in the domain page, one-time credential
  shown inline; postfix joins the selfpost group and entrypoint normalises
  /data/sasl and /data/postfix (setgid, group-readable) with self-heal.

Verified on the dev server: gofmt/vet/test green, image builds, and a
container e2e covers the full application lifecycle, domain-delete
cascade, restart persistence, and a real postfix reload.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-12 21:18:10 +03:00

136 lines
4.6 KiB
Go

// Package web implements the SelfPost control panel's HTTP surface: the
// one-time administrator setup flow (spec 7.6.1), login/session handling
// (spec 7.6.5-6) and the authenticated shell the later phases build on.
package web
import (
"embed"
"log"
"net"
"net/http"
"time"
"codeberg.org/mix/selfpost/internal/app"
"codeberg.org/mix/selfpost/internal/domain"
"codeberg.org/mix/selfpost/internal/store"
)
//go:embed templates/*.html static/*
var assetsFS embed.FS
// Config holds the panel's HTTP-facing configuration.
type Config struct {
// Hostname is the server's external hostname, used to build the absolute
// setup link shown in the logs (spec 7.6.1, 8: SELFPOST_HOSTNAME).
Hostname string
// CookieSecure sets the Secure attribute on the session cookie. It defaults
// to true (spec 7.6.6); it exists as a knob only so the panel can be tested
// over plain HTTP in development, never for production.
CookieSecure bool
}
// Server is the panel HTTP application.
type Server struct {
store *store.Store
domains *domain.Service
apps *app.Service
cfg Config
tmpl *templates
sessions *sessionStore
setup *setupManager
loginLimiter *rateLimiter
setupLimiter *rateLimiter
}
// New builds the panel server. setupTokenPath is where the current setup token
// is mirrored on disk (spec 7.6.1); domains is the sending-domain service that
// owns DKIM keys and the OpenDKIM tables (spec 6); apps owns application SASL
// accounts and the Postfix sender map (spec 5.1).
func New(st *store.Store, domains *domain.Service, apps *app.Service, cfg Config, setupTokenPath string) (*Server, error) {
tmpl, err := loadTemplates()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
s := &Server{
store: st,
domains: domains,
apps: apps,
cfg: cfg,
tmpl: tmpl,
sessions: newSessionStore(),
// Setup: a handful of attempts per minute per IP is plenty for a
// legitimate admin and blunts automated probing (spec 7.6.1).
setupLimiter: newRateLimiter(10, time.Minute),
// Login: throttle brute-force by IP (spec 7.6.5).
loginLimiter: newRateLimiter(10, 15*time.Minute),
}
s.setup = newSetupManager(st, cfg.Hostname, setupTokenPath)
return s, nil
}
// Start performs first-run bootstrapping: if there is no administrator yet, it
// generates and announces the setup link (spec 7.6.1). Safe to call once at
// server startup.
func (s *Server) Start() error {
return s.setup.bootstrap()
}
// Handler returns the panel's HTTP handler (router).
func (s *Server) Handler() http.Handler {
mux := http.NewServeMux()
// Health check stays unauthenticated for the container/orchestrator.
mux.HandleFunc("/healthz", handleHealth)
// Vendored static assets (HTMX). Served from the embedded FS.
mux.Handle("/static/", http.FileServer(http.FS(assetsFS)))
// One-time administrator setup (spec 7.6.1).
mux.HandleFunc("/setup/", s.handleSetup)
// Authentication.
mux.HandleFunc("/login", s.handleLogin)
mux.HandleFunc("/logout", s.handleLogout)
// Authenticated panel. Everything not matched by a more specific pattern
// above falls through to this sub-mux, wrapped once in the auth middleware.
authed := http.NewServeMux()
authed.HandleFunc("GET /{$}", s.handleDashboard)
authed.HandleFunc("POST /domains", s.handleAddDomain)
authed.HandleFunc("GET /domains/{id}", s.handleDomainDetail)
authed.HandleFunc("GET /domains/{id}/delete", s.handleDeleteConfirm)
authed.HandleFunc("POST /domains/{id}/delete", s.handleDeleteDomain)
authed.HandleFunc("POST /domains/{id}/applications", s.handleAddApplication)
authed.HandleFunc("POST /applications/{aid}/mode", s.handleUpdateAppMode)
authed.HandleFunc("POST /applications/{aid}/password", s.handleRegenPassword)
authed.HandleFunc("POST /applications/{aid}/delete", s.handleDeleteApplication)
authed.HandleFunc("POST /reload", s.handleReload)
mux.Handle("/", s.requireAuth(authed))
return mux
}
func handleHealth(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain; charset=utf-8")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte("ok\n"))
}
// clientIP extracts the peer IP for rate-limiting. It uses the transport peer
// (RemoteAddr), not client-supplied headers, so it cannot be spoofed; behind a
// reverse proxy this is the proxy address, which is an acceptable backstop for
// a single-admin panel.
func clientIP(r *http.Request) string {
host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr)
if err != nil {
return r.RemoteAddr
}
return host
}
// logf is a thin wrapper so handlers log with a consistent prefix.
func logf(format string, args ...any) {
log.Printf(format, args...)
}