82ec287ba1
Sessions move from an in-memory map (absolute 12h TTL) to a `sessions` table (migration 0002), storing only the SHA-256 of the token. Expiry is now a sliding idle window (PANEL_SESSION_IDLE_DAYS, default 7, no absolute cap), extended at most once an hour and never by the monitoring screens' background polling (GET + HX-Request), so a forgotten open tab doesn't keep a session alive indefinitely. A login now survives a container restart or redeploy. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
124 lines
7.8 KiB
Markdown
124 lines
7.8 KiB
Markdown
# Changelog
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All notable changes to this project are documented here.
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Format follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/); versioning follows [SemVer](https://semver.org/).
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## [Unreleased]
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- panel: login sessions now persist in SQLite instead of memory, so an
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administrator's login survives a container restart or redeploy. Only the
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SHA-256 of the session token is stored, never the token itself. The
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absolute 12-hour TTL is replaced by a **sliding idle timeout**
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(`PANEL_SESSION_IDLE_DAYS`, default 7 days, no absolute cap): the
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monitoring screens' background polling does not count as activity, so a
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forgotten open tab does not keep a session alive forever. Changing the
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password still signs out every other session.
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- panel: security headers on every response — `Content-Security-Policy`,
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`X-Content-Type-Options`, `X-Frame-Options`, `Referrer-Policy`, and
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`Strict-Transport-Security` where the deployment is HTTPS-only. They are
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emitted by the panel itself, so the reverse proxy still needs no security
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configuration of its own.
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- panel: state-changing requests are now checked against the panel's own
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origin (`Sec-Fetch-Site`, falling back to `Origin` vs `Host`). This closes
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cross-site request forgery from a *neighbouring host on the same domain* —
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a CMS or a forgotten staging subdomain next to the panel — which the session
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cookie's `SameSite=Lax` counts as same-site and therefore cannot stop. A
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request that sends neither header is still let through, so genuinely ancient
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browsers keep working. **The reverse proxy must pass the original `Host`
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header through** (every shipped fragment already does); one that rewrites it
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makes the panel refuse every form submission, and the log line names both
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the `Origin` and the `Host` it compared.
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- panel: the session cookie is now named `__Host-selfpost_session` wherever it
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is `Secure` (the standard deployment), which makes the browser enforce that
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no other host can set or overwrite it. **Upgrading signs the administrator
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out once.** With `PANEL_COOKIE_SECURE=false` the old name is kept, because
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the prefix is invalid without TLS. Signing out clears both names.
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- panel: if a request arrives with two cookies of the session cookie's name —
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what a neighbouring host does when it overwrites the session — the request
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counts as signed out and the log says so, instead of the panel silently
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picking the other host's value and looping back to the login form forever.
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- panel: the layout's stylesheet moved to `/static/panel.css` and the
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confirmation prompts on destructive buttons moved into `/static/panel.js`.
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No visible change; the panel's CSP allows no inline script or style, and
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this is what keeps that policy free of exemptions.
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- docs: the first-run setup link is also written to `/data/setup-token`
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(`0600`) — documented in the README as the way to read it without the token
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passing through a container-log pipeline.
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- panel: new **Status** page — supervised processes, mail queue, TLS
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certificate expiry, milter sockets and the server's own hostname/reverse-DNS
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(FCrDNS) check — and it is now the panel's landing page. The local checks
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refresh by polling; the DNS lookup is cached with a *Re-check* button.
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- panel: the domain page shows a **DNS status** card: the published DKIM record
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compared against the key this server actually signs with, plus SPF and DMARC.
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The SPF check is deliberately shallow — it looks for a mechanism literally
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covering this server's address and does not follow `include:`/`redirect=`, so
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a record that authorises the server through an include is reported as "cannot
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tell", not as a failure.
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- panel: the domain list moved from `/` to `/domains`; `/` redirects to the
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status page. The **Reload** button moved from the domain list to the status
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page and now explains what it regenerates and when to use it.
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- fix: the panel could never read the mail queue in the documented deployment.
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`postqueue` relies on its setgid-`postdrop` bit, which `no-new-privileges`
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(set in the shipped compose file) disables, so the *Queue* screen always said
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"Could not read the mail queue". The `panel` user is now a real member of
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`postdrop`.
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- panel: navigation bar is now rendered once from the shared layout, so every
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authenticated page has it — including the domain page and the delete
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confirmation, which had no navigation links at all — and the current page is
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highlighted instead of silently missing from the list.
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- panel: new *Account* page to change the administrator's username and/or
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password (the current password is required, throttled on the same limiter as
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the login form). Changing the password invalidates all other sessions.
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- panel: *Backup & migration* moved off the domain list onto its own *Backup*
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page, with the full backup and the domain import as two separate cards.
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- panel: the domain page now shows the *Sending server settings* (server,
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port and encryption) needed to configure a mail client; port 587 is listed
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only when `SUBMISSION_ENABLE=true` for this deployment.
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- panel: *Copy* buttons on the DKIM record, on a newly issued application
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login/password and on the sending server name.
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- panel: the *Addresses* field is hidden while an application's address mode is
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*Any address of the domain*, where the server ignores it.
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- ci: disable provenance attestation on release image push, so the ghcr.io
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manifest list shows only `linux/amd64`/`linux/arm64` (no `unknown/unknown`).
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- ci: run `go vet` and `go test ./...` on every push to `main` and every pull
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request, not only the image build on a release tag.
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- security: optionally honour `X-Forwarded-For` for login/setup rate-limiting
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when the request's direct peer is in the new `TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDR` list,
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giving real per-client limits behind a reverse proxy instead of one global
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bucket. Unset by default (unchanged `RemoteAddr`-only behaviour).
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## [0.1.0] - 2026-07-15
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Initial feature-complete implementation of the v1.0 specification (phases 0-11
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of `docs/implementation-plan.md`).
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### Added
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- Panel (Go, single static binary) with SQLite persistence, one-time
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crypto-random setup link, bcrypt admin auth, session cookies.
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- Domain management with per-domain DKIM (RSA-2048, generated in pure Go) and
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OpenDKIM KeyTable/SigningTable regeneration + privilege-safe reload.
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- Application (sender identity) management: SASL credentials via `sasldb2`,
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`smtpd_sender_login_maps` enforcing sender/domain ownership, no open relay.
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- Full Postfix relay config generated from env at container start: SMTPS 465,
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optional STARTTLS submission 587, SASL auth, TLS for outbound delivery,
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anvil-based rate limiting (level 1).
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- Journal milter (pure Go, `go-milter`) recording every send to `send_log`;
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fail-open by design so a milter fault never blocks mail.
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- Monitoring UI: send log, Postfix queue, and mail.log tail, all
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HTMX-polling, HTML-escaped.
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- Per-domain/per-application sending rate limit (level 2), enforced in the
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journal milter at `MAIL FROM`, fail-open on the limiter's own errors.
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- Full backup/restore (`tar.gz` of `/data`, consistent SQLite snapshot via
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`VACUUM INTO`) with a version guard that refuses to start on a
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manifest/binary version mismatch. Per-domain export/import for moving a
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single domain between hosts without re-issuing DNS records.
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- Deployment: Docker image + compose, reverse-proxy fragments for Apache
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(default), nginx, Caddy, and Traefik; CI workflow publishing tagged,
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multi-arch images to `ghcr.io` on `vX.Y.Z` tags.
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- Security pass against spec 7.6 (exec safety, config-write sanitization,
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server-side validation, rate limiting, session/cookie hardening, output
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escaping, non-root panel) — full compliance, no code changes required.
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- Live production deployment on `selfpost.mixfed.ru` with a real Let's
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Encrypt certificate; end-to-end delivery confirmed (DKIM pass, SPF pass).
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