A bounce could be recorded as a successful delivery. The log-tailer's Fixed: - A bounce could be recorded as a successful delivery. The log-tailer's - Log-tailer resumes where it stopped instead of jumping to end-of-file on - Level-2 rate limit no longer overshoots under concurrency: messages that Changed: - The project has a single public home: `github.com/mixeme/selfpost`. Codeberg - Code comments no longer cite the archived specification. References like - `docs/code-review.md` is gone. Its plan is finished — phases 0 (bar the - `docs/architecture.md` gained a *Code layers* section: a diagram of - Phase 1 doc/code hygiene (`docs/code-review.md`): removed ~30 stale … (1 more in CHANGELOG) Security: - Pre-release security review (plan § D, model Fable, 2026-08-06): full pass - `saslpasswd2` argv: the application login is now passed after a `--` Added: - Optional password encryption for the two secret-bearing downloads (plan - Domain import accepts an encrypted export: the envelope is detected by its - `selfpost-backup` writes encrypted archives and reads them back: - `TestParseDelivery` covers the exotic mail.log shapes the review asked for - docs: README *Encrypting a backup or export*; `docs/security.md` § … (14 more in CHANGELOG) Removed: - docs: `security.md` — accepted risk «restore old backup revives session rows» Changed: - docs: `implementation-plan.md` trimmed to the sole open v1.x gate — pre-release - docs: `architecture.md` — sessions (SQLite, idle renew, password change), - docs: `development.md` — expanded e2e stack and `release.yml` matrix workflow. - docs: `security.md` — accepted risk for send-log rows stuck at `queued` after - docs: `roadmap.md` — optional send-log / `mail.log` follow-ups under v1.x tail. … (10 more in CHANGELOG) Full detail: CHANGELOG.md (0.5.0).
142 lines
4.8 KiB
Go
142 lines
4.8 KiB
Go
package web
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import (
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"crypto/sha256"
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"encoding/hex"
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"time"
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"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/store"
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)
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// renewThreshold bounds how often an active session's expiry is written back
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// to the database. Renewing on every request would mean a write (and a new
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// Set-Cookie) per click; renewing at most once an hour keeps that cost low
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// while still keeping a busy admin's session alive indefinitely (plan B.1).
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const renewThreshold = time.Hour
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// sessionStore persists login sessions in the database (plan B.1): a login
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// survives a container restart or redeploy. Only the SHA-256 of the token is
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// stored, never the token itself (security.md's crypto-random bearer token), so
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// a stolen database file or backup archive cannot be replayed as a session —
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// it only extends the login of whichever browser still holds the original
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// cookie.
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type sessionStore struct {
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store *store.Store
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// idle is the sliding inactivity window (PANEL_SESSION_IDLE_DAYS). There is
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// no absolute cap: an administrator who keeps coming back stays signed in
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// indefinitely, deliberately.
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idle time.Duration
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}
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func newSessionStore(st *store.Store, idle time.Duration) *sessionStore {
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return &sessionStore{store: st, idle: idle}
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}
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// MaxAge is the session cookie's Max-Age in seconds, kept equal to the
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// sliding idle window so the browser drops the cookie no later than the
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// server would have expired it anyway.
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func (s *sessionStore) MaxAge() int {
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return int(s.idle.Seconds())
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}
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func hashToken(token string) string {
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sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(token))
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return hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
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}
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// Create issues a new session for username and returns its token.
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func (s *sessionStore) Create(username string) string {
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token := randomToken(32)
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now := time.Now()
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if err := s.store.CreateSession(hashToken(token), username, now.Add(s.idle)); err != nil {
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logf("panel: session: create failed: %v", err)
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}
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// Opportunistic cleanup: a session nobody ever came back to otherwise sits
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// in the table forever. Piggybacking on Create (the one write every login
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// already pays for) avoids a dedicated background sweep for what is, on a
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// single-admin panel, a handful of rows at most.
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if _, err := s.store.DeleteExpiredSessions(now); err != nil {
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logf("panel: session: prune expired failed: %v", err)
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}
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return token
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}
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// Lookup returns the session username for a token if it exists and is
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// unexpired.
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func (s *sessionStore) Lookup(token string) (string, bool) {
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if token == "" {
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return "", false
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}
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hash := hashToken(token)
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row, found, err := s.store.LookupSession(hash)
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if err != nil {
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logf("panel: session: lookup failed: %v", err)
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return "", false
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}
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if !found {
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return "", false
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}
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if time.Now().After(row.ExpiresAt) {
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if err := s.store.DeleteSession(hash); err != nil {
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logf("panel: session: delete expired failed: %v", err)
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}
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return "", false
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}
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return row.Username, true
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}
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// Touch extends a session's sliding expiry if it has been at least
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// renewThreshold since the last extension, and reports whether it did so —
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// the caller uses that to decide whether the response needs a fresh
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// Set-Cookie. It assumes the caller has just confirmed the session is valid
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// (e.g. via Lookup); it does nothing for a token that no longer exists.
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func (s *sessionStore) Touch(token string) bool {
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hash := hashToken(token)
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row, found, err := s.store.LookupSession(hash)
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if err != nil {
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logf("panel: session: touch lookup failed: %v", err)
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return false
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}
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if !found {
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return false
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}
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// expiresAt = lastRenewal + idle, so this recovers when the session was
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// last extended without a separate column.
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lastRenewal := row.ExpiresAt.Add(-s.idle)
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now := time.Now()
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if now.Sub(lastRenewal) < renewThreshold {
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return false
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}
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if err := s.store.RenewSession(hash, now.Add(s.idle)); err != nil {
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logf("panel: session: renew failed: %v", err)
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return false
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}
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return true
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}
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// Rename updates the username carried by a session, keeping its expiry. It is
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// used when the administrator renames their own account so the current
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// session keeps working under the new name.
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func (s *sessionStore) Rename(token, username string) {
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if err := s.store.RenameSession(hashToken(token), username); err != nil {
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logf("panel: session: rename failed: %v", err)
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}
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}
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// DestroyOthers invalidates every session except keep. It is called when the
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// administrator changes their password: a stolen cookie issued under the old
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// password must stop working, while the admin performing the change stays
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// signed in.
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func (s *sessionStore) DestroyOthers(keep string) {
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if err := s.store.DeleteOtherSessions(hashToken(keep)); err != nil {
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logf("panel: session: destroy others failed: %v", err)
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}
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}
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// Destroy invalidates a session token (logout).
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func (s *sessionStore) Destroy(token string) {
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if err := s.store.DeleteSession(hashToken(token)); err != nil {
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logf("panel: session: destroy failed: %v", err)
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}
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}
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