mix
bf477f4e6a
Add/list/delete of sending domains with per-domain DKIM keys and the OpenDKIM tables that drive signing (spec 6, 7.2.2-4, 7.2.10). internal/domain: - Pure-Go RSA-2048 keygen; PKCS#1 PEM written atomically at 0640; the published DNS TXT record is derived from the key on disk (single source of truth) rather than persisted. No os/exec for key generation. - KeyTable/SigningTable fully regenerated from the registry on every add/delete (idempotent), written atomically; SigningTable via refile: with *@domain, KeyTable with absolute key paths. Table writer refuses any unsafe character as a backstop (spec 7.6.4). - Reload without root: the unprivileged panel signals OpenDKIM through supervisord (`supervisorctl signal USR1 opendkim`, fixed args, no shell, no user input — spec 7.6.3). An existing key is reused, never overwritten, so re-adding a domain keeps its published DNS valid. - Service orchestrates registry -> key -> table rebuild -> reload, with rollback of the row if a downstream step fails; delete cascades apps via the DB FK and removes the key + table entries. Infra: - Shared `selfpost` group bridges panel (writes keys) and opendkim (reads them); /data/opendkim is setgid so panel-created files inherit the group, keys are 0640, RequireSafeKeys is disabled by design. - opendkim.conf moves from verify-only (Mode v) to signing (Mode s). - entrypoint.sh normalises the DKIM tree on every start (ownership, setgid, perms, empty tables before opendkim starts) — self-healing after a restore. - supervisord control socket opened to the `selfpost` group so the panel can request the reload. web/store: - Strict domain-name validation (whitelist [a-z0-9.-], DNS shape, >=2 labels), lower-case normalisation (spec 7.6.2). - Domain queries with application counts; delete relies on ON DELETE CASCADE. Dashboard lists domains + add form; domain page shows the DKIM record; a dedicated confirm page warns about the app cascade before deletion (spec 7.2.4); manual reload button (spec 7.2.12, OpenDKIM side; Postfix reload lands in Phase 5). - Authenticated routes moved to a sub-mux using Go 1.22 method/wildcard patterns. Tests: validateDomain, DKIM keygen/record roundtrip, table rendering + injection-safety, key reuse, store cascade. Verified on the dev server: gofmt/vet/test green, image builds, container e2e (add/delete a domain, DKIM record shown, OpenDKIM reads panel keys and reloads, keys and tables persist across a restart). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
31 lines
1.4 KiB
Plaintext
31 lines
1.4 KiB
Plaintext
# OpenDKIM — per-domain signing (spec 6).
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#
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# Signing is strictly per-domain: each sending domain has its own key pair and
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# selector. The panel generates keys under /data/opendkim/keys/<domain>/ and
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# keeps KeyTable/SigningTable in sync as domains are added or removed, then asks
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# supervisord to send this process SIGUSR1 to reload the tables (spec 6.2, 6.5).
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#
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# Both table files are created (empty) by entrypoint.sh before OpenDKIM starts,
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# so the daemon comes up cleanly on a fresh /data with no domains yet and simply
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# signs nothing until the first domain is added.
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Syslog no
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UMask 007
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Mode s
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# SigningTable uses refile: so the "*@example.com" left-hand patterns match any
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# local-part for a domain; KeyTable maps each domain to its key and selector.
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KeyTable /data/opendkim/KeyTable
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SigningTable refile:/data/opendkim/SigningTable
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# The private keys are owned by `panel` and read by `opendkim` through the shared
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# `selfpost` group, so they are deliberately group-readable (mode 0640). That is
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# safe on this single-tenant, private bind mount, but it trips OpenDKIM's default
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# key-safety check, so the check is disabled here by design.
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RequireSafeKeys no
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Socket local:/run/opendkim/opendkim.sock
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PidFile /run/opendkim/opendkim.pid
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UserID opendkim
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Background no
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