Files
selfpost/internal/web/auth/ratelimit.go
T
mixandClaude Opus 5.5 e9d2cbbe28 findings of the security review of stage 0
The review of 2c27275..2c8e981 (read-only, a separate agent) found no high
or medium; three small ones, fixed here:

- reauth took a limiter attempt before the compare, right password
  included: with A2 asking on every user save, ten saves in fifteen
  minutes locked the administrator out of Account's password change, the
  backup and the export. A right password now gives its attempt back
  (rateLimiter.Refund, Module.PasswordCheckPassed; a bucket already at its
  limit stays blocked). TestRightAccountPasswordsDoNotUseUpTheLimit.
- LoggedPath hid the tokens of /login/reset/ and /confirm/ but not of the
  first administrator's /setup/<token>; now it does (test case added).
- The entrypoint's own `[ -e ] || : >` lines (sender_login_maps, the four
  inbound maps, mail.log) get the `[ -L ]` guard postfix-config.sh got for
  I2. Safe before too - drop_links runs first on those paths and the panel
  is not running yet - this is the belt and braces.

The review also confirmed, with a probe of the regex against Postfix's
formats, that a port-25 client can place only its own envelope in an
Inbound log row, and that every path to a password, e-mail or role asks
for the signed-in password.

go test ./internal/web/handlers ./internal/web/auth; sh -n entrypoint.sh.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-17 21:58:38 +03:00

147 lines
3.7 KiB
Go

package auth
import (
"sync"
"time"
)
const defaultMaxBuckets = 4096
// blockedBucketCeiling is how far past maxBuckets the map may grow while every
// bucket in it is blocked. Blocked buckets are normally protected from
// eviction (see evictNearest), but protecting them unconditionally would let
// an attacker with many source addresses grow the map without bound — each
// address only has to fail max times. Past the ceiling blocked buckets are
// evicted too, nearest expiry first: bounded memory wins over holding every
// block, and the addresses that lose their bucket have to spend max attempts
// again to get back to blocked.
const blockedBucketCeiling = 4
// rateLimiter is a simple fixed-window per-key counter used to throttle the
// setup and login routes (security.md). Keys are client IPs.
type rateLimiter struct {
max int
window time.Duration
maxBuckets int
mu sync.Mutex
buckets map[string]*rlBucket
lastOverflow time.Time
}
type rlBucket struct {
count int
windowEnds time.Time
}
func newRateLimiter(max int, window time.Duration) *rateLimiter {
return &rateLimiter{
max: max,
window: window,
maxBuckets: defaultMaxBuckets,
buckets: make(map[string]*rlBucket),
}
}
func (r *rateLimiter) startSweeper() {
go func() {
ticker := time.NewTicker(r.window)
defer ticker.Stop()
for range ticker.C {
r.mu.Lock()
r.sweep(time.Now())
r.mu.Unlock()
}
}()
}
func (r *rateLimiter) Allow(key string) bool {
now := time.Now()
r.mu.Lock()
defer r.mu.Unlock()
b := r.buckets[key]
if b == nil || now.After(b.windowEnds) {
r.makeRoom(now)
r.buckets[key] = &rlBucket{count: 1, windowEnds: now.Add(r.window)}
r.sweep(now)
return true
}
if b.count >= r.max {
return false
}
b.count++
return true
}
// Refund gives back the attempt Allow took for key, for an attempt that
// turned out not to be a guess (a right password). A bucket already at its
// limit stays there: a refund never unblocks.
func (r *rateLimiter) Refund(key string) {
r.mu.Lock()
defer r.mu.Unlock()
if b := r.buckets[key]; b != nil && b.count > 0 && b.count < r.max {
b.count--
}
}
func (r *rateLimiter) makeRoom(now time.Time) {
if r.maxBuckets <= 0 || len(r.buckets) < r.maxBuckets {
return
}
r.sweep(now)
hardCap := r.maxBuckets * blockedBucketCeiling
for len(r.buckets) >= r.maxBuckets {
if r.evictNearest(false) {
continue
}
// Nothing evictable is left: every remaining bucket is blocked. Hold
// them until the map reaches the hard ceiling, then start evicting
// blocked buckets as well so memory stays bounded.
if len(r.buckets) < hardCap {
break
}
if !r.evictNearest(true) {
break
}
if now.Sub(r.lastOverflow) >= r.window {
r.lastOverflow = now
logf("panel: login rate limiter holds %d blocked buckets (cap %d) — evicting blocked entries; "+
"this means many distinct client addresses are failing authentication", len(r.buckets), r.maxBuckets)
}
}
}
// evictNearest removes the bucket whose window ends soonest and reports whether
// it removed one. Blocked buckets (count >= max) are skipped unless evictBlocked
// is set, so an attacker cannot flush active rate-limit state by filling the map
// with new keys.
func (r *rateLimiter) evictNearest(evictBlocked bool) bool {
var bestKey string
var bestEnds time.Time
first := true
for k, b := range r.buckets {
if !evictBlocked && b.count >= r.max {
continue
}
if first || b.windowEnds.Before(bestEnds) {
bestKey = k
bestEnds = b.windowEnds
first = false
}
}
if bestKey == "" {
return false
}
delete(r.buckets, bestKey)
return true
}
func (r *rateLimiter) sweep(now time.Time) {
for k, b := range r.buckets {
if now.After(b.windowEnds) {
delete(r.buckets, k)
}
}
}