Files
selfpost/internal/app/validate.go
T
mixandClaude Opus 5.5 b113e72c71 milter, postfix, app, domain: cite the source of what they rely on (assumptions part B)
Comments only, no behaviour changed. go-milter v0.4.1 (session.go: one
session per connection, replaced after a non-continue reply; macros per
stage), Postfix 3.7.11 (milter8.c, smtpd_check.c
reject_auth_sender_login_mismatch(), mail_addr_find.c, showq_compat.c,
mail_conf_time.c, mail_params.h), Cyrus SASL 2.1.28 (saslpasswd.c,
plugins/sasldb.c: deleting a missing login is not an error), OpenDKIM
2.11.0~beta2 (opendkim-db.c, opendkim-genkey), Berkeley DB 5.3 db_dump,
rspamd 3.11.0. Comments that claimed what the source denies are corrected
(sasldb keeps the password as given, not hashed; an embedded newline is
kept, not truncated; rspamd sorts symbols by absolute weight); fixtures say
seen or composed. The sender check's From: parsing gets no citations: it is
replaced by the port of OpenDKIM's dkim_mail_parse next.

Contradictions left for their own commits: B-G5 cleanAddress, B-PS1 first
key wins, B-PQ1 the forced-expire flag, B-PQ10/PQ11 Postfix's time units.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-14 19:36:12 +03:00

169 lines
6.1 KiB
Go

package app
import (
"fmt"
"strings"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/store"
)
const (
minLoginLen = 3
maxLoginLen = 64
)
// ValidationError is a refusal of what was submitted: its text says what the
// administrator must fix and is written to be shown on the page. Any other
// error from this package (a failed write, a failed reload) is not, and the
// caller must not put its text in front of a user.
type ValidationError struct{ msg string }
func (e *ValidationError) Error() string { return e.msg }
func invalid(format string, args ...any) error {
return &ValidationError{msg: fmt.Sprintf(format, args...)}
}
// foldLogin is a new application's login as it is stored: in lower case
// (audit 2026-10-12, H4; owner: fold, do not refuse). Postfix compares the
// SASL login with the sender map's without regard to case, so two logins
// that differ only in case would be one sender to Postfix and two
// applications to the panel. The store refuses such a pair as well
// (idx_applications_login_nocase); a login imported from another instance is
// not folded, since its SASL account and its client use it as it is.
//
// Postfix 3.7.11, src/smtpd/smtpd_check.c, reject_auth_sender_login_mismatch():
// the SASL login is compared with each owner by strcasecmp_utf8().
func foldLogin(login string) string {
return strings.ToLower(login)
}
// validateLogin enforces a strict server-side whitelist for the SASL login
// (security.md). It intentionally excludes '@': the login is stored in sasldb2,
// where '@' separates the user from the realm, so allowing it would change the
// account's identity. Client validation is never trusted. (Cyrus SASL 2.1.28,
// common/plugin_common.c, _plug_parseuser(): a login is split into user and
// realm at its first "@", for saslpasswd2's store and for the lookup alike.)
//
// The login is the one piece of user input that is passed to saslpasswd2 as a
// command argument (never through a shell, security.md); this whitelist is what
// makes that safe.
func validateLogin(login string) error {
if len(login) < minLoginLen || len(login) > maxLoginLen {
return invalid("login must be %d-%d characters", minLoginLen, maxLoginLen)
}
for _, r := range login {
lower := r >= 'a' && r <= 'z'
upper := r >= 'A' && r <= 'Z'
digit := r >= '0' && r <= '9'
if !lower && !upper && !digit && r != '.' && r != '-' && r != '_' {
return invalid("login may contain only letters, digits, '.', '-' and '_'")
}
}
return nil
}
// validateImportedPassword guards a password taken from a domain-export file
// (architecture.md § Persistence) before it is written to sasldb2. Our own
// exports carry base64url passwords, but the file is untrusted input, so we
// reject an empty value or one containing control characters — saslpasswd2
// reads the passphrase from stdin and a newline would silently truncate it
// (security.md).
func validateImportedPassword(password string) error {
if password == "" {
return invalid("imported application password is empty")
}
if len(password) > 1024 {
return invalid("imported application password is too long")
}
for _, r := range password {
if r < 0x20 || r == 0x7f {
return invalid("imported application password contains control characters")
}
}
return nil
}
// validateAddressMode checks the submitted mode is one of the two known values.
func validateAddressMode(mode string) error {
if mode != store.AddressModeWildcard && mode != store.AddressModeList {
return invalid("invalid address mode")
}
return nil
}
// normalizeAddress lower-cases and trims a sender address. Both the local part
// and domain are treated case-insensitively for the ownership check and for the
// generated map, matching how addresses are compared elsewhere.
func normalizeAddress(addr string) string {
return strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(addr))
}
// validateSenderAddress enforces that a list-mode address is well-formed and,
// critically, belongs to the application's own domain (security.md). The domain
// check is done here, before anything is written to a config file — not left to
// smtpd_sender_login_maps to catch at delivery time. domain must already be a
// validated, normalised domain name.
func validateSenderAddress(addr, domain string) error {
at := strings.LastIndexByte(addr, '@')
if at < 0 {
return invalid("%q is not a valid email address", addr)
}
local, host := addr[:at], addr[at+1:]
if host != domain {
return invalid("%q does not belong to domain %s", addr, domain)
}
if err := validateLocalPart(local); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("%q: %w", addr, err)
}
return nil
}
// validateLocalPart applies a conservative whitelist to the part before '@'.
// This is deliberately stricter than RFC 5321 (no quoted local parts) so the
// value is always safe to write verbatim into the Postfix map (security.md).
func validateLocalPart(local string) error {
if local == "" {
return invalid("missing the part before '@'")
}
if local[0] == '.' || local[len(local)-1] == '.' {
return invalid("local part must not start or end with '.'")
}
for i := 0; i < len(local); i++ {
c := local[i]
lower := c >= 'a' && c <= 'z'
digit := c >= '0' && c <= '9'
if !lower && !digit && c != '.' && c != '-' && c != '_' && c != '+' {
return invalid("local part may contain only lower-case letters, digits, '.', '-', '_' and '+'")
}
}
return nil
}
// parseAddresses normalises, validates and de-duplicates a list of submitted
// sender addresses for a list-mode application. It requires at least one address
// and that each belongs to domain. The returned slice is de-duplicated but keeps
// submission order stable for display; the store sorts on read.
func parseAddresses(raw []string, domain string) ([]string, error) {
seen := make(map[string]bool)
out := make([]string, 0, len(raw))
for _, r := range raw {
addr := normalizeAddress(r)
if addr == "" {
continue
}
if err := validateSenderAddress(addr, domain); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if seen[addr] {
continue
}
seen[addr] = true
out = append(out, addr)
}
if len(out) == 0 {
return nil, invalid("list mode requires at least one address")
}
return out, nil
}