Files
selfpost/internal/web/handlers_backup.go
T
mix 6a7d010868 feat: optional password encryption for backup and domain export (code-review.md § Phase 1.5)
Both secret-bearing downloads can now be sealed with a password. Unticked, the
forms produce exactly the files they did before.

- internal/secretfile: envelope format — magic/type/scrypt params/salt/nonce
  prefix header, then 64 KiB AES-256-GCM chunks each authenticated with the
  header, its counter and an end-of-stream flag, so truncation, reordering and
  tampering fail to open instead of restoring a plausible prefix. Streams both
  ways, so a full backup never sits in memory.
- Panel: "Encrypt with a password" checkbox on the full-backup and
  domain-export forms (shared partial, toggled from panel.js — no inline
  script); domain import detects an encrypted export by magic bytes, not by
  extension, and asks for the password.
- selfpost-backup: writes .spbk when given a password and converts one back
  with -decrypt, which a restore needs. The password comes from
  SELFPOST_BACKUP_PASSWORD or -password-file, never argv.
- Docs: README, security.md (+ accepted risk: encryption stays opt-in),
  architecture.md, progress.md, CHANGELOG.

Verified locally: panel-encrypted archive decrypts through the CLI and unpacks;
wrong password and password mismatch are refused; UI checked in a browser.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-06 16:43:28 +03:00

318 lines
12 KiB
Go

package web
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"time"
"codeberg.org/mix/selfpost/internal/backup"
"codeberg.org/mix/selfpost/internal/domain"
"codeberg.org/mix/selfpost/internal/secretfile"
"codeberg.org/mix/selfpost/internal/store"
)
// maxImportBytes caps a domain-import upload. A domain export is a small JSON
// document (a DKIM key and a handful of credentials); this leaves generous head
// room while refusing anything large enough to be an abuse attempt. An
// encrypted export adds only a header and per-chunk tags, so the same ceiling
// covers both forms.
const maxImportBytes = 1 << 20 // 1 MiB
// handleBackupPage renders the backup/migration screen: the full-server backup
// and the domain import are separate actions with different risk, so each gets
// its own card here rather than sharing a block on the domain list.
func (s *Server) handleBackupPage(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
s.renderBackupPage(w, r, http.StatusOK, "")
}
// renderBackupPage draws the page; importErr surfaces a failed domain import
// (spec 7.5.B) next to the form that produced it.
func (s *Server) renderBackupPage(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, status int, importErr string) {
s.renderBackupPageWith(w, r, status, importErr, "")
}
// renderBackupPageWith is renderBackupPage with the second of the page's two
// error slots: backupErr belongs to the full-backup card (a rejected encryption
// password), importErr to the import card, so neither message appears under the
// wrong form.
func (s *Server) renderBackupPageWith(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, status int, importErr, backupErr string) {
s.render(w, status, "backup", map[string]any{
"Title": "SelfPost — backup",
"User": currentUser(r),
"Active": "backup",
"ImportErr": importErr,
"BackupErr": backupErr,
"MinPwLen": minSecretFilePasswordLen,
})
}
// handleBackup streams a full-server backup as a download (spec 7.5.A). It is an
// authenticated admin action (this handler sits behind the auth middleware). The
// archive carries DKIM private keys, the admin password hash and SASL
// credentials, so it is served with no-store and as an attachment to discourage
// caching of secret material. When the operator ticks "encrypt with a
// password", the archive is wrapped in a .spbk envelope on the way out, so the
// file that lands on their disk — wherever it is copied afterwards — is useless
// without the password.
func (s *Server) handleBackup(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
password, pwErr := secretFilePassword(r)
if pwErr != "" {
s.renderBackupPageWith(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "", pwErr)
return
}
stamp := time.Now().UTC().Format("20060102-150405")
filename := fmt.Sprintf("selfpost-backup-%s.tar.gz", stamp)
contentType := "application/gzip"
if password != "" {
filename = fmt.Sprintf("selfpost-backup-%s%s", stamp, secretfile.ExtBackup)
contentType = "application/octet-stream"
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", contentType)
w.Header().Set("Content-Disposition", fmt.Sprintf("attachment; filename=%q", filename))
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
// Everything below streams: past this point headers (and possibly some
// bytes) are already on the wire, so a failure cannot switch to a clean
// error page. Log it and let the truncated download fail loudly on the
// client side — for an encrypted archive that is a missing end-of-stream
// chunk, which decryption refuses outright.
sink := io.Writer(w)
var env *secretfile.Writer
if password != "" {
var err error
// The only failures here are key derivation (which happens before
// anything is written) and writing the envelope header, which fails only
// if the client is already gone.
env, err = secretfile.NewWriter(w, secretfile.TypeFullBackup, password)
if err != nil {
logf("panel: full backup: encrypt: %v", err)
http.Error(w, "backup failed", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
sink = env
}
if err := backup.Create(sink, backup.Params{
DataDir: s.cfg.DataDir,
DBPath: s.cfg.DBPath,
Version: s.cfg.Version,
}); err != nil {
logf("panel: full backup failed: %v", err)
return
}
if env != nil {
if err := env.Close(); err != nil {
logf("panel: full backup failed: %v", err)
}
}
}
// handleExportDomain streams a single-domain export as a secret download (spec
// 7.5.B). Like the full backup it is POST-only (state is not changed, but the
// response contains the domain's DKIM private key and application passwords, so
// it must not be prefetchable or cached). Like the full backup it can be
// encrypted with a password, in which case the download is a .spde envelope
// instead of plain JSON.
func (s *Server) handleExportDomain(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
d, ok := s.lookupDomain(w, r)
if !ok {
return
}
password, pwErr := secretFilePassword(r)
if pwErr != "" {
s.renderDomainDetail(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, d, detailView{
FormMode: store.AddressModeWildcard,
ExportErr: pwErr,
})
return
}
exp, err := s.domains.Export(d.ID)
if err != nil {
logf("panel: export domain %d: %v", d.ID, err)
http.Error(w, "export failed", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
body, err := json.MarshalIndent(exp, "", " ")
if err != nil {
logf("panel: export domain %d: encode: %v", d.ID, err)
http.Error(w, "export failed", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
filename := fmt.Sprintf("selfpost-domain-%s.json", d.Name)
contentType := "application/json"
if password != "" {
// An export is small, so it is sealed in memory: the response is only
// started once the ciphertext is complete and nothing can half-fail.
var buf bytes.Buffer
env, err := secretfile.NewWriter(&buf, secretfile.TypeDomainExport, password)
if err == nil {
_, err = env.Write(body)
}
if err == nil {
err = env.Close()
}
if err != nil {
logf("panel: export domain %d: encrypt: %v", d.ID, err)
http.Error(w, "export failed", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
body = buf.Bytes()
filename = fmt.Sprintf("selfpost-domain-%s%s", d.Name, secretfile.ExtDomainExport)
contentType = "application/octet-stream"
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", contentType)
w.Header().Set("Content-Disposition", fmt.Sprintf("attachment; filename=%q", filename))
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
_, _ = w.Write(body)
}
// handleImportDomain accepts an uploaded domain-export file and re-creates the
// domain on this instance (spec 7.5.B). The domain name is normalised and
// validated here (spec 7.6.2); the domain service validates the selector, each
// login and address, and the DKIM key before writing anything. On success it
// redirects to the new domain's page; on failure it re-renders the backup page,
// where the import form lives, with a friendly message.
func (s *Server) handleImportDomain(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, maxImportBytes)
if err := r.ParseMultipartForm(maxImportBytes); err != nil {
s.renderBackupPage(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "Could not read the uploaded file (too large or not a valid upload).")
return
}
file, _, err := r.FormFile("file")
if err != nil {
s.renderBackupPage(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "Choose a domain export file to import.")
return
}
defer file.Close()
// An encrypted export announces itself with the envelope magic, so the file
// decides which path it takes; the password field is only consulted when the
// file actually needs it, and a password typed for a plain file is a plain
// mistake worth reporting.
head := make([]byte, secretfile.MagicLen)
n, err := io.ReadFull(file, head)
if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) && !errors.Is(err, io.ErrUnexpectedEOF) {
s.renderBackupPage(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "Could not read the uploaded file.")
return
}
source := io.MultiReader(bytes.NewReader(head[:n]), file)
password := r.PostFormValue("import_password")
if secretfile.HasMagic(head[:n]) {
if password == "" {
s.renderBackupPage(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "That file is encrypted — enter the password it was exported with.")
return
}
env, err := secretfile.NewReader(source, password)
if err != nil {
s.renderBackupPage(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, decryptErrorMessage(err))
return
}
if env.Type() != secretfile.TypeDomainExport {
s.renderBackupPage(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "That file is an encrypted "+env.Type().String()+", not a domain export.")
return
}
// Read the whole plaintext first: authentication of the last chunk is
// what proves the file is intact, and a streaming JSON decoder could
// accept a truncated document before ever reaching it.
plain, err := io.ReadAll(env)
if err != nil {
s.renderBackupPage(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, decryptErrorMessage(err))
return
}
source = bytes.NewReader(plain)
} else if password != "" {
s.renderBackupPage(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "That file is not encrypted — leave the password empty.")
return
}
var exp domain.DomainExport
dec := json.NewDecoder(source)
dec.DisallowUnknownFields()
if err := dec.Decode(&exp); err != nil {
s.renderBackupPage(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "That file is not a valid SelfPost domain export.")
return
}
// Normalise and validate the domain name before it reaches the service, the
// same gate the add-domain form uses (spec 7.6.2).
exp.Domain = normalizeDomain(exp.Domain)
if err := validateDomain(exp.Domain); err != nil {
s.renderBackupPage(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid domain in export file: "+err.Error())
return
}
d, err := s.domains.Import(exp)
if err != nil {
logf("panel: import domain %q: %v", exp.Domain, err)
status, msg := importErrorMessage(err)
s.renderBackupPage(w, r, status, msg)
return
}
http.Redirect(w, r, fmt.Sprintf("/domains/%d?imported=1", d.ID), http.StatusSeeOther)
}
// secretFilePassword reads the "encrypt this download with a password" controls
// shared by the full-backup and domain-export forms. It returns the password to
// encrypt with — empty when the box is not ticked, which keeps the plain
// .tar.gz/.json behaviour of earlier versions — or a message to show above the
// form. The confirmation field is checked here rather than in the browser
// because a typo in an encryption password is unrecoverable: the archive would
// be sealed with a secret the operator does not know.
func secretFilePassword(r *http.Request) (password, errMsg string) {
if err := r.ParseForm(); err != nil {
return "", "Invalid form submission."
}
if r.PostFormValue("encrypt") == "" {
return "", ""
}
password = r.PostFormValue("password")
if len([]rune(password)) < minSecretFilePasswordLen {
return "", fmt.Sprintf("The encryption password must be at least %d characters.", minSecretFilePasswordLen)
}
if password != r.PostFormValue("password_confirm") {
return "", "The two passwords do not match."
}
return password, ""
}
// decryptErrorMessage phrases an envelope failure for the operator. A wrong
// password and a damaged file are deliberately indistinguishable to the code,
// so the message names both possibilities.
func decryptErrorMessage(err error) string {
switch {
case errors.Is(err, secretfile.ErrWrongPassword):
return "Wrong password, or the file has been altered since it was exported."
case errors.Is(err, secretfile.ErrCorrupt):
return "That file is damaged or incomplete."
case errors.Is(err, secretfile.ErrNotEncrypted):
return "That file is not a SelfPost export."
default:
return "Could not decrypt the file."
}
}
// importErrorMessage maps a domain-import failure (already logged by the caller)
// to an HTTP status and a user-facing message. Duplicate domain/login are called
// out specifically; other failures — validation errors describing what is wrong
// with the file, or an internal write/reload problem — are surfaced verbatim to
// this admin-only panel so the operator can act on them.
func importErrorMessage(err error) (int, string) {
switch {
case errors.Is(err, store.ErrDomainExists):
return http.StatusConflict, "A domain with that name already exists here. Delete it first, or import into a fresh instance."
case errors.Is(err, store.ErrLoginExists):
return http.StatusConflict, "One of the application logins in the file is already in use on this instance. Application logins must be unique across all domains."
default:
return http.StatusBadRequest, "Could not import the domain: " + err.Error()
}
}