Files
selfpost/build/logrotate-loop.sh
T
mixandClaude Opus 5 ab2cd885c4
test / test (push) Has been cancelled
review follow-up: close the gaps left by the phase1-6 pass
Verified the tree against docs/plans/code-review-2026-08.md and finished the
tasks that were only partly done, plus two defects the pass introduced.

- bcrypt: the setup account was still hashed at DefaultCost (10). The work
  factor now has one definition, auth.BcryptCost = 12, used everywhere.
- rate limiter: protecting blocked buckets from eviction was unbounded — an
  attacker with many source addresses could grow the map by making each one
  fail its way to blocked. Blocked buckets are now evicted past
  maxBuckets * 4, nearest expiry first, logged once per window. Tests cover
  both halves.
- postqueue: the 5s timeout left the output size unbounded; reads are now
  capped at 4 MiB and report truncation.
- spec references: the ~76 `spec N` citations CHANGELOG [0.5.0] claimed were
  gone are removed from build/, deploy/, the first two migrations and the
  release workflow, with the affected comment paragraphs re-wrapped. Comments
  only; shell/YAML/SQL syntax re-checked.
- schema-migrations.md: schema section was headed v9 with the chain at v10,
  and three links pointed at deleted plan files.
- internal/configsafe: the shared empty/forbidden-character check behind the
  OpenDKIM and Postfix config writers; each writer keeps its own forbidden set.
- dropped the parseDomainRateLimitForm/parseAppRateLimitForm pass-throughs
  left behind by the parser merge (only their own tests still called them).
- plan doc now carries a status table: what shipped, what was already in
  place, what was declined (//go:build linux for the /proc reader) and the
  open CSRF-token question.

Not done, each its own phase: typed template data structs, log/slog, DMARC
service and handler tests, error-page/corrupted-backup tests, backup re-auth.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-19 20:03:05 +03:00

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#!/bin/sh
# Periodic logrotate for /data/log/mail.log. Rotation renames the file,
# recreates it (`create 0640 postfix selfpost`, matching a cold container
# start), then runs `postfix reload` (the same mechanism `postfix logrotate`
# uses): postlogd keeps writing to the renamed inode until reload, and the
# panel's log-tailer holds its own descriptor on that inode, so nothing written
# before the reload is lost. `create` (rather than `nocreate`) matters here
# beyond timing: a postlogd-triggered recreate lands the file at 0600 owned by
# postfix, which the unprivileged panel process cannot read — confirmed on a
# live container — so logrotate must be the one to create it.
#
# logrotate itself only rotates once the configured "daily" period has elapsed
# (tracked in /var/lib/logrotate/status), so it is safe to invoke this more
# often than daily — polling merely bounds how late a legitimate rotation runs.
set -eu
CONFIG=/etc/logrotate.d/mail
INTERVAL="${LOGROTATE_INTERVAL_SECONDS:-21600}"
# logrotate refuses configs writable by group or others and exits 0 while
# ignoring them — fail here so supervisord reports the fault.
logrotate_config_ok() {
mode=$(stat -c '%a' "$CONFIG")
mode=${mode#0}
grp=$(( (mode / 10) % 10 ))
oth=$(( mode % 10 ))
case $grp in 2|3|6|7) return 1 ;; esac
case $oth in 2|3|6|7) return 1 ;; esac
return 0
}
logrotate_config_fatal() {
echo "logrotate-loop: refusing to run: $CONFIG mode $(stat -c '%a' "$CONFIG") is writable by group or others" >&2
exit 1
}
if ! logrotate_config_ok; then
logrotate_config_fatal
fi
run_logrotate() {
out=$(logrotate "$CONFIG" 2>&1) || {
echo "$out" >&2
return 1
}
case "$out" in
*Ignoring*|*Potentially\ dangerous\ mode*)
echo "$out" >&2
logrotate_config_fatal
;;
esac
return 0
}
while true; do
if ! logrotate_config_ok; then
logrotate_config_fatal
fi
if run_logrotate; then
:
else
echo "logrotate-loop: logrotate failed, will retry after ${INTERVAL}s" >&2
fi
sleep "${INTERVAL}"
done