Files
selfpost/internal/milter/ratelimit.go
T
mix b4a9b93cf2
test / test (push) Waiting to run
release: 1.9.0
Application client IP allow-list restricts which addresses may submit as a SASL login; level-2 rate limits override the domain ceiling per application (higher or lower, capped at L1). Migration 0009, authips form, milter enforcement, export/import, and operator docs.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
2026-08-18 23:51:41 +03:00

102 lines
3.6 KiB
Go

package milter
import (
"log"
"time"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/store"
)
// overLimit reports whether the message currently being received should be
// refused under a level-2 differentiated limit (guide § Rate limiting).
//
// When an application has an active limit, it overrides the domain limit for
// that login (the ceiling may be higher or lower than the domain). Otherwise
// the domain ceiling applies when configured; if neither is set, only level 1
// applies.
//
// It is deliberately fail-open: any store error, or the absence of a usable
// limit, is treated as "not over limit" so a malfunction of the level-2
// limiter can never block mail — Postfix's level-1 anvil limit
// (architecture.md § Mail path) remains the backstop, and it does not depend
// on this milter at all. Only a clean count at or above a configured ceiling
// returns true.
//
// A message that passes reserves a slot per applicable limit, released once it
// reaches the send log (or is abandoned) — see inflight for why the stored
// count alone is not enough.
func (s *session) overLimit() bool {
if s.clientIP == "" {
return false // no client IP to key on; level-2 does not apply
}
if s.login != "" {
rl, ok, err := s.rec.RateLimit(store.RateLimitScopeApp, s.login)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("journal-milter: rate-limit lookup application %q: %v (fail-open)", s.login, err)
} else if ok && rl.Active() {
return s.enforceLimit(store.RateLimitScopeApp, s.login, rl)
}
}
domain := domainOf(s.from)
if domain == "" {
return false
}
rl, ok, err := s.rec.RateLimit(store.RateLimitScopeDomain, domain)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("journal-milter: rate-limit lookup domain %q: %v (fail-open)", domain, err)
return false
}
if !ok || !rl.Active() {
return false
}
return s.enforceLimit(store.RateLimitScopeDomain, domain, rl)
}
// enforceLimit counts recent messages for scope/ref and refuses when at or
// above the ceiling. The stored count and the in-flight slots are weighed and
// the admitted message's own slot is taken in one atomic step (tryAdmit), so
// two sessions racing at MAIL FROM cannot both claim the last free slot.
func (s *session) enforceLimit(scope, ref string, rl store.RateLimit) bool {
since := time.Now().Add(-time.Duration(rl.WindowSeconds) * time.Second)
stored, err := s.rec.CountMessages(scope, ref, since)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("journal-milter: rate-limit count %s %q: %v (fail-open)", scope, ref, err)
return false
}
r, n, ok := s.flight.tryAdmit(scope+"|"+ref, since, stored, int64(rl.MaxMessages))
if !ok {
log.Printf("journal-milter: %s %q over limit: %d/%d in %ds from %s — refusing 4xx",
scope, ref, n, rl.MaxMessages, rl.WindowSeconds, s.clientIP)
return true
}
s.reserved = append(s.reserved, r)
return false
}
// releaseReservations gives back every slot this message holds. It runs once
// the message is in the send log (where the stored count sees it), and whenever
// the transaction ends without getting there.
func (s *session) releaseReservations() {
for _, r := range s.reserved {
s.flight.release(r)
}
s.reserved = nil
}
// recordRejected writes a send-log row for a message refused by a level-2
// limit (guide § Rate limiting — refusals are recorded too), so the rejection
// shows up in the monitoring screen. Only MAIL-stage fields are known; the
// write is best-effort and never affects the response.
func (s *session) recordRejected() {
err := s.rec.InsertRejected(store.SendLogEntry{
Domain: domainOf(s.from),
AppLogin: s.login,
From: s.from,
})
if err != nil {
log.Printf("journal-milter: record rejected %s: %v", s.from, err)
}
}