selfpost/docs/audit-2026-10-12.md

# Code audit — 2026-10-12

**What this is.** A full-tree audit of the code and infrastructure at `8f226bd`
(release `2.4.0`): leftovers, unfinished work, defects, performance, doc drift
and test gaps — explicit ones (there are no `TODO`/`FIXME` markers anywhere in
the product code) and the implicit ones that only reading finds. The panel's
visual design (mockups, `panel.css`, layout) is a separate audit and is not
touched here. Nothing was changed in the tree; this file is the only output.

**Method.** Six parallel readers, one per zone (mail path; background roles;
store/backup/composition root; HTTP surface; view and services; build/deploy/
CI/e2e), each reading every file of its zone and its tests in full, each
told to find where the code does not do what `architecture.md` says, and to
prove it (a throwaway test, `EXPLAIN QUERY PLAN`, a probe) rather than guess.
Machine checks: `go build`, `go vet`, `gofmt -l`, `go mod tidy`/`verify`,
`staticcheck`, `govulncheck`, `go test ./...`. Five claims the readers could
not settle from source were settled on the test server
(`selfpost.mixfed.ru`, running a locally built `2.3.0-post.c817f08`) and
against GHCR. Two hypotheses were refuted there and are **not** findings:
`saslpasswd2 -d` of a missing login exits 0 (deletion is idempotent, as the
code says), and a duplicate key in a `texthash:` map is a warning with the
first entry winning, not a fatal error.

**Machine results.** Build, vet, gofmt, tidy, verify: clean. `staticcheck`:
four items (an unused `domainIDSet` in `handlers/authz.go:63`, two unused
assignments in `handlers_outbound_pages_test.go:174,194`, one `S1003` in
`view/pages_test.go:170`). `govulncheck`: nine standard-library findings
(`net/http` HTTP/2, `net/textproto`, `html/template`), all fixed in the
current Go patch release; `golang.org/x/crypto` `0.54.0` has three published
fixes in `0.56.0` that this code does not call. `modernc.org/sqlite` is seven
minor versions behind (`1.53.0` → `1.60.1`). `go test ./...`: green on Linux
semantics; on Windows two tests fail for OS reasons (`TestWriteLoadPrivateKeyRoundtrip`
expects a POSIX mode; `TestFollowTailsAndRotates` renames an open file) — the
tests, not the product, are platform-bound.

Severity: **critical** — mail or data lost or the security boundary crossed
today; **high** — a documented guarantee is false in a way an operator will
hit; **medium** — wrong under a realistic condition, or a stated guard that is
not there; **low** — wrong under an unlikely condition, or cost without
failure; **nit** — hygiene. Confidence is stated where a finding was not
proven.

---

## Findings

### High

**H1. Every published release image is stamped `VERSION=e2e`, so the
backup/restore version check never checks anything.**
[release.yml:75-84](../.github/workflows/release.yml) builds the image with
`VERSION=X.Y.Z` and tags it `selfpost:e2e`; the e2e step then runs
`docker compose build` through
[test/e2e/compose.override.yml:23-32](../test/e2e/compose.override.yml),
which rebuilds **the same tag** with `args: VERSION: e2e`; `docker tag
selfpost:e2e …X.Y.Z-amd64` pushes the rebuilt one. Confirmed: `docker run
ghcr.io/mixeme/selfpost:1.3.0 panel -version` prints `e2e`. Consequences:
the footer and `-version` lie; `backup.CheckRestore` compares a manifest's
version to `e2e`, so a backup of any release restores into any other and the
promise in development.md:270 and guide.md:191 ("the version is the single
source … so they cannot drift apart") is false. Every image this workflow has
ever published is affected; they stay as they are (owner, 2026-10-12: old tags
and images are history and are not touched) — the fix is for the next
publication.

**H2. Renewed TLS certificates are never picked up while the container
runs.** [postfix-config.sh:75-89](../build/postfix-config.sh) copies the
mounted cert and key into `/etc/postfix/tls-internal/` at start and points
Postfix at the copy; [postfix-cert-reload.sh](../build/postfix-cert-reload.sh)
runs `postfix reload` daily but nothing re-copies. The copy is the only
`tls-internal` reference in the tree; on the test server the copy carries the
container's start time. Scenario: Let's Encrypt renews at day 60, nobody
restarts, from day 90 ports 465/587 serve an expired certificate.
architecture.md:33,154-155 and supervisord.conf:92-95 say the opposite.

**H3. The queue-reconcile sweep marks delivered mail `bounced` whenever the
tailer is blind.** Four mechanisms, one consequence (a row the log would have
resolved as `sent` is closed as a failure, which the Outbound log shows and
the notifier believes):
- *Tailer stuck, sweep running.* [logtail.go:559-581](../internal/logtail/logtail.go):
  `caughtUp` closes after the first drain and never re-opens; `reconcileLoop`
  (:174-191) then runs every 5 min regardless. If `openAt` fails after a
  rotation (:573-576, e.g. postlogd recreated the file `0600` — entrypoint.sh:132
  says this happens) the loop logs and retries forever on the old inode while
  every new delivery line goes unread; two minutes later `reconcile()` finds the
  rows absent from `postqueue -p` (they were delivered) and bounces them.
- *Truncated queue listing read as complete.*
  [postfix/queue.go:64-68,81-87](../internal/postfix/queue.go): `Queue()` caps
  `postqueue -p` at 4 MiB and appends a text note; `QueueIDs()` parses that
  text and returns the first 4 MiB of ids with no error. A deferred backlog of
  ~30k messages — the outage the sweep exists for — makes every row past the
  cut `bounced` while Postfix still holds the mail. `queuejson.go:48-52` handles
  the same cap correctly for the notifier; the two drifted.
- *Rotation drain window.* :567-578 drains the renamed inode once more; postlogd
  keeps writing to it until master's reload reaches it (seconds), so lines
  written in that window are never read. architecture.md:372-373 claims the
  drain covers it.
- *No status guard on close.* `UpdateStatus` ([store/sendlog.go:86-98](../internal/store/sendlog.go))
  is `WHERE queue_id = ? AND to_addr = ?`; the reconcile path can overwrite a
  `sent` written an instant earlier, and a reused short queue id to the same
  recipient rewrites a months-old row.

**H4. Application logins are case-sensitive in the panel and case-insensitive
in Postfix; a tenant can take another tenant's envelope sender.**
[app/validate.go:35-48](../internal/app/validate.go) accepts `A-Z` and nothing
lowercases a login; `applications.login` is `UNIQUE` under BINARY collation
([0001_init.sql:91](../internal/store/migrations/0001_init.sql)), so `Ops` and
`ops` are two applications. The sender map is written as stored
([postfix/postfix.go:95-115](../internal/postfix/postfix.go)); Postfix's
`reject_sender_login_mismatch` compares logins without regard to case (the
code's own comment, [milter/sender.go:35-36](../internal/milter/sender.go),
and architecture.md:239-240 say so). Scenario: domain A has `Ops` bound to
`@a.com`; a *domain*-role administrator of B creates `ops` in B, authenticates
as `ops`, sends `MAIL FROM:<x@a.com>` with `From: y@b.com`. Postfix accepts
the envelope (`@a.com Ops` matches), the sender check judges only the header,
which is B's — the message leaves with A as its SPF and bounce identity.
Confidence: the panel side is confirmed; Postfix's compare is taken from the
code's own statement. Fix shape: lower-case at validation, `COLLATE NOCASE`
on the column (a migration — check the live registry for a pair first).

### Medium

Persistence, restore, backup

**M1. The restore manifest is consumed before anything that can fail.**
[backup.go:436-446](../internal/backup/backup.go) deletes `manifest.json`
inside `CheckRestore`; [main.go:282-300](../cmd/panel/main.go) runs
`store.Open` and `resyncAfterRestore` afterwards. If either fails, supervisord
restarts the panel with `restored == false` and the one-time drift-healing
Resync never runs. Docs say "on the first *successful* boot"; the code says
"on the first attempt". `restore_test.go` passes `testNoReload=true` and never
fails Open/Resync, so nothing covers it.

**M2. Three queries on the single connection run without the index they
need.** Measured with `EXPLAIN QUERY PLAN` against the real migrations:
- `CountMessages` by domain ([ratelimits.go:186-190](../internal/store/ratelimits.go))
  and `sendStats` ([stats.go:77-94](../internal/store/stats.go)) use
  `idx_send_log_domain (domain)` and apply `created_at >=` by scanning every
  row of the domain over the retention window — on every `MAIL FROM` of an
  application under a domain-level limit, with the milter, tailer and HTTP
  queued behind it. The baseline's comment promises a composite index for
  "the journal milter … on every MAIL FROM"; only the `app_login` half exists.
- `ListQueuedOlderThan` ([sendlog.go:117-122](../internal/store/sendlog.go))
  is a full `SCAN send_log` every 5 min (no index on `status`; the cutoff
  matches nearly every row). Mirror of what `0005` fixed for `rejected`: a
  partial index `(created_at) WHERE status = 'queued'` makes it a handful of
  rows.
- Scoped `QuerySendLog` ([sendlog.go:214-219](../internal/store/sendlog.go))
  sorts a domain's whole scope with a temp b-tree for every page a domain user
  opens.

**M3. `selfpost-backup` with a wrong `SELFPOST_DB_PATH` creates an empty
database and ships a "valid" backup of nothing.** [backup.go:394-405](../internal/backup/backup.go)
opens the source without `mode=ro` or an existence check; `VACUUM INTO` on a
non-existent path succeeds (measured), creates the file on disk and snapshots a
4 KiB empty database; `Create` and `Check` pass. A restore of it opens the
`/setup` link on a host that still carries live DKIM keys and `sasldb2`.

**M4. `secretfile`'s KDF cap does not do what its comment says.**
[secretfile.go:108-113,184](../internal/secretfile/secretfile.go):
`maxLogN=20, maxR=32, maxP=16` lets a 44-byte header demand
`128·2²⁰·32` = 4 GiB and sixteen times the CPU, under a comment that says the
cap exists "so a hostile header cannot make the reader allocate its way to an
out-of-memory kill". The domain-import form calls `NewReader` on the upload.
Operator foot-gun rather than attack surface (global role only), but the
stated guarantee is false; the real writer never exceeds N=2¹⁵, r=8, p=1.

**M5. The CLI enforces no password floor for an encrypted backup.**
[cmd/selfpost-backup/main.go:170-187](../cmd/selfpost-backup/main.go) takes
any non-empty string; the panel enforces `validate.MinSecretFilePasswordLen`
(12); security.md:291 says the minimum applies to these files. (The roadmap's
"empty password accepted" item: an empty password is *not* accepted as an
encryption password — empty means plain output by design; the gap is the
floor.)

**M6. The compose pin, README and guide point at an image that does not
exist.** `deploy/docker-compose.yml:24`, `README.md:115` and guide.md:187 pin
`ghcr.io/mixeme/selfpost:2.4.0` (`2.4.1` since this cut); GHCR holds `1.0.0`
and `1.3.0` only (checked
through the Packages API and by pulling); no 2.x was ever published, and tag
`v2.0.0` exists in git without a release. The quick start cannot work for
anyone but the owner, who runs locally built `-post.<sha>` images. Decided
(owner, 2026-10-12): the old tags and images are history and stay untouched;
the pin points forward — it is made true by the next publication, after H1 is
fixed, and until then the documents should not claim an image that is not
there.

HTTP surface

**M7. The last-global-user guard is check-then-act without a transaction.**
[store/users.go:315-341](../internal/store/users.go) (`DeleteUser`:
`CountGlobalUsers` then `DELETE`), [handlers_users.go:277-287,317-322](../internal/web/handlers/handlers_users.go)
(demotion), [users.go:80-97](../internal/store/users.go) (`CreateGlobalUser`:
`UserExists` then `INSERT`). `MaxOpenConns(1)` serialises statements, not
pairs. Two globals deleting or demoting each other at once leave no global;
`/server/*` answers 404 to everyone and recovery is database surgery.
security.md:155 promises the guard.

**M8. Login discloses whether a username exists by timing.**
[auth/handlers.go:109-121](../internal/web/auth/handlers.go): unknown user
returns at :114 without bcrypt; a known one costs ~250 ms (cost 12). The test
compares bodies only. Rate limiting slows enumeration; a dummy compare stops
it.

**M9. `submitUserUpdate` is five writes with no transaction.**
[handlers_users.go:304-336](../internal/web/handlers/handlers_users.go):
`UpdateUser` → `endSessionsAfterPasswordSet` → `SetUserRole` →
`ClearUserReach` (error only logged) → `SetUserReach`. A failure after the
first leaves a user renamed and signed out everywhere with the old role, or a
`domain` user with empty reach — the state the "Assign at least one domain"
check exists to prevent.

**M10. Domain import trusts the export file for everything but the domain
name, selector and password.** [domain/transfer.go:145-190](../internal/domain/transfer.go):
`DMARCRua` is not run through `validate.Email` (the form path is), client IPs
not through `parseIPList`, rate-limit `Mode`/`WindowSeconds`/`MaxMessages`
not through the form's parsers. `WindowSeconds: 0` yields a limit that counts
nothing ([milter/ratelimit.go:61](../internal/milter/ratelimit.go)); garbage
IPs make the imported application refuse every client with no word at import.
[app/validate.go:50-55](../internal/app/validate.go) calls the file "untrusted
input" — for the password only.

**M11. Polling stops for good after one failed refresh.**
[panel.js:202-257](../internal/web/view/static/panel.js): the scheduled poll
is `htmx.ajax(...)` without `source`, so htmx attributes it to `document.body`;
`htmx:responseError` therefore reaches an element with no `data-poll` and
nothing reschedules; `htmx:sendError` and `htmx:timeout` are not handled at
all. A panel restart while Overview or Health is open freezes the page until
the tab is hidden and shown. Related: an expired session answers an
`HX-Request` with `303 /login` ([auth/middleware.go:14](../internal/web/auth/middleware.go));
the XHR follows it and the sign-in document is swapped into the box — no
`HX-Redirect` on either side.

Log tailer and checks

**M12. `deliveryRe` is unanchored; a stranger's HELO parses as a delivery
result.** [logtail.go:85](../internal/logtail/logtail.go): a port-25 reject
line ending `helo=<41E862C00D9E: to=<victim@…>, status=sent>` yields
`(id, recipient, sent)` (probed), and `UpdateStatus` rewrites the matching row.
The attacker must guess an id+recipient pair, so impact is bounded — but
`lines.go:21-24` and `inbound.go:48-51` anchor at the head for exactly this
reason, and this pattern, the one that writes status, does not.

**M13. The sender-check deferred counter misses the case it is documented to
see.** [sendercheck.go:50](../internal/logtail/sendercheck.go) matches only
`postfix/…smtpd[pid]`; header/EOH events run in cleanup(8), so the warning for
a panel that accepts the socket but hangs at end-of-headers is logged by
`postfix/cleanup`. The fixture at `sendercheck_test.go:64-68` puts those lines
under `smtpd` and says it was "composed from Postfix's source rather than
seen". architecture.md:286-287 claims the figure sees "a panel that is running
and not answering". Confidence: plausible; one `kill -STOP` on the stand
settles it.

**M14. Resolver fall-back is hollow when the first resolver drops packets.**
[dnscheck/resolver.go:72-90](../internal/dnscheck/resolver.go) tries resolvers
in turn under one 5 s context; a blackhole eats the budget and the second is
asked with an expired context. The `DefaultResolvers` comment promises
otherwise. **M15.** [dnscheck/server.go:26-33,42-46](../internal/dnscheck/server.go)
turns a resolver timeout into "does not resolve" / "no PTR record" (every
other check routes transient errors to Unknown), and empties `ServerIPs` so
the SPF check goes Unknown in the same minute. architecture.md:339-340.

Infrastructure

**M16. `envdoc_test.go` compares three hand-written lists to each other and
reads neither `main.go`, the scripts nor `guide.md`.**
[envdoc_test.go:70-136](../cmd/panel/envdoc_test.go). Already drifted:
`ANTISPAM_DIR`, `INBOUND_JOURNAL_MILTER_SOCKET`, `INBOUND_SPAM_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS`,
`RATE_LIMIT_MESSAGES_PER_IP`, `RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS` are read by
`loadConfig` and absent from `loadConfigKeys`; `postfix-config.sh` and
`postfix-wrapper.sh` read `INBOUND_JOURNAL_MILTER_SOCKET`, `SELFPOST_DATA_DIR`,
`SELFPOST_DB_PATH`, `INBOUND_RELAY_ENABLE`, absent from `buildScriptKeys`. The
tests pass; development.md:353-357 and :503-504 describe a guard that does
not exist.

**M17. The supervisord control socket is `0770 root:selfpost` and the
`postfix` and `opendkim` users are in `selfpost`.**
[supervisord.conf:26-29](../build/supervisord.conf) ("only root and the two
SelfPost services"), [Dockerfile:68-71](../build/Dockerfile) (three users);
confirmed on the server. A compromised smtpd can `supervisorctl stop panel`
(all submission deferred), `stop opendkim` or `shutdown`. No escalation; a
whole-stack denial from the least trusted process.

**M18. DMARC maps are never ownership-normalised.** entrypoint.sh:108-125
normalises five maps; `dmarc_recipients`/`dmarc_transport`/`dmarc_relay_domains`
are created by postfix-config.sh:315-317 as root only when missing. A tar
restore as root (guide, methods 3/4) yields `root:root 0640`, which smtpd
cannot open → `451 table lookup problem` on every report until the panel next
rewrites them. Confidence: plausible, needs a run.

**M19. logrotate state lives in the container layer.** [logrotate-loop.sh:42](../build/logrotate-loop.sh)
uses the default `/var/lib/logrotate/status`, not under `/data`. On the server
the state file is dated the container's start; with no entry logrotate records
today and does not rotate, so a host that recreates the container daily
(`.env` change, image bump) never rotates `mail.log`. The e2e uses `-f` and
cannot see it.

**M20. `test.yml` never compiles `test/e2e`.** A type error there surfaces in
`release.yml` after the GitHub Release is published and the tag checked out.

**M21. `deploy/traefik/extract-cert.sh` writes empty PEM files and exits 0 on
a `jq` miss** (:17-25, `sh` without pipefail; `jq` exits 0 on no match); the
files are `0644` until :27. Postfix TLS breaks at the next restart.

### Low

- **L1** `-decrypt -o FILE` truncates the output before the password is
  verified ([main.go:132-148](../cmd/selfpost-backup/main.go)); a wrong
  password leaves an empty file where a good one may have been.
- **L2** Backups skip symlinks silently and `Check` does not notice
  ([backup.go:323-327](../internal/backup/backup.go)); a `certs/` of symlinks
  (the Let's Encrypt layout) yields an archive with no TLS material while the
  guide promises refusal.
- **L3** Trailing bytes after the last `secretfile` chunk are ignored
  (:400-416): two envelopes concatenated open as the first.
- **L4** `parseTrustedProxies` turns a bare `::ffff:10.0.0.1` into `::/32`
  silently ([main.go:247-253](../cmd/panel/main.go)).
- **L5** `tls_policy` is keyed by next-hop; two inbound domains to one
  `[host]:port` with different TLS modes write duplicate keys and the first
  (by domain order) wins with a warning — confirmed on the server. The per-
  domain TLS mode in the form is not what Postfix does
  ([postfix/inbound.go:69-72](../internal/postfix/inbound.go)).
- **L6** Multi-file map rebuilds are not all-or-nothing
  ([inbound.go:42-55](../internal/postfix/inbound.go), `dmarc.go:31-41`); a
  write failure mid-sequence leaves `relay_domains` ahead of `transport`.
- **L7** `atomicfile.Write` never fsyncs the directory and the package has no
  tests ([atomicfile.go:40-44](../internal/atomicfile/atomicfile.go)); every map
  writer goes through it.
- **L8** The refusal reply names the other sender's domain
  ([sender.go:334](../internal/milter/sender.go)) — an oracle for the server's
  signing names, available to any authenticated application.
- **L9** go-milter accumulates every message's headers for a connection's
  life (library `session.go:173-187`, cleared on ABORT only); the sender check
  is safe because it ignores `h`, and the test passes `nil` so would not catch
  a "simplification" to `h.Values("From")`.
- **L10** `parsePage` is not clamped to `lastPage` for the Outbound log
  ([handlers_monitor.go:357-371](../internal/web/handlers/handlers_monitor.go));
  the inbound log clamps. Known roadmap row, confirmed.
- **L11** `parseAutoMultiplier` accepts `NaN` ([handlers_ratelimit.go:44-49](../internal/web/handlers/handlers_ratelimit.go));
  SQLite stores NULL, read-back is 0, recalc silently uses 2.5 (probed).
- **L12** Outbound rows belong to a domain by **name** ([handlers_monitor.go:97,345](../internal/web/handlers/handlers_monitor.go)):
  a domain deleted and re-added shows its earlier rows to the new assignee.
  security.md:419 accepts this for the inbound log only.
- **L13** `HandleReload` answers failures as plain-text `http.Error`
  (handlers_domains.go:173-184), and the flash "Configuration regenerated from
  the database" oversells: DMARC maps and filter-list files are skipped
  (architecture.md:856-859 says so for DMARC; `Lists.Sync` is documented
  nowhere).
- **L14** `http.Server` has only `ReadHeaderTimeout` ([httpserver.go:145-149](../cmd/panel/httpserver.go)).
- **L15** The Account password change shares the per-IP login bucket
  ([handlers_account.go:142](../internal/web/handlers/handlers_account.go)):
  ten wrong current passwords lock sign-in for that IP 15 min.
- **L16** Login issues a fresh token but does not destroy the session a
  presented cookie already holds ([auth/handlers.go:123-130](../internal/web/auth/handlers.go)).
- **L17** `domain.Service.Delete` returns a bare error after the row is gone
  when `resync()` fails ([service.go:202-210](../internal/domain/service.go));
  `apps.Resync()` is not reached, so the sender map keeps the purged logins.
- **L18** A `rate-limited` refusal is a grey tag in the Outbound log
  ([outbound_log.go:213](../internal/web/view/outbound_log.go), no such status
  in `components.go:132-146`); its two siblings are red, and the test pins the
  grey.
- **L19** *Recalculate rate limit* on the application form submits the whole
  form and discards every unsaved edit ([out_app.html:67](../internal/web/view/templates/out_app.html),
  handlers_ratelimit.go:178-189).
- **L20** DMARC parse rewrites `<pct>0</pct>` to 100 and stores a missing
  `date_range` as 1970 ([parse.go:125-136](../internal/dmarc/parse.go)).
- **L21** Several `mailStack` instances per process with no shared lock on
  table rebuilds (`run`, `newPanel`, `runNotifier`); the notifier's
  `EnsureServerSigned` at start can write a stale table over a domain added
  in the same second. **L22** `IncrDMARCParseFailures` is read-modify-write
  across concurrent `dmarc-ingest` processes ([dmarc.go:163-173](../internal/store/dmarc.go)).
- **L23** The restore-boot Resync reloads Postfix before Postfix exists
  (panel priority 200, postfix 300) — an error line per restore boot; the
  DMARC bootstrap works around the same thing with a no-op hook and does not
  say why ([main.go:301-307](../cmd/panel/main.go)).
- **L24** `health/processes.go:43`, `supervisor.go:17,30`: `exec.Command`
  without context; `/healthz` and the 5 s status poll hang on a wedged
  supervisord. **L25** `health/cert.go:70-83` assumes the first PEM block is
  the leaf and grades a not-yet-valid certificate OK; `machine.go:193-204`
  advances `prevAt` when only one of cpu/net succeeded.
- **L26** Only successful sends count toward the notifier's 60/h ceiling
  ([notify.go:196-207](../internal/notify/notify.go)); with sendmail broken,
  `CheckLimits` spawns a 20 s process per recipient per minute forever.
- **L27** `v=dmarc1` matched case-insensitively ([records.go:74,121](../internal/dnscheck/records.go));
  RFC 7489 §6.4 says the version must match exactly, so a lower-case record is
  graded OK and ignored by receivers. **L28** The domain cache is keyed by
  name only ([dnscheck.go:155-173](../internal/dnscheck/dnscheck.go)) though
  the verdict depends on `ExpectedDKIM`/`ServerIPs`.
- **L29** `lineTime` normalises a Feb 29 line read the following January to
  Mar 1 ([inbound.go:254-261](../internal/logtail/inbound.go)); `isoStampRe`
  accepts a zone-less stamp that `time.Parse` then rejects (dated `now`).
- **L30** OpenDKIM: `Syslog no` with no `LogWhy`/`Logfile` — it logs nothing
  anywhere; no `Canonicalization relaxed/simple`; no `OversignHeaders From`
  (the header-append replay is the class 2.4.0 is about).
- **L31** Postfix: `smtpd_tls_protocols` at the 3.7 default `>=TLSv1`,
  `disable_vrfy_command = no` (VRFY on 25 enumerates `relay_recipient_maps`),
  the stock `(Debian/GNU)` banner — all confirmed on the server.
  `RATE_LIMIT_*`, `*_SIZE_LIMIT`, `MILTER_*_TIMEOUT` reach `postconf -e`
  unvalidated; a non-integer passes `postfix check` and kills every smtpd at
  connect.
- **L32** `crashexit` fires on FATAL only, which arises only from
  `startretries` exhausted within `startsecs` (1 s): a program that crashes
  after one second cycles forever and never exits the container.
  architecture.md:40-41 reads wider than that.
- **L33** `.dockerignore` excludes `docs`, `dev`, `bin` but not `test/`; a
  developer build after an e2e run ships `test/e2e/.stage/data` (DKIM keys,
  `sasldb2`) into the build context. Base images pinned by tag, not digest.
- **L34** e2e: `stage.go:77` pulls `alpine:3.20` from the internet;
  `hostname_gate_test.go:97-101` runs with the host's real network;
  `sender_check_test.go:141` has a fixed `time.Sleep(2s)` against
  development.md:409 "no fixed sleep".

### Nits

Dead code: `handlers/authz.go:63 domainIDSet`; `view.Facts`
(`components.go:414`); `dmarc.Service.HostedSuggestion`, `ValidateHostedAddress`
(`dmarc/service.go:98-109`); `app.Service.UpdateMode` (`app/service.go:132-145`,
superseded by `SaveSettings`); `Settings.WithResult` (`view/account.go:137-145`)
re-implements `resultFlash`; `KitPage()`'s hard-coded `User: "admin"`
(overwritten by the handler); dead method checks in `handlers_dmarc.go:20-24`
and the `default:` branches of `HandleUserNew`/`HandleUserEdit`/`HandleServerSettings`
(mux patterns are method-bound); the `postfix set-permissions` branch in
entrypoint.sh:170-172 (`postfix check` has already created the tree).
Duplication: `canViewDMARCDomain` repeats `lookupDomain`'s check; `ParseForm`
twice on the user-edit POST; `Lookup` then `Touch` per request in
`auth/middleware.go:17,28`; `retry.go:58-67` repeats the six `postconf` keys as
literals instead of `retryConfKeys`; three header-name canonicalisers with two
behaviours (`milter.go:124`, `inbound.go:89`, `sender.go:248`). Behaviour:
`submitUserCreate` does `CreateUser` then `UpdateUser` for the e-mail;
self-demotion redirects to a page that is now 404; `redirectHome` gives a
domain user with no outbound reach an empty 200 where the inbound list gives
404; `sort.Slice` in `postfix/inbound.go:59` reorders the caller's slice;
`strings.Split(raw, "\n")` in `sender.go:65,104` keeps `\r`; `lists.go:428`
trims the filter key while the Lua side reads it verbatim; `InDomain.WithMX`
labels a `warn` status "NOT CHECKED"; `senderSession` does not override `Body`
(the library discards the session after every accepted message — harmless,
inconsistent with `milter.go:130-134`). The handlers test package takes ~105 s
on this machine (likely bcrypt cost 12 on the user-creation paths).

### Doc drift

architecture.md: :167 (§ OpenDKIM) still says the `From:` header is not held
against the login — contradicted by 2.4.0 and by § Sender check in the same
file; :272-274 credits `/run` being tmpfs for a fresh `.alive` mark (it is a
plain image directory; a restarted container keeps the mark); :328-329 "a
deleted domain's row goes with it" — only `dns:` rows, `limit:` lingers up to
48 h; :493 and § Who may open what omit `/inbound/log` and
`/inbound/filter-lists`; :800 names only migration `0002`; :832-836 omits
`inbound_spam_log`, `inbound_spam_list`, `notify_state`, `sender_check_days`;
:838 "the panel is the only writer" — `dmarc-ingest` is a separate process
that opens the store, migrates and writes; :856-859 vs `backup.go:19-23` and
`httpserver.go:52-53` ("the same Resync") — the button skips DMARC maps and
filter lists; the Internal env list omits `ANTISPAM_DIR` and
`INBOUND_JOURNAL_MILTER_SOCKET`; § View engine calls the kit page "fixtures"
(it is production data). schema-migrations.md: :20 "chain head `user_version
= 5`" (six files; `TestBaselineSchema` asserts 6); the "Schema at head (v2)"
table omits `sender_check_days` and `send_log.reason`/`header_from`.
guide.md: :214 `INBOUND_JOURNAL_MILTER_SOCKET` "Set in: compose" (it is not);
:1260 lines "deleted together with the row" (at the next six-hourly prune, and
not while a reused id has a row); :720 "first successful boot" (M1).
development.md: :270 version/tag coupling (H1); :353-357, :503 the env guard
(M16); :404 "milter fail-open" as a covered negative (the suite now proves
deferral); :409 "no fixed sleep". roadmap.md: `template-data-typing` describes
`renderDomainDetail` with forty map keys — gone since 2.0 (one typed-before-
render map remains, the health sampler's); `structured-logging` says `logf`
"in five packages" — it is in 21 files of `internal/web`;
`review-2026-08-followups` row "empty password" is misdescribed (M5). Code
comments: `milter.go:7-11` "it never rejects" (it tempfails at `MAIL FROM`);
`store/sendlog.go:19-22,61-65` `StatusRejected`/`InsertRejected` describe the
level-2 case only; `store.go:2-3` "domain-admins"; `schema_test.go:15`
`TestBaselineIsTheOnlyMigration`; `health/machine.go:225` "see roadmap
panel-docs … later" (shipped 1.8.0); `inboundspam.go:349-350` "does not read
the whole journal" (it scans it); `logtail.go:466` mentions `copytruncate`;
supervisord.conf:25 "two services", :107 "7-14 files"; entrypoint.sh:119-120
"no secrets" in `/data/antispam` (`filter.key`); docker-compose.yml:85,88 cite
a guide section by a title it does not have.

### Test gaps

No test for: the H1 stamp (a `panel -version` assertion in the e2e against the
version the stand was told to build); cert re-copy (H2); `follow()` with an
unreadable or recreated log, a truncated `postqueue -p`, lines written to the
old inode after the switch, `UpdateStatus` from `sent` (H3); two logins
differing in case (H4); M1's ordering (restore tests never fail Open/Resync or
exercise the real reload hook); `CheckRestore` with malformed JSON; M3, M5,
L1, L2; `secretfile` concatenation (L3); the sender-check counter with the
real program name (M13); a `LookupAddr` timeout (M15); `TestLimitRefusalsSince`
EXPLAINs a stand-in query, not the real one; `TestOpenMigratesA20Database`
stops at 0004; `Import` with a bad rua / IPs / window 0 / mode (M10); panel.js
has no test at all (M11); login timing (M8); concurrent last-global (M7);
`TestOriginCheck` lacks the Host-with-port vs Origin case;
`TestServerSubtreeIsGlobalOnly` skips any `/server/` route not in
`routes.always`; `internal/atomicfile` and `internal/supervisor` have no
tests; `TestRenderInboundMaps` has no two-routes-one-next-hop case (L5);
`TestSenderCheckResetsBetweenMessages` passes `h = nil` (L9); the handler test
rows of `review-2026-08-followups` (apps/domains/users/dmarc handlers
directly, `internal/dmarc` service) are still open.

### Checked and sound

Worth writing down so the next review does not re-read it: the sender check's
layered rule holds against every `From:` shape tried (quoted local parts with
`@`, CFWS, encoded words decoding to addresses, groups, `<>`, address
literals, obs-route) — the "one `@` outside quotes" rule is the real backstop;
extension stripping and case folding match Postfix; every error path of the
check tempfails; level-2 accounting reserves under one lock and cannot be
inflated by multi-RCPT or bypassed by ABORT/reconnect; the inbound verdict is
trusted only under the queue-id-bound HMAC; the port-25 `-o` overrides are
complete and read back by the e2e through `postconf -Ph`; the generated
milter chain is exactly sender(tempfail) → OpenDKIM(tempfail) →
journal(accept); `/server/` is guarded at registration and per handler;
scopes fail closed (`1 = 0`); sessions store the hash only, `__Host-` cookie,
constant-time setup token; `SaveSettings` restores prior state on mid-way
failure; `secretfile`'s AAD binds header, counter and last-flag, and
truncation, reorder and tamper are tested; shutdown order (tailer offset
saved, HTTP drained, DB closed last) is right; rspamd map names, deny message,
symbol prefixes and key-file format match the Go side byte for byte.

---

## Plan

Six stages, each a self-contained cut, each small enough for one sitting,
with model routing per development.md (security/infra → Opus, UI/docs →
Sonnet). "Done when" is the test that proves it, not the edit.

**Agreed with the owner on 2026-10-12** (roadmap row `audit-2026-10-12`):
stage 0 first, then stages 1 and 2 as one cut, the rest after in any order.
This is the **active plan** in the sense of development.md § Plan checklists:
the `- [ ]` lines below are the implementation checklist, a line is ticked in
the commit that finishes it, and the roadmap's Progress column counts them.
After a context reset, start at the first unchecked line of stage 0. The
owner's decisions on the contested items are written next to the steps they
changed and under *Decided with the owner* at the end; they are not open.

Working rules that apply, from [development.md](development.md) and the
project's memory: every step updates CHANGELOG `[Unreleased]` in its own
commit; a version is cut only at the owner's word; `main` is pushed, tags
are not; design changes (the only one in this plan would be a *Delivery log*
card, and it is not planned) are mockup-first; a migration the test server
has already run is never edited — the next file is added; the published
`1.x` tags and images are history and are not touched.

### Stage 0 — release hygiene (no product code) → `2.4.2`

- [ ] **Stamp the right version** (H1). Make the e2e build take the version from
   the environment (`VERSION: ${SELFPOST_E2E_VERSION:-e2e}` in
   `compose.override.yml`, set by `release.yml`), or have the e2e reuse the
   image already built instead of rebuilding. Done when the e2e asserts
   `panel -version` equals what it was told, and `release.yml` runs that
   assertion before the push. — **Opus**
- [ ] **Compile the e2e in `test.yml`** (M20): `cd test/e2e && go vet ./... && go
   test -run xxx ./...`. — **Haiku**
- [ ] **`.dockerignore` + `test/`** (L33). — **Haiku**
- [ ] **The pin** (M6): old tags and images are not touched (owner,
   2026-10-12). The next publication through the fixed `release.yml` is the
   one the pin names; until then README/guide say that the current line is
   not yet published rather than name an image that is not there. — **Sonnet**
- [ ] **Toolchain and deps**: `modernc.org/sqlite`, `x/crypto`, `x/sys`; note in
   development.md that the image is rebuilt after each Go patch release
   (`golang:1.26-bookworm` floats, so a rebuild suffices). — **Haiku**
- [ ] The four `staticcheck` items. — **Haiku**

### Stage 1 — mail that is shown wrong (H3, H2, M12, M13) → `2.5.0`

- [ ] **`QueueIDs` on a truncated listing returns an error**, as `postqueueJSON`
   does; `reconcile` already treats an error as no information. Test: a 5 MiB
   fake `postqueue -p`. — **Opus**
- [ ] **Reconcile only closes `queued` rows** (`AND status = 'queued'` in the
   reconcile path's update) and marks what it closed: `reason = 'reconcile'`
   on the row (the 0006 column; a new value, no schema change). — **Opus**
- [ ] **Measure before deciding the sweep's fate** (owner, 2026-10-12: the
   keep / remove / `lost` question needs real data, and today the only
   record of a sweep is a stdout line that dies with the container). A table
   `delivery_log_days` (migration `0007`, DDL only; a row per UTC day, kept a
   year, the shape of `sender_check_days`) with four counters:
   `reconcile_closed` (rows the sweep closed); `reconcile_contradicted` (a
   `reason = 'reconcile'` row the tailer later rewrote from a `status=` line —
   the log wins, and the rewrite is counted); `tailer_blind_seconds`
   (`follow()` unable to read: reopen failing, file gone — the sender check's
   downtime mechanics); `queued_over_lifetime` (rows still `queued` past
   `maximal_queue_lifetime` at the day's end — what removing the sweep would
   leave visible). **No screen for this** (owner, 2026-10-12: nothing is
   drawn that ordinary operation will not need): the table is read off a
   copy of the database when the month is up. Whether a durable *Delivery
   log* card (tailer blindness, stuck rows — the two counters that outlive
   the decision) earns a place on Health is a separate question, asked only
   if the data shows those numbers are ever non-zero.
   Decision rule, written now: `closed = 0` for a month → remove the sweep;
   `closed > 0, contradicted = 0` → keep; `contradicted > 0` → each case
   explained by `tailer_blind` means fix the tailer and keep the sweep,
   otherwise `lost` or remove. Decide after 30 days of data, or sooner if
   `contradicted` is ever non-zero. — **Opus**
- *Deferred until the data is in* (not a step yet): pausing the sweep while the tailer is
   not reading (publish "healthy" from `follow`, skip the sweep otherwise),
   and the rotation window (keep draining the old inode until it has not
   grown for a tick and the new file has a line). Both are fixes to the
   tailer's blindness and stay on the list whatever the sweep's fate; their
   priority follows `tailer_blind_seconds`.
- [ ] **A refused message's page shows what Postfix wrote** (owner,
   2026-10-13: "the log box is required" - the box is the reason
   delivery-log-storage was built, and its absence from the picture he
   approved for 2.4.0 was an oversight, not a decision). Today every
   `rejected` row - `wrong From`, `wrong client`, `rate-limited` - has no
   queue id, and its page shows the box with one sentence,
   "This message never reached the queue, so Postfix wrote no delivery lines
   for it" ([handlers_monitor.go](../internal/web/handlers/handlers_monitor.go)).
   The sentence is untrue: Postfix wrote a line for each (`milter-reject:
   END-OF-MESSAGE ... 5.7.1 From: ...` from cleanup, `NOQUEUE: reject: ...`
   from smtpd). The tailer attaches that line to the row it belongs to, by
   client address, time and the addresses in the line, and stores it in
   `send_log_lines` like any other; the page shows it. First on the stand:
   read `mail.log` for the three kinds of refusal and write down what
   identifies each line. Then the mockup: the refused variant of `out-message`
   gets the box with the line in it (`design:` commit), then the code. The
   sentence stays only for a row whose line was truly never written or is
   older than this change, and says that. Done when the e2e shows the stored
   line on the page of each of the three refusals. - **Opus**
- [ ] **Anchor `deliveryRe`** at the head of the line like its two siblings;
   test with the probed HELO and quoted-sender lines. — **Opus**
- [ ] **TLS re-copy** (H2): `postfix-cert-reload.sh` compares the mounted files
   to the copy and re-copies before `postfix reload` (atomically, same modes);
   e2e replaces the cert in the stand and reads the new serial off 465.
   — **Opus**
- [ ] **Deferred counter** (M13): on the stand, `kill -STOP` the panel mid-message
   and record which program logs the warning; widen the matcher accordingly
   and replace the composed fixture with the seen lines. — **Opus**
- [ ] Docs: architecture § Log tailer, § Queue reconcile (the measurement and
   the rule), § Sender check "what it costs"; guide § Delivery log, § Health.
   — **Sonnet**

### Stage 2 — the tenant boundary and the registry (H4, M7, M9, M10) → in `2.5.0` (migration `0008`)

- [ ] **Logins lower-cased** at validation (owner, 2026-10-12: fold, do not
   refuse) and `applications.login COLLATE NOCASE` (migration `0008` rebuilds
   the unique index). Before the migration a check
   that no two existing logins differ only in case (there is one
   installation; look). Tests: `Ops`/`ops` refused; the map written lower-
   case. Then verify Postfix's compare on the stand once (`MAIL FROM` as the
   other case) so the doc's claim is seen, not assumed. — **Opus**
- [ ] **Last global in one transaction**: `DeleteUser`/`SetUserRole` take a
   `tx`, count and act inside it; `CreateGlobalUser` likewise. A concurrency
   test with two goroutines. — **Opus**
- [ ] **`submitUserUpdate` in one transaction** (store method that takes the
   whole change). — **Opus**
- [ ] **Import validates like the form**: route `DMARCRua`, IPs, limit mode,
   window and count through the same parsers; refuse the file with the
   validator's text. Tests per field. — **Opus**
- [ ] **Send-log rows belong to a domain by id** (L12; owner, 2026-10-12).
   `send_log.domain_id INTEGER REFERENCES domains(id) ON DELETE SET NULL` in
   migration `0008`, backfilled once by name against the registry as it is at
   migration time (rows of a domain already gone stay NULL); written by the
   journal milter and by the sender check's refusal rows at insert, looked up
   from the login's domain; the `domain` name column stays for display and
   for the global view. A domain user's log, stats, auto rate limit and the
   notifier's refusal count select by id; a NULL row is nobody's but the
   global role's. A domain deleted and re-added under its old name therefore
   starts with an empty log. The inbound journal (`inbound_spam_log`, the
   same accepted risk in security.md:419) gets the same treatment in the same
   migration — my proposal, so that the two logs do not follow two rules.
   Tests: delete-and-re-add shows nothing to the new assignee; the old rows
   are still in the global log. — **Opus**
- [ ] Docs: security.md § Roles (the guard) and the struck accepted risk, guide
   § Domain export, schema-migrations.md. — **Sonnet**
- [ ] **The 550 reply names no other domain** (L8): `sender.go:334` stops at
   "it names another sender of this server"; the refused message's page
   still shows the `From:` line as written (`header_from`), so the operator
   loses nothing. Test pins the reply text; e2e's sender-check negatives
   assert the reply does not contain the other tenant's name. — **Opus**

### Stage 3 — persistence and restore (M1–M5, L1–L4, L7) → `2.5.1`

- [ ] **Consume the manifest after the resync succeeds** (`CheckRestore` reports;
   `run` deletes after `resyncAfterRestore` returns nil). Test: Resync fails →
   manifest kept → second boot resyncs. — **Opus**
- [ ] **Indexes**: `idx_send_log_domain_created_at (domain_id, created_at)` —
   on the id column stage 2 adds, replacing `idx_send_log_domain`;
   partial `idx_send_log_queued (created_at) WHERE status = 'queued'`;
   consider `(domain, id)` for the scoped page. Migration `0009` DDL only;
   `TestLimitRefusalsSince`-style EXPLAIN tests against the **real** query
   strings. — **Opus**
- [ ] **CLI backup**: open the source `mode=ro`, refuse a missing file; password
   floor of 12 shared with the panel (`validate.MinSecretFilePasswordLen`);
   `-decrypt -o` verifies the password (first chunk) before opening the
   output; `OnWarn` for skipped symlinks and `Check` fails when `certs/` is
   named but empty. — **Opus**
- [ ] **`secretfile` caps**: bound `128·N·r` to a stated budget (e.g. 128 MiB)
   and `p` to 1-2; refuse the rest with `ErrHeader`; reject trailing bytes
   after the last chunk. Tests. — **Opus**
- [ ] **`atomicfile`**: fsync the directory after rename; a test file for the
   package. — **Opus**
- [ ] Docs: security.md § Backup; guide § Backup. — **Sonnet**

### Stage 4 — panel behaviour (M8, M11, L10–L19) → `2.5.2`

- [ ] Login: dummy bcrypt on unknown user; a test that measures both paths within
   a tolerance. Account password change gets its own limiter bucket. Login
   destroys the presented session. — **Opus**
- [ ] `http.Server`: `ReadTimeout`, `WriteTimeout`, `IdleTimeout`. — **Opus**
- [ ] **Polling recovery**: schedule from `htmx:afterRequest` on the box (or pass
   `source`), handle `sendError`/`timeout` with back-off; `RequireAuth`
   answers an `HX-Request` with `HX-Redirect: /login` instead of a 303. A
   minimal JS test (node + jsdom) or at least an e2e that restarts the panel
   with Overview open. — **Sonnet**
- [ ] `parsePage` clamp; `NaN` refused; `rate-limited` tag red (add the status to
   `components.go`, flip the test); the recalc button posts only what it
   needs or warns; `HandleReload` either covers DMARC maps and filter lists or
   the flash and the two comments say what it covers. — **Sonnet**
- [ ] `domain.Service.Delete`: say the domain is deleted when a later step fails,
   and run `apps.Resync()` anyway. — **Opus**
- [ ] **A status filter and a day filter in the Outbound log** (owner, 2026-10-13, from the
   Not done list of from-header-binding). The mockup `out-log` has drawn a
   third list since the redesign and the built log never had it; the Inbound
   log has its counterpart built (domain, decision, day). One list: *Any
   status*, `queued`, `sent`, `deferred`, `bounced`, `rejected` - the statuses
   of a row, and `rejected` shows all three kinds of refusal together. He was
   shown the list with the refusals split by reason and chose it without the
   split. The mockup's own list is wrong (it offers `rate-limited`, which is
   a reason, and lacks `queued` and `rejected`): correct it first (`design:`
   commit). And a filter by day, as the Inbound log has it (owner, the same
   day): the same control, drawn in the mockup first. Both filters survive
   paging and the rows' polling. - **Sonnet**
- [ ] **The last untyped page data** (owner, 2026-10-13): `healthChecks`
   ([handlers_status.go](../internal/web/handlers/handlers_status.go)) returns
   a struct instead of `map[string]any`, so a mistyped key in `healthPage` /
   `healthCards` is a compile error and not an empty card on Server › Health.
   No template change. This closes what is left of the roadmap's former
   `template-data-typing`. — **Sonnet**
- [ ] **Upstream TLS mode validated at save** (L5): saving an inbound domain
   whose `[host]:port` is already used by another domain with a different
   TLS mode is refused with the validator's text naming that domain and its
   mode; `TestRenderInboundMaps` gets the two-routes-one-next-hop case and the
   map is asserted to hold one key. Guide § Inbound domains says a next hop
   has one TLS mode. — **Opus**

### Stage 5 — image and Postfix hardening (M17–M19, M21, L30–L32) → `2.6.0`

- [ ] **Supervisor socket**: a group of its own (`supervisor`), panel only;
   `postfix`/`opendkim` keep `selfpost` for the file paths. — **Opus**
- [ ] **OpenDKIM**: `Syslog yes` (supervisord captures it) or `Logfile`;
   `Canonicalization relaxed/simple`; `OversignHeaders From`. e2e: DKIM still
   verifies; a message with two `From:` is refused before signing anyway.
   — **Opus**
- [ ] **Postfix**: `smtpd_tls_protocols = >=TLSv1.2`, `smtpd_tls_mandatory_protocols`
   likewise, `disable_vrfy_command = yes`, `smtpd_banner = $myhostname ESMTP`;
   integer validation of `RATE_LIMIT_*`, `*_SIZE_LIMIT`, `MILTER_*_TIMEOUT` at
   the top of `postfix-config.sh` with a clear exit. — **Opus**
- [ ] **logrotate state under `/data/log/.logrotate.status`** (`-s`), group-
   readable as the directory is. — **Opus**
- [ ] **entrypoint**: normalise the three DMARC maps with the other five;
   remove the dead `set-permissions` branch. — **Opus**
- [ ] **`extract-cert.sh`**: `set -o pipefail` under `bash`, check both outputs
   are non-empty PEM before moving them into place, create `0600` first.
   — **Opus**
- [ ] **`crashexit`**: subscribe to `PROCESS_STATE_EXITED` with a restart-count
   threshold, or raise `startsecs` so a crash after 1 s still reaches FATAL;
   say in architecture.md what actually exits the container. — **Opus**
- [ ] **`envdoc_test` made real**: parse `envDefault|envInt|os.Getenv("…")` out of
   `cmd/panel/*.go` and `${VAR` out of `build/*.sh`, parse the key tables out
   of guide.md and architecture.md, compare. — **Opus**
- [ ] Docs: architecture § Image and processes, § Configuration; security.md
   § Process. — **Sonnet**

### Stage 6 — documentation and roadmap sweep (no product code, no cut)

- [ ] Every item under *Doc drift* above, file by file. — **Sonnet**
- [ ] roadmap.md: `template-data-typing` is struck already (owner, 2026-10-13;
   its last map is a step of stage 4); `structured-logging` is dropped (owner,
   2026-10-13, roadmap § Dropped) - nothing to reword; in
   `review-2026-08-followups` mark `parsePage` and `secretfile` rows as
   addressed by stages 3-4, keep the `offset.go` inode row (still open:
   fingerprint of the first 512 bytes only), and the `dnscheck` fan-out row
   now points at M14. Add the open tests list above as the test row's new
   content. — **Sonnet**
- [ ] Comments named above (`milter.go`, `sendlog.go`, `store.go`, `schema_test.go`,
   `machine.go`, `inboundspam.go`, `logtail.go`, supervisord.conf,
   entrypoint.sh, docker-compose.yml). — **Haiku**
- [ ] Dead code removal from § Nits, with `staticcheck` added to `test.yml` so it
   stays gone. — **Haiku**

### Decided with the owner on 2026-10-12

Four items I had first put below the line; three of them are in the plan
above after discussion, which is why they are recorded here with the
reasoning rather than struck.

- L5 (`tls_policy` per next-hop): the full fix is a model change (TLS mode per
  upstream, not per domain) — a design item. Decided (owner, 2026-10-12):
  validate instead — stage 4, item 6.
- L12 (rows by domain name): decided (owner, 2026-10-12): the send log gets
  the domain's id — stage 2, item 5.
- L8 (the signing-name oracle): decided (owner, 2026-10-12): do it — stage 2,
  item 7. (The names are not public: rDNS gives the hostname only, so the
  reply told one tenant which other domains are hosted here.)
- L9 (go-milter header accumulation): decided (owner, 2026-10-12): locally
  only — a comment on `senderSession.Headers` saying why `h` is ignored, and
  `TestSenderCheckResetsBetweenMessages` passing an `h` that still holds the
  first message's `From:` (stage 2, with item 7). The library itself stays
  as vendored; an upstream patch is a separate, unhurried matter.
- The Windows-bound tests: not worth platform guards; CI is Linux.