Files
selfpost/internal/web/validate/validate.go
T
mixandClaude Opus 5.5 f09b60aaa2
test / test (push) Canceled after 0s
panel-notifications: findings of the technical and security reviews
Neither review (read-only agents, Opus and Fable, over 972a9f8..400aa76) has
a Critical finding. Both found the same serious one, and more:

- The notification about refused mail was built on what a rejected row says
  of itself. Its domain is the one in MAIL FROM, which the client typed and
  Postfix has not yet held against the login when the milter refuses: an
  application over its limit could have had the panel write a message per
  made-up domain, to another tenant's users among others. And the same
  status is written when an application is refused for its client address,
  which is no limit. Refusals are now counted by the domain the login is
  registered under, only for logins that exist and only while a limit is set
  on the login or its domain; one subject per sending domain. They are read
  through a partial index of their own (migration 0005): the query walked
  the whole send log every minute.
- Account and user e-mails were checked with the DMARC report validator,
  which refuses Gmail and the like - the owner's own kind of address. A new
  validate.AccountEmail accepts them and refuses a local part beginning "-".
- "Said" now means sent: what arises while nobody can be told, or while
  Postfix does not take the message, is told at a later check. Its ending
  with nobody left to tell is simply over.
- Two DNS checks must be 45 minutes apart as well as two: the last check
  before a restart and the first after it were minutes apart.
- The notifier's own mail waiting in the queue, and its bounce coming back
  to postmaster@ this server, are not the queue's subject. A listing cut at
  its size limit or with a line too long to read is no listing; postqueue -j
  gets 30 seconds.
- The tables must name the selector the panel shows, not only have the line.
- An a/mx lookup that did not answer inside the SPF check made the record
  "not authorising"; it is "cannot tell" now, for the pages too.
- A ceiling of 60 messages an hour; a pass stops between domains when the
  process is asked to stop; sendmail gets a WaitDelay; days are rounded as a
  person counts; a failed read of the switch shows it on, not off.

Recorded as accepted in security.md, with a roadmap candidate
(from-header-binding): an application can have a message signed as the
server's own name - or, as always, as another registered domain - by writing
it into the From: header, which nothing holds against the login.

Left as found: a recipient whose copy failed while another's went out is not
tried again; a certificate that lives under 14 days is reported at each
renewal.

On the test server, for this tree: go vet clean, go test ./... 23 packages
ok, make e2e ok (326 s).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-12 17:00:01 +03:00

167 lines
5.5 KiB
Go

// Package validate holds shared server-side form validation for the panel.
package validate
import (
"fmt"
"strings"
"unicode"
)
// MinAdminPasswordLen is the floor for the administrator password. The panel is
// public (security.md), so this is deliberately not tiny.
const MinAdminPasswordLen = 12
const (
minUsernameLen = 3
maxUsernameLen = 64
)
// MinSecretFilePasswordLen is the floor for the password protecting an
// encrypted backup or domain export. Such a file is offline and can be attacked
// at leisure, so the floor matches the administrator password's rather than the
// weaker "any password is better than none".
const MinSecretFilePasswordLen = MinAdminPasswordLen
// Username enforces a strict server-side whitelist (security.md): letters,
// digits, dot, dash, underscore. Client validation is never trusted.
func Username(u string) error {
if len(u) < minUsernameLen || len(u) > maxUsernameLen {
return fmt.Errorf("username must be %d-%d characters", minUsernameLen, maxUsernameLen)
}
for _, r := range u {
if r > unicode.MaxASCII || (!isASCIILetterOrDigit(r) && r != '.' && r != '-' && r != '_') {
return fmt.Errorf("username may contain only letters, digits, '.', '-' and '_'")
}
}
return nil
}
// AdminPassword enforces a minimum length. Composition rules beyond length tend
// to reduce entropy in practice, so length is the sole gate.
func AdminPassword(p string) error {
if len(p) < MinAdminPasswordLen {
return fmt.Errorf("password must be at least %d characters", MinAdminPasswordLen)
}
return nil
}
func isASCIILetterOrDigit(r rune) bool {
return (r >= 'a' && r <= 'z') || (r >= 'A' && r <= 'Z') || (r >= '0' && r <= '9')
}
const maxDomainLen = 253 // RFC 1035 limit on a fully-qualified name
// NormalizeDomain lower-cases and trims a domain name. Domain names are
// case-insensitive, and the generated OpenDKIM tables/keys use the canonical
// lower-case form, so we normalise before both validation and storage.
func NormalizeDomain(name string) string {
return strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(name))
}
// Domain enforces a strict server-side whitelist for sending-domain names
// (security.md). The result is safe to write verbatim into the OpenDKIM
// KeyTable/SigningTable and to use as a filesystem path segment: only
// lower-case letters, digits, '.' and '-' are allowed, in valid DNS label
// shape. Input must already be normalised with NormalizeDomain.
func Domain(name string) error {
if name == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("domain is required")
}
if len(name) > maxDomainLen {
return fmt.Errorf("domain must be at most %d characters", maxDomainLen)
}
labels := strings.Split(name, ".")
if len(labels) < 2 {
return fmt.Errorf("domain must include at least one dot (e.g. example.com)")
}
for _, label := range labels {
if err := domainLabel(label); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
func domainLabel(label string) error {
if len(label) == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("domain must not contain an empty label")
}
if len(label) > 63 {
return fmt.Errorf("each domain label must be at most 63 characters")
}
if label[0] == '-' || label[len(label)-1] == '-' {
return fmt.Errorf("domain labels must not start or end with '-'")
}
for i := 0; i < len(label); i++ {
c := label[i]
lower := c >= 'a' && c <= 'z'
digit := c >= '0' && c <= '9'
if !lower && !digit && c != '-' {
return fmt.Errorf("domain may contain only lower-case letters, digits, '.' and '-'")
}
}
return nil
}
// freemailDomains lists public mail hosts that cannot publish _report._dmarc
// authorisation for third-party sending domains.
var freemailDomains = map[string]struct{}{
"gmail.com": {},
"googlemail.com": {},
"outlook.com": {},
"hotmail.com": {},
"live.com": {},
"yahoo.com": {},
"icloud.com": {},
"me.com": {},
"proton.me": {},
"protonmail.com": {},
}
// AccountEmail checks a panel user's own address: where the panel writes to
// them. Empty is allowed. It is the address check of Email without that
// function's refusal of public mail hosts - a mailbox at one of those is a
// perfectly good place to be notified, and for many administrators the only
// one that does not depend on the server the notification is about.
func AccountEmail(addr string) error {
return emailAddress(addr, true)
}
// Email checks a DMARC rua= mailbox. Empty is allowed (policy-only).
func Email(addr string) error {
return emailAddress(addr, false)
}
func emailAddress(addr string, publicHosts bool) error {
addr = strings.TrimSpace(addr)
if addr == "" {
return nil
}
at := strings.LastIndex(addr, "@")
if at <= 0 || at >= len(addr)-1 {
return fmt.Errorf("enter a valid email address")
}
local := addr[:at]
// An address is handed to sendmail(1) as an argument; one that begins like
// an option is refused here, where the user can be told.
if strings.HasPrefix(local, "-") {
return fmt.Errorf("email address must not begin with '-'")
}
domain := NormalizeDomain(addr[at+1:])
if err := Domain(domain); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("email domain is invalid: %w", err)
}
for _, r := range local {
if r > unicode.MaxASCII {
return fmt.Errorf("email address must be ASCII")
}
if !isASCIILetterOrDigit(r) && r != '.' && r != '-' && r != '_' && r != '+' {
return fmt.Errorf("email address contains invalid characters")
}
}
if _, blocked := freemailDomains[domain]; blocked && !publicHosts {
return fmt.Errorf("use an address on a domain you control; public mail hosts cannot receive authorised DMARC reports")
}
return nil
}