The owner, 2026-10-12: take quarantine out of the main plan, it is an idea to think about. Its index row and section leave roadmap.md; a new closing section, "Ideas, not on the roadmap", keeps a paragraph and the link to the notes in plans/inbound-quarantine.md. panel-notifications no longer lists "mail is held in quarantine" among its events. The plans that called it a candidate say what it is now. The drawn screens stay unbuilt, as they were. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Plan: inbound-quarantine
Status: an idea to think about, not on the roadmap (owner, 2026-10-12) — design TBD; needs explicit agreement before any code
Version: TBD (1.x MINOR if opt-in and backward-compatible; may warrant 2.x
if it changes inbound storage or backup contract).
Goal (draft)
Let the operator hold suspicious inbound mail instead of only accept/reject at the milter — review in the panel, then release to the configured upstream, delete, or add sender to allow/deny lists.
This is a product boundary question, not a settled design. The item exists so we can compare approaches before committing.
Why it is separate from inbound-antispam-panel
inbound-antispam-panel.md covers metadata
(journal + lists). Quarantine implies storing message bodies (or a durable
reference to them) under /data, retention, release workflow, and a wider
attack/backup surface — closer to "mini-mailbox" than pure relay.
Mockup
A target look is drawn — list and detail — in-quarantine, in-quarantine-message — under the design contract of panel-redesign.md. It assumes answers to the questions below (SelfPost holds the mail, release goes to the upstream, 14 days, headers only in the panel); it does not settle them.
Open questions (to decide before a checklist)
- Where mail lives
- SelfPost store under
/data/quarantine/(panel owns lifecycle), or - delegate to rspamd/Redis and panel only proxies release (less storage in SelfPost, tighter rspamd coupling).
- SelfPost store under
- What "release" means
- inject into Postfix as a new delivery to the domain's upstream transport;
- or manual download only (no automatic forward).
- Retention and caps
- max age, max total bytes, per-domain limits; interaction with backup size.
- RBAC
- global admin only vs domain-admin for assigned inbound domains.
- Threat model
- malware in stored MIME, path traversal on extract, quota DoS on busy MX.
- Product fit
- does this violate product.md "no mailboxes" if we only hold spam suspects briefly? Explicit product decision required.
Context (as-built)
- Inbound relay forwards or rejects; no local delivery (architecture.md § Mail path).
- Optional
INBOUND_ANTISPAM_MILTER— external rspamd may quarantine on its own today, without panel integration. - DMARC
p=quarantineis unrelated (outbound policy for receivers).
Likely out of scope (until revisited)
- IMAP/webmail for quarantined mail.
- End-user self-service quarantine (non-admin recipients).
- Outbound quarantine.
Dependencies
- Inbound relay, shipped in
[1.4.0]— as built in architecture.md § Mail path. - Sensible to decide after or alongside inbound-antispam-panel.md (journal/lists), but not blocked on it for design discussion.
Done when (placeholder)
TBD once approach is chosen. Minimum bar would include: opt-in flag, panel list/detail, release or discard action, retention, backup inclusion documented, security review.
Implementation checklist
None yet — expand this plan after the open questions above are answered.