Files
selfpost/cmd/selfpost-backup/main_test.go
T
mixandClaude Opus 5.5 242515c305 audit 3: backup CLI, envelope budget, directory sync, docs; findings of the reviews
Steps 3-6 of stage 3 and what the two reviews found in steps 1-6, in one
commit: the review fixes sit in the same hunks.

Step 3, CLI backup (M3, M5, L1, L2; L4 of the stage's list):
- backup.snapshotDB refuses a database that is not there and opens the
  source mode=ro (measured: mode=ro creates no file).
- selfpost-backup holds an encrypting password to
  validate.MinSecretFilePasswordLen; -o of both directions writes a
  temporary file beside the name and renames it whole; -decrypt peeks the
  first chunk (password and type authenticated) before the output exists.
- what a backup leaves out (a link under data/, a link under certs/ to a
  directory, a socket...) is told to OnWarn; certs/ with no file is
  backup.ErrNoCerts, refused by Check and Create, named by the panel.
- parseTrustedProxies: a bare address takes /128 when written with a
  colon (::ffff:10.0.0.1/32 was ::/32).
Step 4, secretfile (M4, L3): scrypt's V at most 128 MiB, r <= 64, p <= 2;
bytes after the last chunk are ErrCorrupt.
Step 5 (L7): atomicfile.SyncDir after the rename, used by Write,
replaceSASLDB and the CLI; atomicfile_test.go.
Step 6: security.md and guide on backup and restore.

Reviews (technical, security):
- H1: a restore of a server with DMARC on was refused on every start - the
  archive records no owner, tar as root left the DMARC maps root's, and the
  entrypoint only chowned the maps it named. It now hands every file beside
  queue/ in /data/postfix to panel:selfpost 0640; e2e writes an extra map
  before the backup and finds it panel:selfpost 640 after a root unpack.
- the comparison reads regular files only (Lstat, size, LimitReader); a
  record unpacked again wins over the earlier check's mark; ConsumeRestore
  removes both; the mark is synced; a journal file beside a freshly unpacked
  database is refused.
- AttachRefusalLine refuses an empty line as the old statement did; skipped
  entries named in words; -decrypt of an empty payload is no failure; guide
  wording on the shell's '>' and a killed CLI; the in-place restore's
  'mv .' (older than this stage) fixed.

Tested on the test server: go vet + go test of 25 packages, make e2e (all
pass, 643 s) on this tree.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-15 10:38:39 +03:00

238 lines
7.4 KiB
Go

package main
import (
"archive/tar"
"compress/gzip"
"io"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/backup"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/store"
)
// seedProject builds the minimum operator project tree a backup can be taken from.
func seedProject(t *testing.T) (deployRoot, dataDir string) {
t.Helper()
deployRoot = t.TempDir()
dataDir = filepath.Join(deployRoot, "data")
if err := os.MkdirAll(dataDir, 0o750); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("mkdir data: %v", err)
}
st, err := store.Open(filepath.Join(dataDir, "selfpost.db"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("open store: %v", err)
}
if _, err := st.AddDomain("example.com", "selfpost"); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("add domain: %v", err)
}
if err := st.Close(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("close store: %v", err)
}
writeFile(t, filepath.Join(deployRoot, backup.ComposeFileName), "services:\n selfpost:\n image: test\n")
writeFile(t, filepath.Join(deployRoot, backup.EnvFileName), "SELFPOST_HOSTNAME=mail.example.com\n")
writeFile(t, filepath.Join(deployRoot, backup.CertsDirName, "fullchain.pem"), "CERT")
writeFile(t, filepath.Join(deployRoot, backup.CertsDirName, "privkey.pem"), "KEY")
t.Setenv("SELFPOST_DATA_DIR", dataDir)
t.Setenv("SELFPOST_DB_PATH", filepath.Join(dataDir, "selfpost.db"))
t.Setenv("SELFPOST_DEPLOY_ROOT", deployRoot)
return deployRoot, dataDir
}
func writeFile(t *testing.T, path, content string) {
t.Helper()
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(path), 0o750); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("mkdir %s: %v", path, err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(content), 0o640); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write %s: %v", path, err)
}
}
// An encrypted backup is only worth having if the container it came from can
// hand it back as an ordinary archive during a restore, so the two halves of
// the CLI are tested as the one round trip an operator actually performs.
func TestEncryptedBackupRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
seedProject(t)
dir := t.TempDir()
encrypted := filepath.Join(dir, "backup.spbk")
plain := filepath.Join(dir, "backup.tar.gz")
const password = "a long enough password"
if err := run(encrypted, password); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create encrypted backup: %v", err)
}
head, err := os.ReadFile(encrypted)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read backup: %v", err)
}
if !strings.HasPrefix(string(head), "SELFPOST") {
t.Fatalf("encrypted backup does not start with the envelope magic")
}
if err := runDecrypt(encrypted, plain, "the wrong password"); err == nil {
t.Fatal("decryption with the wrong password succeeded")
}
if err := runDecrypt(encrypted, plain, password); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decrypt: %v", err)
}
// What comes out must be the same gzip tar the plain path produces.
f, err := os.Open(plain)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("open decrypted archive: %v", err)
}
defer f.Close()
gz, err := gzip.NewReader(f)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("gzip: %v", err)
}
names := map[string]bool{}
tr := tar.NewReader(gz)
for {
hdr, err := tr.Next()
if err == io.EOF {
break
}
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("tar: %v", err)
}
names[hdr.Name] = true
}
for _, want := range []string{
backup.DataArchivePrefix + backup.ManifestName,
backup.DataArchivePrefix + "selfpost.db",
backup.ComposeFileName,
backup.EnvFileName,
} {
if !names[want] {
t.Errorf("decrypted archive has no %s (entries: %v)", want, names)
}
}
}
// Without a password the CLI keeps producing the plain archive that existing
// backup scripts consume.
func TestUnencryptedBackupStaysPlain(t *testing.T) {
seedProject(t)
out := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "backup.tar.gz")
if err := run(out, ""); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create backup: %v", err)
}
f, err := os.Open(out)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("open archive: %v", err)
}
defer f.Close()
if _, err := gzip.NewReader(f); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("plain backup is not a gzip archive: %v", err)
}
}
// Decrypting needs a password, and it must come from a file or the environment
// — never an argument, which the process list would expose.
func TestReadPassword(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
pwFile := filepath.Join(dir, "pw")
if err := os.WriteFile(pwFile, []byte("from the file\nignored second line\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write password file: %v", err)
}
t.Setenv(passwordEnv, "from the environment")
got, err := readPassword("")
if err != nil || got != "from the environment" {
t.Errorf("readPassword(\"\") = %q, %v", got, err)
}
got, err = readPassword(pwFile)
if err != nil || got != "from the file" {
t.Errorf("readPassword(file) = %q, %v", got, err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(pwFile, nil, 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("truncate password file: %v", err)
}
if _, err := readPassword(pwFile); err == nil {
t.Error("an empty password file was accepted")
}
os.Unsetenv(passwordEnv)
if err := runDecrypt("", "", ""); err == nil {
t.Error("-decrypt without a password was accepted")
}
}
// An encrypted backup is held to the panel's password floor (audit
// 2026-10-12, M5); a refused one writes nothing.
func TestEncryptionPasswordFloor(t *testing.T) {
seedProject(t)
out := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "backup.spbk")
err := run(out, "eleven-char")
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "at least 12 characters") {
t.Fatalf("an 11-character password = %v, want refused", err)
}
if _, statErr := os.Stat(out); !os.IsNotExist(statErr) {
t.Errorf("the refused backup wrote %s", out)
}
}
// A wrong SELFPOST_DB_PATH makes no backup and no database (audit
// 2026-10-12, M3).
func TestBackupOfAMissingDatabaseIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
_, dataDir := seedProject(t)
missing := filepath.Join(dataDir, "typo.db")
t.Setenv("SELFPOST_DB_PATH", missing)
out := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "backup.tar.gz")
if err := run(out, ""); err == nil {
t.Fatal("a backup of a database that is not there was made")
}
for _, p := range []string{missing, out} {
if _, err := os.Stat(p); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
t.Errorf("the refused backup left %s (stat err = %v)", p, err)
}
}
}
// -decrypt -o writes its file whole or not at all: a wrong password or an
// envelope cut short leaves the file that had the name before, and nothing
// else in its directory (audit 2026-10-12, L1 and stage 3).
func TestDecryptLeavesTheOutputAloneOnFailure(t *testing.T) {
seedProject(t)
dir := t.TempDir()
encrypted := filepath.Join(dir, "backup.spbk")
const password = "a long enough password"
if err := run(encrypted, password); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create encrypted backup: %v", err)
}
sealed, err := os.ReadFile(encrypted)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
cut := filepath.Join(dir, "cut.spbk")
writeFile(t, cut, string(sealed[:len(sealed)-100]))
outDir := t.TempDir()
out := filepath.Join(outDir, "backup.tar.gz")
const before = "the archive that was here"
for _, c := range []struct{ name, in, password, want string }{
{"wrong password", encrypted, "the wrong password", "wrong password"},
{"cut short", cut, password, "corrupted"},
} {
t.Run(c.name, func(t *testing.T) {
writeFile(t, out, before)
err := runDecrypt(c.in, out, c.password)
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), c.want) {
t.Fatalf("runDecrypt = %v, want %q", err, c.want)
}
if got, _ := os.ReadFile(out); string(got) != before {
t.Errorf("the failed decryption changed %s to %d bytes", out, len(got))
}
entries, _ := os.ReadDir(outDir)
if len(entries) != 1 {
t.Errorf("the failed decryption left files beside its output: %v", entries)
}
})
}
}