Files
selfpost/internal/web/handlers_account.go
T
mix efaf016c5f
test / test (push) Has been cancelled
Fix DMARC guidance for send-only relays with optional rua= settings.
The panel now suggests policy-only DMARC by default, lets operators configure a default and per-domain report address, and DNS-checks hub _report._dmarc records. Future in-panel report ingestion is tracked as dmarc-reports in the roadmap.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
2026-08-10 22:47:34 +03:00

208 lines
6.9 KiB
Go

package web
import (
"context"
"errors"
"net/http"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/dnscheck"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/store"
"golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"
)
// handleAccount serves the administrator's own account settings: the username
// and password chosen during setup are the only panel credentials
// (security.md), and until now they could be changed only by recreating the
// state. Changing them here never touches application SASL logins, which are a
// separate identity system (architecture.md § Mail path).
func (s *Server) handleAccount(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
switch r.Method {
case http.MethodGet:
admin, err := s.store.GetAdmin()
if err != nil {
logf("panel: account: get admin failed: %v", err)
http.Error(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
s.renderAccount(w, r, http.StatusOK, "", admin.Username, admin.DMARCReportEmail)
case http.MethodPost:
s.submitAccount(w, r)
default:
w.Header().Set("Allow", "GET, POST")
http.Error(w, "method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
}
}
// renderAccount draws the settings form. formUsername and formDMARCEmail
// repopulate fields after a rejected submission; password fields are never
// repopulated.
func (s *Server) renderAccount(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, status int, formErr, formUsername, formDMARCEmail string) {
var reportAuth dnscheck.Result
if hub := dnscheck.EmailDomain(formDMARCEmail); hub != "" {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(r.Context(), 5*time.Second)
reportAuth = s.dns.ReportAuth(ctx, hub)
cancel()
}
s.render(w, status, "account", map[string]any{
"Title": "SelfPost — settings",
"User": currentUser(r),
"Active": "account",
"FormUsername": formUsername,
"FormDMARCEmail": formDMARCEmail,
"ReportAuthName": dnscheck.ReportAuthRecordName(dnscheck.EmailDomain(formDMARCEmail)),
"ReportAuthExample": dnscheck.ReportAuthExample(),
"ReportAuthDNS": reportAuth,
"ReportAuthHub": dnscheck.EmailDomain(formDMARCEmail),
"Error": formErr,
"Flash": accountFlash(r),
})
}
// accountFlash maps a fixed redirect flag to a fixed message, so status text
// after a redirect is never attacker-influenced.
func accountFlash(r *http.Request) string {
switch r.URL.Query().Get("updated") {
case "username":
return "Username changed."
case "password":
return "Password changed. Any other signed-in sessions were signed out."
case "both":
return "Username and password changed. Any other signed-in sessions were signed out."
case "email":
return "DMARC report address updated."
case "username-email":
return "Username and DMARC report address updated."
case "password-email":
return "Password and DMARC report address updated. Any other signed-in sessions were signed out."
case "all":
return "Settings updated. Any other signed-in sessions were signed out."
default:
return ""
}
}
// submitAccount applies a username and/or password change. The current password
// is always required, so a stolen session alone cannot lock the administrator
// out of their own panel, and the attempt is throttled on the same limiter as
// the login form so this route cannot be used to brute-force the password past
// that limit (security.md).
func (s *Server) submitAccount(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if !s.loginLimiter.Allow(clientIP(r, s.trustedProxies)) {
s.renderAccount(w, r, http.StatusTooManyRequests,
"Too many attempts. Please wait and try again.", currentUser(r), "")
return
}
if err := r.ParseForm(); err != nil {
s.renderAccount(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid form submission.", currentUser(r), "")
return
}
username := strings.TrimSpace(r.PostFormValue("username"))
current := r.PostFormValue("current_password")
password := r.PostFormValue("new_password")
confirm := r.PostFormValue("new_password_confirm")
dmarcEmail := strings.TrimSpace(r.PostFormValue("dmarc_report_email"))
admin, err := s.store.GetAdmin()
if err != nil {
logf("panel: account: get admin failed: %v", err)
http.Error(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
if username == "" {
username = admin.Username
}
if err := bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword([]byte(admin.PasswordHash), []byte(current)); err != nil {
s.renderAccount(w, r, http.StatusUnauthorized, "Current password is incorrect.", username, dmarcEmail)
return
}
renaming := username != admin.Username
if renaming {
if err := validateUsername(username); err != nil {
s.renderAccount(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error(), username, dmarcEmail)
return
}
}
if err := validateEmail(dmarcEmail); err != nil {
s.renderAccount(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error(), username, dmarcEmail)
return
}
emailChanging := dmarcEmail != admin.DMARCReportEmail
repassword := password != "" || confirm != ""
if repassword {
if password != confirm {
s.renderAccount(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "New passwords do not match.", username, dmarcEmail)
return
}
if err := validateAdminPassword(password); err != nil {
s.renderAccount(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error(), username, dmarcEmail)
return
}
}
if !renaming && !repassword && !emailChanging {
s.renderAccount(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest,
"Nothing to change: enter a new username, password, or DMARC report address.", username, dmarcEmail)
return
}
hash := admin.PasswordHash
if repassword {
newHash, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte(password), bcrypt.DefaultCost)
if err != nil {
logf("panel: account: hashing password failed: %v", err)
s.renderAccount(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError,
"Internal error. Please try again.", username, dmarcEmail)
return
}
hash = string(newHash)
}
if err := s.store.UpdateAdmin(username, hash, dmarcEmail); err != nil {
logf("panel: account: update admin failed: %v", err)
msg := "Could not save the changes. Please check the logs and try again."
if errors.Is(err, store.ErrNoAdmin) {
msg = "There is no administrator account to update."
}
s.renderAccount(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError, msg, username, dmarcEmail)
return
}
if token, ok := s.sessionToken(r); ok {
if renaming {
s.sessions.Rename(token, username)
}
if repassword {
s.sessions.DestroyOthers(token)
}
}
logf("panel: administrator account updated (username: %t, password: %t, dmarc email: %t)", renaming, repassword, emailChanging)
http.Redirect(w, r, "/account?updated="+updatedFlag(renaming, repassword, emailChanging), http.StatusSeeOther)
}
func updatedFlag(renamed, repassword, emailChanged bool) string {
switch {
case renamed && repassword && emailChanged:
return "all"
case renamed && emailChanged:
return "username-email"
case repassword && emailChanged:
return "password-email"
case renamed && repassword:
return "both"
case renamed:
return "username"
case repassword:
return "password"
default:
return "email"
}
}