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Review pass over `1.4.0`…`1.9.1`: port 25 no longer shares the submission milter chain, DMARC reports are validated before they are stored, and the auto rate limit is correct for a non-default level-1 window. Schema migration `0010` (index only). Upgrading is a tag bump. Added: - SQLite migration `0010_send_log_app_login_index.sql` — - DMARC aggregate reports are accepted as **zip** as well as gzip or plain XML - e2e: `checkPort25ConfigCombinations` regenerates the Postfix configuration Changed: - README hero line and a **Positioning** block in `docs/product.md` record the Fixed: - The setup account's password is hashed at bcrypt cost `12` like every other - Login/setup rate limiter: protecting blocked buckets from eviction is now - `postqueue -p` output is bounded to 4 MiB (the timeout alone left the size of - [schema-migrations.md](docs/schema-migrations.md): the schema section was - postqueue reader is now time-bounded: `postqueue -p` runs under a 5-second … (11 more in CHANGELOG) Changed: - [roadmap.md](docs/roadmap.md) now carries everything the 2026-08-19 code - Extracted `internal/configsafe` — the empty-value and forbidden-character - Build, deploy and migration comments no longer cite the archived - Dropped the `parseDomainRateLimitForm` / `parseAppRateLimitForm` pass-through - Extracted shared helpers: `internal/atomicfile` (atomic temp-write+rename) and … (7 more in CHANGELOG) Removed: - Unused legacy asset `docs/assets/icon.png` (superseded by the four brand SVGs - Plan documents for already-shipped features: `domain-stats-auto-ratelimit`, Full detail: CHANGELOG.md (1.9.2).
84 lines
3.3 KiB
Markdown
84 lines
3.3 KiB
Markdown
# Plan: inbound-quarantine
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**Status:** candidate — design TBD; needs explicit agreement before any code
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**Version:** TBD (`1.x` MINOR if opt-in and backward-compatible; may warrant `2.x`
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if it changes inbound storage or backup contract).
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---
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## Goal (draft)
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Let the operator **hold suspicious inbound mail** instead of only accept/reject
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at the milter — review in the panel, then release to the configured upstream,
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delete, or add sender to allow/deny lists.
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This is a **product boundary question**, not a settled design. The item exists
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so we can compare approaches before committing.
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## Why it is separate from inbound-antispam-panel
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[inbound-antispam-panel.md](inbound-antispam-panel.md) covers **metadata**
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(journal + lists). Quarantine implies **storing message bodies** (or a durable
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reference to them) under `/data`, retention, release workflow, and a wider
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attack/backup surface — closer to "mini-mailbox" than pure relay.
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## Mockup
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A target look is drawn — list and detail —
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[in-quarantine](../assets/panel-redesign/panel/in-quarantine.html),
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[in-quarantine-message](../assets/panel-redesign/panel/in-quarantine-message.html)
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— under the design contract of [panel-redesign.md](panel-redesign.md). It
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assumes answers to the questions below (SelfPost holds the mail, release goes
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to the upstream, 14 days, headers only in the panel); it does not settle them.
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## Open questions (to decide before a checklist)
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1. **Where mail lives**
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- SelfPost store under `/data/quarantine/` (panel owns lifecycle), or
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- delegate to rspamd/Redis and panel only proxies release (less storage in
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SelfPost, tighter rspamd coupling).
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2. **What "release" means**
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- inject into Postfix as a new delivery to the domain's upstream transport;
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- or manual download only (no automatic forward).
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3. **Retention and caps**
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- max age, max total bytes, per-domain limits; interaction with backup size.
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4. **RBAC**
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- global admin only vs domain-admin for assigned inbound domains.
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5. **Threat model**
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- malware in stored MIME, path traversal on extract, quota DoS on busy MX.
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6. **Product fit**
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- does this violate [product.md](../product.md) "no mailboxes" if we only
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hold spam suspects briefly? Explicit product decision required.
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## Context (as-built)
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- Inbound relay forwards or rejects; no local delivery
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([architecture.md](../architecture.md) § Mail path).
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- Optional `INBOUND_ANTISPAM_MILTER` — external rspamd may quarantine on its
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own today, without panel integration.
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- DMARC `p=quarantine` is unrelated (outbound policy for receivers).
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## Likely out of scope (until revisited)
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- IMAP/webmail for quarantined mail.
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- End-user self-service quarantine (non-admin recipients).
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- Outbound quarantine.
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## Dependencies
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- Inbound relay, shipped in `[1.4.0]` — as built in
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[architecture.md](../architecture.md) § Mail path.
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- Sensible to decide **after** or **alongside**
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[inbound-antispam-panel.md](inbound-antispam-panel.md) (journal/lists), but
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not blocked on it for design discussion.
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## Done when (placeholder)
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TBD once approach is chosen. Minimum bar would include: opt-in flag, panel
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list/detail, release or discard action, retention, backup inclusion documented,
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security review.
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## Implementation checklist
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None yet — expand this plan after the open questions above are answered.
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