architecture.md § Log tailer gains "Stored lines": what is kept and why the
queue id is read from the head of a line, why the tailer does not check for a
row before writing, the one prune rule that is the table's retention, how a
row is given its lines when Postfix reuses queue ids, the write-once rule
while catching up, and the size. QueueLines is described as what it is now,
the fallback for rows without stored lines. guide.md: the message page keeps
its lines after rotation; retention also bounds the kept lines, which are in
a full backup.
Docs only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Delivery log box on a message's page was filled by searching the current
mail.log on every view; that file is rotated daily, so the box was empty for
anything not sent today. deliveryLog now asks the store for the row's lines -
its queue id, dated within the row's queue lifetime plus a day
(RetryPolicy.LongestLifetime) - and shows the latest 200, oldest first.
When nothing is stored the page still searches the current file, which is
what shows a message accepted before 2.2.0. When that finds nothing either,
the note no longer blames rotation for the ordinary case: it says lines are
kept with the row since 2.2.0. The Outbound log help topic in help.go follows
the mockup changed in fc184ec, word for word.
Checked on Windows: go vet clean; go test ./internal/web/... ./internal/postfix
./internal/store pass, the guards among them. New test: lines shown from the
table when mail.log holds none of them, without another queue id's lines and
without those of an earlier message under the same id.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The topic said a message's lines are found in mail.log by queue id and that an
old message may show none, because that file is rotated. With
delivery-log-storage the lines are kept with the row: they stay on the page
for as long as the row does and go with it. A message accepted before 2.2.0
shows them only while they are in the current file.
Mockup source and its built page only; help.go follows with the page.
build.py: 35 pages; check.py: 32 screens, 52 sp- classes, 0 violations.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every mail.log line headed by a queue id is written to send_log_lines as the
tailer reads it, dated by the line's own stamp. The id is taken from the head
of the line only - the tail is the far end's text - and has to look like one:
"NOQUEUE:" and "warning:" stand in the same place.
The tailer does not check for a send-log row first: a message's first lines
come before the journal milter writes it. Lines that never get a row are
removed by the prune, which deletes lines older than an hour whose queue id
no row carries. It runs at start, after each send-log sweep and hourly.
While the tailer catches up at start a line is written only if it is not
there already, as the inbound journal does: its place is saved every few
seconds, so an unclean stop means reading some lines twice.
Checked on Windows: go vet clean; go test ./internal/logtail passes except
TestFollowTailsAndRotates, which fails there on renaming an open file and
always did. New tests: which line heads are queue ids, a line dated by its
stamp, no second copy after a rewound offset, the prune cadence and cutoff.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Migration 0003_send_log_lines.sql, DDL only: queue id, the line's own time,
the line. No reference to send_log, because a message's first lines are
logged before the journal milter writes its row and one queue id is several
rows.
Store methods: InsertSendLogLine; InsertSendLogLineOnce for lines the tailer
reads twice after an unclean stop; SendLogLines, which gives a row the lines
of its queue id dated from an hour before the row to the queue lifetime after
it, so a later message under a reused id is not shown; PruneSendLogLines,
which deletes lines whose queue id has no send-log row - the whole of the
table's retention. A line is cut to 4096 bytes.
Nothing writes or reads the table yet. Checked on Windows: go vet and
go test ./internal/store pass, with the schema test pinning the new table,
its index and user_version 3.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The owner agreed the item on 2026-10-12 (option 1 of the roadmap entry: store
the lines). plans/delivery-log-storage.md records what that means in detail:
every mail.log line headed by a queue id goes into send_log_lines with the
line's own time; a line is a row's when the id matches and its time lies
within the row's queue lifetime, which is the bound against Postfix reusing
ids; a line whose id has no send-log row is deleted after an hour, which is
both the retention and the clean-up of inbound and bounce lines; the page
reads the table and falls back to the current file for rows older than it.
Eight checklist steps, cut 2.2.0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The owner, 2026-10-12: take quarantine out of the main plan, it is an idea
to think about. Its index row and section leave roadmap.md; a new closing
section, "Ideas, not on the roadmap", keeps a paragraph and the link to the
notes in plans/inbound-quarantine.md. panel-notifications no longer lists
"mail is held in quarantine" among its events. The plans that called it a
candidate say what it is now. The drawn screens stay unbuilt, as they were.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
inbound-antispam-panel (docs/plans/inbound-antispam-panel.md, 12/12),
at the owner's word (2026-10-12, "Да").
- Inbound mail is recorded: accepted mail by a second, read-only
milter on port 25 with the spam filter's verdict, refused mail from
the mail log. The filter signs what it judged, and a verdict is
shown only next to its signature.
- Inbound > Log, with a sheet over the page that says who decided
and why; Inbound > Filter lists, allow and deny entries written as
rspamd maps, each with how often it decided a message.
- Migration 0002 - the first after the 2.0 baseline.
Security, outside the feature and in every release since 1.9.0: the
level-2 rate limit and an application's client IP list held only for
the first message of a connection. Fixed; e2e sends two MAIL FROM on
one connection.
Upgrading an installation with the antispam sidecar: copy
deploy/antispam/ again (the fragment mounts two new things) and
restart the sidecar. Port 25 now logs as postfix/inbound.
Cut: CHANGELOG [Unreleased] -> [2.1.0]; image pin 2.1.0 in compose,
README, guide; version table, schema-migrations, roadmap, plan status.
No tag: the owner tags when he decides to (2026-10-11), so there is no
image of this version until then.
On the test server, on 1f44e40: go vet ./... ok, go test ./... ok
(22 packages), make e2e ok.
Full detail: CHANGELOG.md (2.1.0).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The routine kept the key after its first read. SelfPost makes a new key
when the file is lost or damaged, or a backup brings back another, and
rspamd would then have gone on signing with the old one - every verdict
unrecorded - until someone restarted the sidecar. The file is one short
line; reading it per message costs nothing worth keeping a copy for.
The guide says what never needs doing: nothing of rspamd's is cleared
after a change of the lists or the key; a restart is for a change of
its own configuration only.
Prompted by the owner's question whether rspamd's cache needs clearing
(2026-10-12).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes what the security review left as an accepted risk: with the
spam filter down - it is attached fail-open - nothing removes verdict
headers a sender wrote himself, and the inbound journal recorded his
verdict as the filter's. The owner asked whether rspamd could add a
header that proves the others are ours (2026-10-12) and agreed to a
signature: a fixed mark could be written by a sender as easily as the
verdict.
- inbound.FilterKey: a key of 32 random bytes, 64 hex characters, in
/data/antispam/filter.key, made on the first start with the relay
on. 0644 like the list files beside it: the filter is another user
in another container.
- deploy/antispam/rspamd/milter_headers.conf: a custom routine reads
the key through the directory the sidecar already mounts and adds
X-SelfPost-Filter, the HMAC-SHA256 of the message's queue id, hex;
a header of that name from the sender is removed.
- internal/milter/inbound.go: the verdict headers are kept as they
are read, and at end-of-message - when the queue id is known - they
count only if the signature fits (FilterSignature, hmac.Equal). No
key, no queue id, no signature or a wrong one: the row is that of
mail nobody judged (accept, selfpost, no detail).
The signature goes on to the upstream with the mail and is of no use
there: it fits one queue id.
Tried in a throwaway rspamd 3.11 container on the test server before
the Go side was written: the routine loads, signs
(2aa1ca6d... for key 0123...cdef and queue id 4A1B2C3D5E, the value
python's hmac gives and TestFilterSignatureIsWhatTheFilterWrites
pins), removes a sender's header of the same name, and adds nothing
without a queue id.
Tests: signed, unsigned, made-up, another message's, another key's,
the sender's followed by the real one, the next message on the
connection, no queue id; the key made once, read after, replaced when
damaged, left alone by the lists. e2e: filter.key is there, 644, 65
bytes.
docs/security.md: the accepted risk is replaced by a narrower one (the
key is readable on the host); Mail path describes the signature.
Checked on the test server, uncommitted tree: go vet ./... ok,
go test ./... ok (22 packages), make e2e ok.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The owner asked for them to be put right (2026-10-12).
- A refusal is not logged twice after an unclean stop. The tailer
saves its place every five seconds, so on start it reads some
lines again; for the lines it reads on start a row is written only
if the same row is not there already (store.InsertInboundSpamOnce:
same moment, client, sender, recipient, decision, engine, detail).
Lines read as they are written are always new, so two identical
refusals in one second stay two rows.
- The Inbound log offers Deny / Allow sender only for a sender the
lists would take (inbound.Listable): an envelope sender may be
spelt in ways the form refuses, and the link led to a refusal.
- A network of one address is stored as the address: 192.0.2.7/32
and 192.0.2.7 were two entries of one list.
Checked on the test server, uncommitted tree: go vet ./... ok,
go test ./... ok (22 packages), make e2e ok.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Steps 11 and 12 of docs/plans/inbound-antispam-panel.md: 12/12. Two
read-only reviews of d65d632..HEAD by different models (Opus,
technical; Fable, security), each given the code and questions, not
conclusions. Nothing Critical or High in the feature; the High the
technical review found outside it is the commit before this one.
Log tailer (internal/logtail/inbound.go):
- the reply of a refusal ends at the first "; from=<", Postfix's own,
and the HELO name after it is whatever is left. Taking the longest
reply let a HELO name that spelt "; from=<..> to=<..> proto=.."
supply the row's sender, recipient and reply - and so make a
refusal read as the deny list's;
- an address with a quote, a bracket or a space is not kept: a quoted
sender could otherwise supply the recipient;
- the journal is cut to its row cap every 500 rows written, not only
every six hours;
- a queue id is forgotten when the message is queued or the id is
opened by another listener, and a stale place in the queue of
arrivals no longer drops a live id;
- milter-hold lines are not read: the held message reaches the
journal milter, which writes its row - it was written twice.
Lists (internal/inbound/lists.go): a change of the table and the
rewrite of the files are one step under a mutex; a failed rewrite puts
a removed entry back and rewrites after taking a new one out.
Store: the row cap removes the oldest by time, as the page orders them.
Page: on a sheet a refusal's text is a Reply whatever it starts with.
Help and the guide say that an allow entry for a sender address trusts
an address anyone can claim (design commit before this one).
docs/security.md: the two reviews; the roles table gains Inbound > Log
and Filter lists; Mail path describes the milters, the tailer and the
lists; four accepted risks - the filter's verdict while it is down, an
allow entry by sender address, the list files' mode, log rows held by
domain name. The plan's stale lines (size and rate refusals, who reads
the journal) are corrected.
Left as found, told to the owner: the journal's rows after an unclean
stop may be written twice (the tailer saves its place every five
seconds); a "Deny sender" link is offered for an address the form then
refuses; 1.2.3.4 and 1.2.3.4/32 are two entries.
Checked on the test server, uncommitted tree: go vet ./... ok,
go test ./... ok (22 packages), make e2e ok.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
From the security review of 2026-10-12: the allow list matches the
envelope sender, which nobody authenticates. Help's Filter lists topic
says so and points to client addresses and networks.
check.py: 32 screens, 0 violations.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The owner accepted Inbound > Filter lists on 2026-10-12 ("Да"), after
a deny entry he added refused my test message on the live test server
with the list's own reply (554 5.7.1 Refused by this server's deny
list), mail.log carried the milter-reject line the count reads and the
journal its row.
Steps 8-10 of the plan were done with each earlier step and are ticked
with where. 10/12: the technical and the security review remain.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Follows the design commit before it (owner's words quoted there).
The lists' tables are Value, Kind, Matched and Remove. The kind tag
opens the entry's sheet: note, day added, how often it decided a
message in the days the log keeps, and the last match.
Matches are read off the journal on each view, nothing is stored
(inbound.Lists.Usage, store.ListSpamListHits). A row counts for an
entry when the list decided the message - a rejected row whose reply is
the deny rule's message, an accepted row whose verdict carries the
allow rule's symbol for that kind - and the entry fits the row's sender
or client address the way rspamd matches it: an address whole, a domain
as the sender's domain, a network containing the client (an
IPv4-mapped address as IPv4). A failure to count shows the lists with
"never" and logs why.
For that the journal milter keeps the lists' own symbols ahead of its
six-symbol cap: rspamd writes symbols heaviest first, so an allow
entry's -100 came last and was cut behind any six others.
The plan gains "Filter list usage": what counting from the journal
implies, and - the owner asked for it in writing - the conditions under
which a counter kept with each entry becomes worth a migration (the
journal cut by its row cap and not by age; a short retention; counts
that must outlive the journal; a slow page). multimap.conf says which
of its texts SelfPost reads back.
Tests: Usage over every kind on both lists and the rows that are
nobody's; the milter's symbol order; the store query; the page and its
sheets; a handler test from journal rows to the numbers on the page.
Seen: the fixture page with a sheet open, headless Edge at 1360 px -
the same as the accepted drawing.
Checked on the test server, uncommitted tree: go vet ./... ok,
go test ./... ok (22 packages), make e2e ok.
Not seen in a real run: a count above zero. It needs an entry added in
the panel, which I cannot sign in to, and then mail that the list
decides; in particular the deny rule's message arriving in mail.log as
the reply of a milter-reject line is what the trial with rspamc showed,
not yet what Postfix logged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Owner, 2026-10-12, on Inbound > Filter lists as built: "Note хочется
вынести в лист, подсказку, раскрывающийся блок. Тип в отдельную колонку.
Ещё полезно будет дать статистику использования правила, чтобы удалять
устаревшие." Drawn, then accepted ("Да") together with counting the
matches from the Inbound log.
- Kind is a column of its own; the tag no longer wraps under the
value.
- Note and Added leave the table for the entry's sheet, opened by the
kind tag (of his three - sheet, tooltip, disclosure - the sheet: it
exists and works under a finger).
- Matched: how often the entry decided a message, or "never". The
sheet adds the window ("in the last 90 days") and the last match.
A fifth column for the last match did not fit half the page width.
Help, Filter lists: what Matched counts and what "never" suggests.
check.py: 32 screens, 0 violations; outlines.json unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Step 7/12 of docs/plans/inbound-antispam-panel.md. A full backup walks
all of /data, so data/antispam/ was in it from the day the directory
existed; TestCreateIncludesStateExcludesTransient now holds that. On
the first start after a restore the maps are written again from the
database (mailStack.Resync, already there). The guide says what is not
in a backup: the antispam/ directory with the compose fragment and the
rspamd configuration, which is installation and not state.
The plan records the owner's acceptance of Inbound > Log (2026-10-12,
"Этот экран утверждаем") and what he changed on the way to it.
go test ./internal/backup/ ok.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The sample sheet on the components page still held facts; it shows the
table of name and value the accepted sheet is. In in-log a refused
message's sheet has no Subject row - there is no subject to show whole.
check.py: 32 screens, 0 violations.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Owner, 2026-10-11/12, on the Inbound log as built:
- "Why сделать не столбцом, а листом поверх." Opened by the decision
tag ("Тег."), drawn first, then: its content as a table ("В лист
может быть таблицей?" - "Да. Но хорошо бы ещё её отцентрировать."),
with a narrow column of names and only what the row does not show.
- "Почему Deny у того, кто rejected?" - "Убирай": a message Postfix
itself refused offers no Deny sender. Accepted mail offers Deny,
mail the filter refused offers Allow.
A new component, sheet (theme.css, shown on the components page next to
status_tag): the browser's own popover, so no script - the tag is a
button with popovertarget; Esc, a click outside and the cross close it.
It rises from the bottom edge across the window; its content is a table
of name and value in a 44rem column in the middle. A tag that opens a
sheet carries a dotted underline to tell it from a plain tag.
in-log: the Why column is gone and rows are one height. A sheet holds
who decided, the verdict and the symbols (or the reply), and the
subject whole.
Guard: check.py WIDTH_OK gains ".sp-sheet" - the one component laid out
by the window and not by the page. The owner accepted the drawing with
that said.
check.py: 32 screens, 52 sp- classes, 0 violations; outlines.json
unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Owner, 2026-10-11, of "From · client": "Client в названии столбца
зачем? Мне кажется, оно лишним." The client address stays under the
sender, in mono and muted; an address of that shape needs no label.
check.py: 32 screens, 0 violations; outlines.json unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Step 6/12 of docs/plans/inbound-antispam-panel.md. Written by a Sonnet
subagent from the mockups, reviewed and corrected by me.
GET /inbound/log - the journal a page at a time (50), filtered by
domain, decision and day; QueryInboundSpam / CountInboundSpam with the
viewer's inbound domains as the scope. The global role reads all of it
and gets "Deny sender" / "Allow sender" links into the lists; a user
with the domain role reads the rows of the inbound domains assigned to
them, without the links. The plan said global-only for the journal;
the accepted mockup and 2.0's delegation of Inbound say otherwise -
recorded in the plan as built.
GET, POST /inbound/filter-lists and POST .../{id}/delete - global role,
404 otherwise. Add form (prefilled from the query), the two lists with
Remove as the kit's row action, and "Where the lists go" with the
filter's state and when the maps were last written
(Lists.LastWritten). A refused or duplicate entry is 422 with the
message and what was typed.
Server > Settings: "Keep inbound log rows, days" with the relay on.
Help: Inbound log, Filter lists. Navigation: Log for everyone who sees
Inbound, Filter lists for the global role (Shell.ShowFilterLists).
Status tags accept / reject / tempfail join the kit's mapping.
Tests: page fixtures for both screens, held to outlines.json; view and
handler tests (both roles, filters, paging, relay off, add / duplicate
/ invalid / delete, map file content, settings field, help). e2e reads
the journal from the page instead of the database and adds and removes
a deny entry through the panel, reading deny_domain.map after each.
Seen: both pages and Settings rendered from their fixtures and compared
with the mockups side by side (headless Edge, 1360 px) - same layout
and wording.
Checked on the test server, uncommitted tree: go vet ./... ok,
go test ./... ok (22 packages), make e2e ok.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Guards and mockups only, ahead of the pages (inbound-antispam-panel
6/12). The owner agreed the feature ("Следующая по дорожной карте -
inbound-antispam-panel" / "Да", 2026-10-11) and started this step
("Начинай"), so the two screens are no longer "drawn but not built":
- guard_panel_test.go: in-log and in-filter-lists removed from
deferredScreens. From here TestLegacyRatchetMatchesTheEngine wants
the engine to have both pages - red until the next commit.
- guard_routes_test.go: the four routes join routes.inbound, so they
must exist with the relay on and answer 404 with it off.
Two mockup details brought to what the kit can draw, found when the
pages were built from it:
- help: the two new topics are one paragraph with a break in it, as
every topic is (panel.css has no gap between paragraphs of a topic);
- in-filter-lists: the directory in "Files" is mono at the text size -
the kit's inline code has no small variant.
check.py: 32 screens, 0 violations; outlines.json unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Mockup-first step of inbound-antispam-panel 6/12. The two screens were
drawn for the redesign before the feature existed; this brings them to
what steps 3-5 built.
in-log: the lead says where rows come from and how long they are kept;
a help link in the box head; Why is the engine and the detail as the
journal holds them (rspamd: action, score / threshold, weighted
symbols; postfix and a refusing filter: the reply text). No row
invents what the journal cannot hold: the "selfpost - upstream timed
out" tempfail and the Review link to a quarantine page that does not
exist are gone, a refused message has no subject, an allow-listed one
shows SELFPOST_ALLOW_FROM(-100.00).
in-filter-lists: Remove is a POST - the kit's row action, not a link;
a domain entry is shown as stored, without "@"; "Where the lists go"
names the directory and its six files instead of allow.map / deny.map,
says rspamd rereads them by itself and that Deny wins.
settings: "Keep inbound log rows, days" in the Log retention box.
help: two topics under Inbound, Inbound log and Filter lists, and a
sentence in Settings.
outlines.json rewritten: Help's Inbound box has six topics, was four.
check.py: 32 screens, 0 violations.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Step 5/12 of docs/plans/inbound-antispam-panel.md.
Store: AddSpamListEntry, ListSpamListEntries, DeleteSpamListEntry.
internal/inbound/lists.go validates and normalises an entry - sender
address, sender domain, client address or network (canonical text, an
IPv4-mapped address as IPv4, /0 refused) - and writes the lists as six
map files under /data/antispam (ANTISPAM_DIR), each atomically, 0644 in
a 0755 directory: the filter is another user in another container. All
six are written on every change and on every start with the relay on,
empty ones included. An entry whose maps could not be written is taken
back out of the table. The writer refuses a stored value with
whitespace, a newline or # in it.
The plan's allow.map / deny.map became one file per list and entry
type: to rspamd an IP map and a sender map are different map types.
deploy/antispam/rspamd/multimap.conf holds the rules; the fragment
mounts it and ./data/antispam into the sidecar. Deny is a prefilter
reject, allow a symbol weighing -100. Tried in a throwaway rspamd 3.11
container on the test server:
- with allow as a prefilter accept, an address on both lists was
accepted and an IP on both was refused - the rule that ran first
decided; with the weight, deny won in all five mixed cases;
- IPv4, IPv6, address (any case), domain (not its subdomains) match;
- a rewritten file is reread in about ten seconds, no restart;
- files that appear after rspamd started are loaded the same way.
No page edits the lists yet (step 6).
Checked on the test server, uncommitted tree: go vet ./... ok,
go test ./... ok (22 packages), make e2e ok - with the relay on
/data/antispam is 755 and holds the six maps, 644, empty.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Step 4/12 of docs/plans/inbound-antispam-panel.md.
The log tailer writes an inbound_spam_log row for mail port 25 refused
(internal/logtail/inbound.go): a "reject:" line of the port-25 smtpd is
Postfix's own policy; a milter-reject / milter-hold / milter-discard
line of cleanup is the filter's verdict. Only a recipient at an inbound
domain is a row, so "Relay access denied" for a stranger's domain is
not. The row is dated by its log line; the reply text is cut to 255
bytes of printable ASCII; a reply starting with 4 is a tempfail.
To tell port 25 from 465 / 587 the listener now logs as
postfix/inbound (syslog_name). cleanup logs under one name for every
listener, so its verdict counts only for a queue id the port-25 smtpd
was seen to open (4096 remembered). Lines are matched from the head,
after timestamp and host: their tail is the sender's own text.
Retention: PruneInboundSpam every six hours - older than the
inbound_spam_log_retention_days setting (seeded from
INBOUND_SPAM_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS, 90, range 7-365), then down to 10 000
rows. The setting has no field in the panel yet.
Known limits, in architecture.md: a log line names one recipient, so a
message refused at end-of-message is one row; a line re-read after an
unclean stop would be a second row.
Checked on the test server, uncommitted tree: go vet ./... ok,
go test ./... ok (22 packages), make e2e ok - the unknown recipient at
the inbound domain refused on port 25 has its row (reject by postfix),
the stranger's domain has none.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A candidate, recorded at the owner's word (2026-10-11, screenshot of
Server > Health on selfpost.mixfed.ru): the body is laid out in columns
while the navigation is the phone stack with every section open. The
item states what was seen and a first guess at the cause (980 px falls
between Bulma's 769 and 1024 px breakpoints); nothing is investigated
yet.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Step 3/12 of docs/plans/inbound-antispam-panel.md.
The panel serves a second milter while the inbound relay is on
(internal/milter/inbound.go, socket INBOUND_JOURNAL_MILTER_SOCKET,
default /run/selfpost/inbound-journal.sock). build/postfix-config.sh
puts it last on port 25, after the optional antispam milter, with
default_action=accept; postfix-wrapper.sh waits for its socket. At
end-of-message it writes one inbound_spam_log row per recipient at an
inbound domain - other port-25 recipients (DMARC report addresses) get
none - and always accepts. With a filter attached it reads the verdict
from X-Rspamd-Action and X-Spamd-Result (action, score, up to six
weighted symbols, only what the patterns recognise, 255 bytes); without
one those headers are the sender's and are not read. The plan named
X-Rspamd-Score, which rspamd does not have.
The antispam compose fragment mounts rspamd/milter_headers.conf into
the sidecar so that it adds the two headers (checked in rspamd 3.11:
both routines exist and remove a sender's own headers of those names).
Store: InsertInboundSpam, IsInboundDomain.
Checked on the test server, uncommitted tree: go vet ./... ok,
go test ./... ok (22 packages), make e2e ok - the relayed message of
inbound_relay_delivers_and_refuses has its journal row (accept by
selfpost) and the DMARC report sent through the same listener has none.
Not yet seen in a real run: a verdict written by rspamd reaching this
milter. The e2e stand has no filter, and the test server's only inbound
domain has no upstream, so it accepts no mail.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Step 2/12 of docs/plans/inbound-antispam-panel.md, the first migration
after the 2.0 baseline (2.0.1 was cut before it, as agreed).
0002_inbound_spam_log.sql adds inbound_spam_log (one row per recipient:
domain, client IP, envelope, subject, decision, engine, detail) with
indexes on created_at and (inbound_domain, created_at), and
inbound_spam_list (allow / deny entries, unique per list). DDL only;
decision, engine, list_type and entry_type carry CHECKs, as the
baseline does for its own enumerations. Nothing reads or writes the
tables yet.
Tests: TestBaselineSchema pins both tables and user_version 2;
TestOpenMigratesA20Database opens a file holding the baseline alone and
finds its user kept; TestInboundSpamConstraints.
go test ./internal/store/ ok; go vet ./... ok.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A patch on 2.0.0, all of it found on the test server after the cut:
- a message that is not a report this relay keeps is dropped at once
instead of being retried for days;
- a report is bounded before it is stored, and reports are kept per
domain (security review of the ingest path, nothing Critical or High);
- Full backup from the panel works (it had answered 200 with ten bytes
since 1.3.0);
- no backup holds the Postfix queue, and the panel says why.
Cut: CHANGELOG [Unreleased] -> [2.0.1]; image pin 2.0.1 in compose,
README, guide; version table.
On the test server, on dd0fefd: go vet ./... ok, go test ./... ok
(22 packages), make e2e ok.
Full detail: CHANGELOG.md (2.0.1).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Owner, 2026-10-11: the private key is needed, and a backup from the
panel and one from the console have to be the same.
The commit that made the panel's backup work skipped a file under
certs/ the panel could not open - on the test server the private key,
which the certificate hook leaves to root and Postfix's group. That gave
an archive with a certificate and no key, and two kinds of archive.
- Params.Unprivileged is gone. Nothing is left out on account of who
makes the archive; the queue is out for everyone (previous commit).
- When the panel cannot read a file under certs/, backup.Check says so
before the download and the panel refuses with what to do on the host:
chgrp 998 certs/privkey.pem && chmod 640. backup.UnreadableCert tells
that case from any other failure.
- 998 is the container's selfpost group, which holds the panel and
Postfix. Its id was whatever groupadd gave; the Dockerfile now fixes
it at the value it has always had, because an operator addresses it
by number from the host.
- Guide: method 1 is the same archive as method 2, with the permission
the key needs and a note for whatever renews the certificate. Help and
the box follow the design commit before this one.
- e2e: the restore scenario first makes the key unreadable and expects
the refusal naming the file and the way out, then takes the backup and
expects the key in it; nothing is put back by hand before the restart.
go vet ./internal/backup/ ./internal/web/handlers/: ok
go test ./internal/backup/ ./cmd/... ./internal/web/...: ok
make e2e on the test server: ok
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Owner, 2026-10-11: the key is needed and the panel's archive must be the console's. The box no longer says a certificate file may be left out; Help says the key has to be readable by the panel (group 998 on the host) and that the panel refuses, naming the file, until it is.
check.py: 0 violations; outlines.json unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Owner, 2026-10-11: the user has to be told why. The box gives the reason in a sentence - the queue cannot be copied reliably while the server is running; the Help topic explains it (Postfix keeps moving messages, a copy could hold one twice or miss it), what follows (waiting mail is not carried over, a restored server starts with an empty queue) and what to do to keep the queue (stop the container, archive the project directory).
check.py: 0 violations; outlines.json unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Owner, 2026-10-11: the queue goes out of the command's archive too.
The commit that made the panel's backup work left the queue in the
archive of selfpost-backup, which runs as root and can read it. But that
copy was never the queue: the archive is made while the instance runs,
Postfix moves messages between the queue's directories all the time, and
a message on its way could be in the archive twice or not at all. One
rule now - QueueDir is left out of every archive - and
Params.Unprivileged is only about a certs/ file the panel may not open.
What is not carried over is mail still waiting for delivery; a restored
instance builds an empty queue (the e2e restore scenario starts one).
To keep the queue: stop the instance and tar the project directory, as
the guide's methods 3 and 4 already describe.
Guide: the description of a full backup, methods 1 and 2 and the
comparison table. Help follows the design commit before this one.
go vet ./internal/backup/: ok
go test ./internal/backup/ ./cmd/... ./internal/web/...: ok
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Owner, 2026-10-11: the queue is left out of the command's archive as well as the panel's. The Help topic no longer says selfpost-backup takes it; the command still takes the private key the panel cannot read.
check.py: 0 violations; outlines.json unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Found by the e2e restore scenario of the next commit: the Full backup
button answered 200 with ten bytes. The archive includes the Postfix
queue, Postfix keeps every queue file and directory readable by its own
user alone (not configurable), and the panel runs as its own user - the
walk stopped at /data/postfix/queue/active with "permission denied"
after the headers were out. So since the queue moved under /data in
1.3.0. Confirmed on the test server: selfpost-backup as root makes the
whole archive, the same command as user panel fails the same way.
Owner, 2026-10-11: the panel's archive comes without the queue.
- backup.Params.Unprivileged: the queue is left out, and so is a file
under certs/ that cannot be opened (the private key on the test
server is root and Postfix's group only), named through OnWarn. The
selfpost-backup command leaves it unset and takes both, as before.
- backup.Check reads through everything Create would archive, writing
nothing. The panel runs it before the first byte: a failure is a
message on the page, not a download cut short.
- The box, Help (design commit before this one) and the guide say what
the panel's archive leaves out; the guide's comparison table has rows
for the queue and the private key, and tells to put the key back
before starting a restored instance.
go vet ./internal/backup/ ./internal/web/handlers/: ok
go test ./internal/backup/ ./cmd/... ./internal/web/...: ok
make e2e on the test server, with the restore scenario: ok
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Owner, 2026-10-11: the archive made from the panel comes without the Postfix queue (variant 1). The Full backup box and the Help topic say so, and name the other thing the panel may not read - a certificate file, usually the private key - and the command that takes both.
check.py: 0 violations; outlines.json unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security review of the DMARC report path (Fable, 2026-10-11), which ran
for the first time in 2.0.0. No Critical or High finding. Fixed:
- Medium: a report was bounded only as 8 MiB of XML - some 160 000
records or one name of megabytes, all of it rows and table cells. At
most 5 000 records (more is ErrRejected, dropped), text fields cut to
255 bytes on a character boundary, a record's count capped.
- Medium: the cap of 500 reports was for the whole server, so a stranger
filing under one domain's address evicted every other domain's
reports. PruneDMARCReports counts per domain.
- Low: the pipe service ran up to default_process_limit (100) commands
at once against the panel's database; maxproc is 1.
- Low: the reason logged for a dropped message carried the sender's
bytes (header line, zip entry name) as they came; cut to 200 bytes and
reduced to printable ASCII, zip entry names quoted.
- Low: SELFPOST_DATA_DIR / SELFPOST_DB_PATH with whitespace or "$" would
reach the command through export_environment as another path; refused
at start when DMARC ingest is on.
Left as they are, told to the owner: the parse-failure count is a
lifetime figure shown under "This week"; a report larger than the
command reads is dropped as unreadable; nested multipart is not searched.
The hub's Retention line follows the design commit before this one.
security.md: the review, and the accepted-risk entry says what a
stranger can and cannot do now. The roadmap no longer calls the review
pending.
go vet ./cmd/... ./internal/dmarc/ ./internal/store/: ok
go test ./cmd/... ./internal/dmarc/ ./internal/store/ ./internal/web/...: ok
make e2e on the test server (with the port-25 scenarios of the next
commit): ok
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The retention cap is counted per domain (the security commit after this one); the Ingest box says so: 500 reports a domain or 90 days.
check.py: 0 violations; outlines.json unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Owner, 2026-10-11: foreign and malformed reports are turned away.
The command answered every failure with EX_TEMPFAIL, so Postfix kept a
message that could never be stored and offered it again for days, each
attempt adding to the parse-failure count. IngestMessage now marks those
failures (unreadable as an aggregate report, a domain not sent from
here, another domain's report address) with ErrRejected; the command
counts one failure, writes the reason where Postfix puts it on the delivery line of the mail log
and reports the delivery as done. No bounce: the envelope sender of such
a message is whatever its author wrote, and the report addresses are
public. A failing store is still EX_TEMPFAIL.
go vet ./cmd/... ./internal/dmarc/: ok
go test ./cmd/panel/ ./internal/dmarc/ ./internal/web/...: ok
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The panel redesign (docs/plans/panel-redesign.md, 27/27). A breaking
release: every panel URL changed and the database starts from a single
baseline - a 1.x /data is not upgraded.
Since the last cut also fixed, all found on the test server:
- the panel can read the mail queue;
- port 25 answers with DMARC report ingest on, also next to the
inbound relay;
- DMARC reports reach the panel (the delivery service never worked
since 1.7.0);
- Postfix start-up warnings about the queue directory.
Cut: CHANGELOG [Unreleased] -> [2.0.0]; image pin 2.0.0 in compose,
README, guide; roadmap, plan and version table.
On the test server, on 252e5d1: go vet ./... ok, go test ./... ok
(22 packages), make e2e ok.
Full detail: CHANGELOG.md (2.0.0).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Owner, 2026-10-11, after looking at the test server: the anchors work but mean little, Health is short and there is nothing to scroll past. The five cards (Machine, Processes, TLS certificate, Milter sockets, Reverse DNS) lose their #machine ... #hostname, as the links into Domain settings lost theirs.
check.py: 0 violations; outlines.json unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
/preflight is /server/preflight and the retention setting is on /server/settings; the routes are renamed, so the plan no longer says once they are.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
initShowWhen bound a change listener to each control it found at DOMContentLoaded, so a form swapped in later would have been neither synced nor wired. The rules now listen once on the document and are applied again on htmx:load. No form arrives by a swap today; the roadmap row that recorded the gap is struck.
Checked in a browser on the application form: the rate-limit select toggles the manual and auto fields as before, and a copy of the form put into the page with htmx.swap is synced on arrival and follows its select. go vet and go test ./internal/web/... pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
On the test server the form dmarc-reports+<domain>@selfpost.mixfed.ru
broke over three lines in its column (2026-10-10). It takes the
supporting size the report id and rua of a report already use.
check.py: 0 violations.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Seen by the owner on the test server (2026-10-10): following Report
address, Rate limit or Export from the domain's menu opened Domain
settings scrolled down to that box. The page is one screen and a bit, so
the anchor only pushed the title and the first row out of view. The
links (the domain menu, the DMARC record's note, the delete page, Server
> Settings) lose their #reports / #limit / #export.
check.py: 0 violations; outlines.json unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Follows the design commit before it.
- internal/dmarc: the ingest allow-list is the report address of each
domain that is on this host and nothing else;
DefaultHostedReportAddress and DefaultHostedSuggestion are removed.
Since 1.7.0 the general mailbox dmarc-reports@<hostname> was open
while no panel-wide default existed; the three-choice scheme had
left it open always.
- The DMARC hub's Ingest box shows the form of a hosted address,
dmarc-reports+<domain>@<hostname>.
- guide.md: what port 25 accepts.
Evidence: docs/assets/panel-redesign/evidence/dmarc.png re-shot (the
address form wraps after the plus sign in its column at 1440 px).
go test -count=1 ./internal/dmarc/... ./internal/web/... ./cmd/panel: ok
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The owner's decision (2026-10-10): the mailbox for the server as a
whole, dmarc-reports@<hostname>, goes. Under the three-choice scheme a
domain can only choose its own hosted address, so nothing can be told
to report to the general one. The Ingest box's fact becomes "Hosted
addresses: dmarc-reports+<domain>@<hostname>".
check.py: 0 violations; outlines.json unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The owner's instruction (2026-10-10). panel.js sets is-hidden, beside
the hidden attribute, on a block that a control switches off - the
fields of a mode that is not chosen, the password fields of an unticked
encryption box, the domain lists of a global user - because hidden alone
does not hide an element whose stylesheet gives it a display of its own
(a box, a grid row). No screen writes the class and it draws nothing, so
the components page has nothing to show for it; the list now names
everything the panel uses.
check.py: 0 violations.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Stage 3, step 1 (Opus). Each step of stage 2 was reviewed against its
mockup when it landed; this closes the review over the whole, after the
changes of stage 3 (Help topics and the ? on boxes, the three-choice
report address, row actions, the filter's socket).
- Evidence: all 29 screenshots under docs/assets/panel-redesign/
evidence/ are re-shot from the current templates - the 28 pages of
pageFixtures and the sign-in page without an administrator - 1440 px
wide at each page's full height. Headless Edge against the real
templates served locally with their fixtures; NOT from the container
(no Docker on this machine) - the container is checked on the test
server at deployment.
- panel/audit.js over the same 29 pages at 1440 and 1280: 4160 texts
checked, problems: [] (type floor, contrast, sideways scroll,
overflow in boxes and heads, scrolling tables, clipped card values,
missing icons). Every ? link has the form /help#topic, and
TestEveryHelpLinkLandsOnATopic proves each lands.
- Guards: outlines, class vocabulary, page structure, components-only,
stylesheet equality, routes, static allow-list - green; the ratchet
is empty.
Where the product knowingly differs from a mockup (each recorded in the
commit of its step): the queue is the postqueue listing, not a table;
the outbound log has no status filter; the message history has no
"accepted from IP" step; Health draws the sockets this server has;
the Spam filter box states only what the configuration says; the user
form's e-mail help promises nothing that is not built; Overview's title
does not claim that mail is flowing. Roadmap screens (in-log, in-queue,
in-quarantine, in-filter-lists, preflight) are drawn and not built.
Open with the owner: is-hidden, which panel.js sets at run time, is not
in check.py's Bulma subset (the edit of check.py is his).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Stage 3, step 3. Written by Sonnet from the code and the plan, checked
by Opus.
- guide.md: a section on the panel - menu, paths, the roles global and
domain with outbound and inbound assigned separately -, Overview and
Health, Queue and System log, Account and Server > Settings, the
domain page / Domain settings / application form, Help as a page of
topics. The DMARC report address is one of three choices set in
Domain settings. The Spam filter box, the two INBOUND_ANTISPAM_*
variables the panel reads, and the filter's socket on Health.
Sessions; backup and export encrypted unless the box is unticked;
1.x data is not restored into 2.0.
- architecture.md: Panel HTTP surface rewritten from web.go (routes,
the /server/ guard, per-object checks, <page>/fragment, one layout,
typed page data, the kit and its guards, CSP and htmx); Persistence
gains the database - one baseline, a 1.x file refused, the tables as
they are.
- security.md: roles and what each reaches, as built; sessions by user
id and what ends them; state-changing requests; errors shown to
users; the 2.0 review; two accepted risks from it - a delegated
inbound upstream may be any host and port, and Account's profile is
saved without the password.
- CHANGELOG: Removed opens with "2.0 starts from an empty data
directory"; entries that describe the user-default report address
say they were replaced before release; the filter's socket.
- roadmap.md: two review follow-up rows struck as retired by the
redesign (.pair / .split, the two back links); password-reset notes
that changing the account e-mail must then ask for the password.
Progress 25/27.
- development.md: the component kit and its guards; README and
product.md: wording.
Left as they are
- The third follow-up row the plan expected to strike - initShowWhen
is not re-run after an htmx swap - still holds: no polled fragment
carries such a control today, so nothing breaks, but the redesign did
not retire it.
- guide.md embeds no screenshots, so none needed retaking.
- README and guide still name image 1.9.5 - the version cut.
- plans/preflight.md and plans/inbound-antispam-panel.md use pre-2.0
paths; roadmap's template-data-typing is largely done by the
redesign.
go test -count=1 ./cmd/panel (env-doc tables): ok
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
mixandClaude Opus 5.5