Owner, 2026-10-18: "Надо почистить документы от устаревшего и сделанного."
- Deleted, shipped: plans/delivery-log-storage, from-header-binding,
inbound-antispam-panel, inbound-upstream-result, panel-dkim-signing,
panel-notifications, and the own-mta-builds analysis (its three rows
shipped as 2.6.1, 2.7.0, 2.8.0). What outlived them moved first: when a
filter-list counter is worth a migration, and the notifications' "when"
table, into architecture.md; the sender check's own-process trigger into
security.md. Code comments that cited them point at architecture.md or
security.md; CHANGELOG keeps their names, unlinked.
- Kept, marked closed: audit-2026-10-12, assumptions-2026-10-14 and
security-audit-2026-10-17 - the code cites their finding ids in 50-84
files. Their file:line refs are of the tree each audited.
- roadmap.md: open work only - stage H of the security audit (the owner's),
go-milter-upstream (the owner posts), and queue-table, which the
redesign left undecided and only its own shipped section still named;
Dropped and Ideas as they were. 2.x versioning instead of 1.x.
- development.md: the 47-row planned-version-cuts table (history, in the
CHANGELOG) gone; a stage's last step now removes its roadmap item and
plan. Docs map lists the closed audits.
- panel-redesign.md: the done checklist out; Room for roadmap items says
which drawn screens are unbuilt and why.
- Stale facts fixed: schema-migrations.md and architecture.md at schema 14
(0013's users columns and user_links, 0014's secure TLS mode);
security.md's accepted risk "profile saved without the password" - the
e-mail asks for it since 2.14.0.
Tests: go build, go vet; go test of cmd and the touched internal packages
pass except logtail's three Windows-bound rotation tests (rename of an open
file; CI is Linux). Only comments changed in Go.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Stages 0-6 of docs/security-audit-2026-10-17.md in one cut: the high A2
(the user form asks for the account password), the seven mediums (M1, M2,
M3, W1, I1, I2, A1) and the lows and nits the plan names, with three
read-only security reviews of the fixes and their findings fixed. Stage H
(the test server's host) is the owner's.
No migration; schema 13. Upgrading: give the TLS key to group 10997;
copy antispam/ again where the sidecar runs (rspamd 4.2.2, a third file);
set TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDR behind Apache on the host if unset.
make e2e (64 passed) and go vet + go test (26 packages) on the test server
for 32f6ed6, the tree this release commit adds only pins and notes to. The
pins (compose, README, guide), the guide's backup example, the planned
cuts, the roadmap row and the plan's stages marked shipped. No tag.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security audit 2026-10-17, finding S4 (low), stage 4. The sidecar ran
rspamd 3.11.1 (December 2024) with default capabilities; upstream is 4.2.2
(2026-10-10), and the line between fixed a heap overflow in
util.lower_utf8, a use-after-free on reload and parser crashes - rspamd
reads every byte a stranger sends to port 25.
A read-only reading of rspamd 3.11.1 and 4.2.2 and of rspamd-docker
v3.11.1+3 and v4.2.2+0, side by side (sources in dev/upstream), found every
function SelfPost relies on unchanged: milter_headers (skip_wanted, the
custom routine, remove 0, create_specific_keyed, get_queue_id from {i}),
the X-Spamd-Result text, multimap (from/smtp, ip, the reject pre-result,
file-map rereading), the image's uid 11333 and CMD. It also found that the
image binds the normal worker (which takes client-named file and shm
inputs) and the controller (default password "q1") on every address,
reachable from any container on the compose network - so:
- image rspamd/rspamd:4.2.2-0 (the one build of 4.2.2; the others float);
- cap_drop: [ALL], no-new-privileges (rspamd starts unprivileged, ports
above 1024, nothing setuid);
- RSPAMD_LOCAL_ADDR=localhost keeps every worker on loopback, and a new
antispam/rspamd/worker-proxy.inc puts the proxy alone on *:11332. rspamd
expands its template syntax in comments too - the first version of that
comment quoted it and the config failed to load; it quotes none now.
Checked in a throwaway container on the test server with the three files
and the fragment's options (dev/server/rspamd-try.sh): proxy on any
address, 11333/11334 on loopback; from a private address a sender's own
verdict headers removed and rspamd's added; X-SelfPost-Filter equal to
openssl's HMAC-SHA256 of the queue id; a denied address refused with the
deny list's message; healthy. The e2e has no rspamd; the live sidecar is
checked at the rollout. Citations re-pointed to 4.2.2.
Docs: guide § Inbound relay (the third file; copy antispam/ again);
CHANGELOG; plan.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The lines under "Doc and comment drift" that the findings' own commits
did not already fix:
- security.md: a newer confirmation link replaces the older, a reset link
is not replaced; html/template renders every page (no themes); the
container keeps eight capabilities, named, not "KILL".
- architecture.md: ImportKey writes over a name's key, as an import must;
the error text reaches the browser on the Backup page's import refusal.
- guide: with Caddy the key is in Caddy's data, so a full backup refuses
until certs/ holds a copy (or back up caddy-data).
- comments: sasldb2 holds application passwords in the clear (store,
app/password.go); texthash folds ASCII (sender.go); the supervisor
socket's group is supervisor (rpc.go); cert-reload's OpenSSL measurement
was 3.0.x of bookworm; sendReset's limits (links.go).
Migration 0013's comment stays as shipped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security audit 2026-10-17, stage 6.
A10: a session created under a longer PANEL_SESSION_IDLE_DAYS kept its old
expiry after the setting was lowered (the renewal arithmetic took
ExpiresAt minus the new window for the last renewal). Touch now cuts such
a session to now plus the window at once. TestSessionMadeUnderALongerWindowIsCut.
A6, A7, W7 - security.md now says what the code does, which is what it
should do: a wrong method answers 405 with Allow from the router before the
role is looked at (the routes are public source); the setup token is made
anew at the first /setup/ request after expiry, a stranger's included, and
logged where only the operator reads it; two GETs make what must exist,
the server's own DKIM key on Settings and Health. README's local trial
says the compose file is the hardened deployment.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security audit 2026-10-17, finding M7 (low), stage 6; Help's mockup is
c09368c. postfix/inbound.go writes "encrypt" for Required, and Postfix
verifies no certificate at that level: a domain user who chooses it gets
privacy against passive observers only. The guide § Inbound relay and Help
(word for word with the mockup) say so. Offering "secure" with the
upstream's name is a choice for domain users and hours of work: it goes on
the roadmap as a proposal, not into this plan.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security audit 2026-10-17, findings I4 and I5 (low), stage 5.
I4: every action is pinned by commit with its version in a comment - the
latest release of the major each used, so nothing changes in behaviour
(checkout v4.4.0, setup-go v5.6.0, setup-buildx-action v3.12.0,
build-push-action v6.19.2, login-action v3.7.0; commits read with git
ls-remote, the tags are lightweight). govulncheck v1.9.0 runs on the
source in test.yml, and in release.yml on the image's panel and
selfpost-backup binaries before the push (-mode=binary: the base image's
Go, which may lag the runner's - a fixed stdlib advisory then fails the
release until golang:1.26-trixie moves, which is the point). certbot is
pinned to v5.8.0 and Caddy to 2.11.7 (Docker Hub, 2026-10-17).
provenance/SBOM stay off until the GHCR cleanup keeps attestations, as the
plan says.
I5: published tags are never rebuilt, so a Debian security fix reaches
operators with the next release. The guide (§ Upgrading) and SECURITY.md
say so; base-packages.yml runs .github/scripts/base-packages.sh every
Monday: what debian:trixie-slim would install for postfix, libsasl2-2,
libsasl2-modules-db, sasl2-bin, openssl, libssl3t64, libdb5.3t64 against
the table in development.md (the 2.14.3 image's versions), red when one
moved. Tried on the test server: green as it stands, red with a version
changed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security audit 2026-10-17, findings W4/W5/W8 (low), stage 4 - all
global-only and self-inflicted, but unbounded:
- W4: ImportKey took any RSA key; a 16 384-bit key makes every signature
of the domain cost seconds. Now 1024-4096 bits (MinImportKeyBits,
MaxImportKeyBits); under 1024 Go's parser already refuses.
- W5: an export's applications were unbounded, each a copy of sasldb2 and
a saslpasswd2 run on the panel's one connection. Now at most 500
(maxImportApplications).
- W8: an import named as the hostname silently replaced the server's own
signing key while DNS still held the old record. Now refused with a
sentence.
Tests: TestImportKeyRefusesAnOversizedKey (4104 bits); the import cases.
Docs: guide § Moving a domain; CHANGELOG; plan.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security audit 2026-10-17, findings W6/M9 (low), stage 4. Every
application, upstream, recipient or report-address save reloaded Postfix
through supervisord, and POST .../dns-recheck bypassed the five-minute
cache for up to ~14 resolver queries - both at whatever rate an
authenticated user pressed.
- writeChanged: each generated map is written only when its content
differs from the file on disk, and Postfix is reloaded only when one was
(sender map, inbound maps, DMARC maps). Health's Reload configuration
ends with an explicit reload (app.Service.ReloadPostfix, SenderMaps
gains Reload), so it still re-reads whatever is on disk. No debounce:
with unchanged saves gone, a burst is real changes Postfix must see.
- auth.AllowDNSRecheck: twenty forced re-checks in 15 minutes per user;
past that the outbound, inbound and settings re-check show the cached
result without the "re-checked" flash, and the log says why.
Tests: TestARebuildThatChangesNothingDoesNotReload,
TestDNSRechecksArePerUser; the fakes gain Reload. Docs: guide § Overview
and Health; CHANGELOG; plan.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security audit 2026-10-17, finding I3 (low), stage 4. No compose file set
pids_limit: a fork bomb from a compromised panel or postfix had the host's
pid space as its limit. Now 1024 for SelfPost - the plan said 512, but
Postfix starts up to default_process_limit (100) processes per service,
and a busy server runs three smtpd services, cleanup and smtp at once -
256 for nginx, Caddy, Traefik and rspamd, 64 for certbot. The comment that
said root runs "very briefly" now says which root processes stay.
e2e: checkPidsLimit reads /sys/fs/cgroup/pids.max in the container.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security audit 2026-10-17, finding I6 (low), stage 3. /healthz is
registered outside auth and every proxy fragment passed it through: the
live server answered "ok" to the internet, and "unhealthy: postfix"
would have been a free tell.
Now handleHealth answers only a request with no X-Forwarded-For (nor
Forwarded) from loopback or a private address: the image's HEALTHCHECK
(127.0.0.1), the host through the loopback-published port (the Docker
gateway), a monitor on the Docker network. Every supported proxy appends
X-Forwarded-For, so through it the endpoint is 404. The plan named
"trusted-proxy peers"; that would have let the internet in again through
the trusted proxy, hence this shape. The e2e's readiness probe is the
host's, and stays answered.
Test: TestHealthzAnswersOnlyLocalProbes. Docs: guide § Container health,
architecture.md; CHANGELOG; plan.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security audit 2026-10-17, finding A3 (low), stage 3. sendReset spaced
reset mails ten minutes apart and capped them at five an hour per account,
so a stranger who repeated a username kept a live 30-minute link arriving
in the administrator's mailbox five times an hour, for ever.
Now five reset links a day per account (resetDayLimiter); the sixth
request sends one notice instead - "Reset links paused for a day", no
link, saying further requests are ignored for 24 hours and that a global
administrator can set a password on Server > Users - and every later one
in the window sends nothing (resetNoticeLimiter), logged either way. In
memory, like every limiter: a restart clears them.
Test: TestResetLinksPauseForADayAfterFive. Docs: security.md, guide §
Account; CHANGELOG; plan.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security audit 2026-10-17, findings A1 (medium), A8, A9 (low), stage 3.
Under the shipped Apache-on-host deployment with TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDR empty,
every visitor has the Docker gateway's address, and every public limit was
keyed on the address alone: ten POSTs to /login per 15 minutes (any body,
successes counted) locked out every administrator; likewise /login/reset,
the link pages and /setup/. IPv6 was keyed per /128.
Now (internal/web/auth/limitkeys.go):
- sign-in counts per address and username (10 / 15 min) and per address
alone at 100; a right password refunds both (rateLimiter.Refund);
- a reset request counts per address and username (5) and per address
alone (50); a link's page per link, by token hash (30), and per address
alone (300); setup per address as before;
- an IPv6 address is keyed by its /64 (limitAddr);
- proxyWatch: when the first 20 requests after a start all come from one
private or loopback peer with X-Forwarded-For and no proxy is trusted,
the log says so once with the TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDR value to set;
- a refused sign-in or a lockout is logged, five lines per address in 15
minutes, the typed name printable and cut (refusalLog, logName).
The shipped compose cannot know the gateway, so the guide's install step
prints it (docker network inspect) and says to set it.
Tests: TestLoginBehindOneUntrustedProxyKeepsOthersIn (the reader's case),
TestLoginSuccessesDoNotCount, TestIPv6IsLimitedPerSlash64,
TestProxyWatchAndRefusalsAreLogged; the existing lockout tests pass.
Docs: security.md § First-run setup, § Authentication; guide § Full
deployment; CHANGELOG; plan. Also the I1 plan line's Done note.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security audit 2026-10-17, finding I1, stage 2; the help mockup is ff3a118.
The guide had operators give the TLS private key to group 10998 so the
panel can archive it, and the Dockerfile puts postfix in that group (for
sasldb2 and the maps): `docker exec -u postfix head privkey.pem` printed
the live key. postfix-config.sh copies the key to a root-only directory
precisely so that a compromised Postfix daemon cannot read it - the mounted
original undid that.
Now a group backupkey (gid 10997, outside the system range like 10998)
whose one member is the panel; the guide (Apache/certbot, nginx, Taking a
full backup, the backup table), Help, and the backup's refusal name 10997
and say why; postfix-config.sh, extract-cert.sh and the Dockerfile's
comments follow. A key still given to 10998 keeps working for the backup.
CHANGELOG has an Upgrading note.
e2e: the stage gives its key to 10997 at 0640 when the runner is root
(stageKeyMode; 0644 otherwise), and testFullBackupRestore, after the
refusal that now names chgrp 10997, checks that the postfix uid cannot read
/etc/postfix/tls/privkey.pem and the panel can.
Docs: security.md § Output and process (the groups); guide; CHANGELOG;
plan.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security audit 2026-10-17, finding W3 (low), stage 1. Resync read the
bindings and wrote the map with no lock (the selector table has tableMu);
two application changes at once could write in the order opposite to their
reads and leave the map stale - an application whose binding was missing
refused with reject_sender_login_mismatch until the next change. Now a
mutex on the Service holds the read, the write and the reload together.
Test: TestResyncRunsOneAtATime (eight at once, never two inside the
rebuild).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security audit 2026-10-17, finding A5/W2 (low), stage 1; the mockup is
7effc98. dmarc_reports belong to a domain by name, outlive the domain (no
FK), and a domain deleted and added again handed its old reports to
whoever it was assigned to then - the logs were moved to ids in 2.5.0 for
exactly this case, reports were not.
The cheap form of the plan: store.DeleteDomain deletes the domain's
reports (their records by the table's cascade) in the same transaction as
the domain. The confirmation page says so when the domain has reports
("delete the 12 DMARC reports received for it;"), counted by the new
store.CountDMARCReports; NewOutDomainDelete takes the count.
Tests: TestDeletingADomainDeletesItsReports (the domain added again has
none, another domain keeps its report and record, a second delete is
ErrDomainNotFound); TestOutDomainDeleteNamesWhatGoesWithIt with 12, 1 and
0 reports.
Docs: security.md § Roles; CHANGELOG; plan.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security audit 2026-10-17, finding W1, stage 1. HandleDomainDMARC took any
address validate.Email takes; AllowedRecipients opened every stored address
on the hostname, not only the domain's hosted one; checkReportDomain
cross-checked the claimed domain only against a dmarc-reports+<tag> local
part. So a domain user of tenant A could store ops@<hostname> and from then
on anyone could mail a report claiming tenant B's domain to it, stored and
shown under B and counted toward B's 500; or store B's hosted address and
open B's mailbox without B choosing hosted. TestAllowedRecipients asserted
ops@<host> was allowed - a choice, now reversed.
Now: a custom address on the hostname is refused on the form ("choose
SelfPost hosted"); AllowedRecipients adds a domain's address only when it
is that domain's own hosted address; checkReportDomain requires a tag and
the claimed domain to equal it. The live registry (checked 2026-10-17)
holds two hosted addresses and no custom one on the hostname, so nothing
there changes.
Tests: TestCustomReportAddressOnTheHostnameIsRefused (typed, another
domain's hosted, the domain's own hosted typed as custom; an address
elsewhere still saves); TestAllowedRecipientsFollowTheDomainAddresses
inverted plus another domain's hosted address stored; untagged addresses
rejected in TestIngestMessageRejectsTagMismatch; the ingest tests deliver
to tagged addresses.
Docs: security.md § Accepted risks (DMARC), guide § DMARC reports;
CHANGELOG; plan.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security audit 2026-10-17, finding M3, stage 1. inboundSession.RcptTo
appended every RCPT (the outbound session de-duplicates), and the end of
the message inserted a row per recipient one statement at a time inside
Postfix's callback; the cut to 10 000 rows every 500 counted only the log
tailer's rows. Postfix accepts a repeated recipient up to
smtpd_recipient_limit (1 000) and sends each to the milter, so one message
was a thousand rows, uncut until the six-hourly prune.
Now: the inbound milter folds a repeated recipient (case-insensitive, as
cleanup's been_here() with BH_FLAG_FOLD does, and as session.RcptTo does);
a message's rows go in one transaction (store.InsertInboundSpamMessage,
which replaces InsertInboundSpam in milter.InboundStore); the count and the
cut moved from the tailer into the store (countInboundWrites, an atomic
counter on Store) so the milter's rows, the tailer's and the tailer's
start-up re-reads all count. store.InboundSpamLogMaxRows is the one cap.
Tests: TestInboundRecipientRepeatedIsOneRow (1 000 RCPT in two cases, one
row); TestInboundJournalIsCutWhicheverWriterWrites (a small cap: a message's
rows and refusals together cross the mark, the table is cut); the tailer's
own counting test went with its counter. go test ./internal/store
./internal/milter ./internal/logtail (Windows-only Follow failures aside).
Also gofmt of a test line from the M2 commit.
Docs: security.md § Mail path, architecture.md; CHANGELOG; plan.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security audit 2026-10-17, finding M1, stage 1. overLimit took
domainOf(MAIL FROM) whatever the login, and MailFrom ran it with an empty
login: with smtpd_delay_reject at its default Postfix runs no sender
restriction at MAIL and sends the milter's MAIL event at once, so a
stranger on 465/587 with no AUTH, or another tenant's application, could
name a victim domain in MAIL FROM and take its slots for the 10-minute
in-flight TTL, get the victim's application answered 451, and have a limit
row (and the "a rate limit is refusing mail" notification) written under
the victim's domain.
Now overLimit returns at once without a login and takes the domain from
ApplicationByLogin (loginDomain, fail-open like the rest); recordRejected's
Domain is the login's too. The send log already counts a domain's messages
by the login's domain (store.CountMessages, loginDomainID), so the limit
and the count now agree. The null-sender special case is gone: every
message is held to its login's domain.
Tests: TestRateLimitIsNotReservedByAnotherSendersMailFrom (a stranger with
no login; another tenant's application) - fails on the old code at the
second MAIL FROM; the domain-limit tests sign in as app1 at example.com.
e2e domain_limit_not_reserved_by_a_stranger: a domain with a limit of one,
three unauthenticated MAIL FROM naming it on 465, then its own message
passes and its second is refused 451.
Docs: security.md § Mail path; CHANGELOG; plan.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security audit 2026-10-17, finding X1, stage 0: the supported-versions
table named 1.x while the product is at 2.14 - an operator would have
read 2.x as unsupported. Latest 2.x yes, earlier 2.x and 1.x no.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security audit 2026-10-17, finding S6 (low), stage 0 - proven from
outside: `ETRN <an inbound domain>` on port 25 answered "250 Queuing
started". smtpd_etrn_restrictions was empty (Postfix allows every client)
and fast_flush_domains = $relay_domains, so a stranger could flush the
deferred queue toward an inbound domain's upstream at will. Now
smtpd_etrn_restrictions=reject (etrn_cmd -> smtpd_check_etrn -> reject_code
554, Postfix 3.10.13 src/smtpd/smtpd.c) and smtpd_discard_ehlo_keywords=etrn.
e2e: testInboundRelay sends EHLO + ETRN for the inbound domain on port 25
and expects 554 and no ETRN in the EHLO reply (etrnPort25);
checkPostfixHardening reads both settings back. To be run on the server.
Docs: architecture.md § Postfix; CHANGELOG; plan.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security audit 2026-10-17, finding A4 (low), stage 0. The line logged when
a request carries two unprefixed session cookies printed r.URL.Path raw,
so GET /confirm/<token> wrote the token to the log (reachable only with
PANEL_COOKIE_SECURE=false, where a sibling host can plant the bare name).
loggedPath moves from internal/web to internal/web/auth as LoggedPath
(web imports auth, not the other way) and both lines - the origin check's
refusal and the duplicate-cookie one - go through it.
Tests: TestDuplicateCookieLineHidesALinksToken; TestLoggedPathHidesTokens
moved with the function. go test ./internal/web ./internal/web/auth.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security audit 2026-10-17, finding M5 (low), stage 0. senderSession.Header
appended every From:/Sender: value; Postfix bounds one header at 60 000
bytes but not their number, and the signer's 1 MiB cap runs after the
sender check, so an application could make it hold megabytes per
connection (the reader's test: a hundred lines, 6 MB). judge needs only
none / one / more, so two of each are kept; the refusal text joins what is
kept, as before.
Tests: "a hundred From: lines" in the judgement table (refused, more than
one From: line); TestSenderKeepsTwoFromAndSenderLines. go test
./internal/milter.
Docs: security.md (the sentence "a few headers each"); CHANGELOG; plan.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security audit 2026-10-17, finding M2, stage 0 - proven on the live server:
Postfix quotes a refused recipient in its reply in internal form (quotes
removed, "; < > =" kept: extract_addr, tok822_internalize), so
RCPT TO:<"; from=<ceo@…> to=<board@…> proto=ESMTP helo=<x>; "@domain>
spelled a whole tail inside the reply, and inboundRejectRe, whose reply
ended at the FIRST "; from=<", took the stranger's sender, recipient and
inbound domain for the row.
Now the reply is greedy and the tail anchored: "; from=<…> to=<…>
proto=\S+", a HELO name holding none of Postfix's NEUTER_CHARACTERS
(smtpd.c:1634, helo_cmd neuters ` <>()\";@`), and one-word SASL fields to
the end of the line (a `.*` SASL tail would have let a quoted MAIL FROM
spell the whole tail). Belt and braces: a reply that still holds
"; from=<" - a line with two tails - makes no row, so neither a recipient
nor an un-neutered HELO name can choose one. The quote/bracket/space
filter on from/to stays.
Tests: TestInboundRecipientCannotWriteTheRow (the live line's shape, and
with a forged MAIL FROM too); TestInboundHeloCannotWriteTheRow now feeds
HELO names as Postfix logs them (neutered) and expects no row for the
un-neutered ones. go test ./internal/logtail on Windows (the three known
Windows-only Follow failures aside).
Docs: security.md § Mail path; CHANGELOG; plan line ticked.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security audit 2026-10-17, finding I2 (= M4), stage 0. drop_links listed
the outbound maps, sasldb2, the key tree and mail.log but not the three
DMARC maps that postfix-config.sh creates as root with `[ -e ] || : >`
when DMARC_REPORTS_ENABLE=true; -e is false for a dangling link and the
redirect follows it, and /data/postfix is the panel's. Now the three are in
drop_links, and both map loops refuse to create through a link
(`[ -e ] || [ -L ] || : >`).
e2e: TestStartsOnA28Data plants a dangling /data/postfix/dmarc_transport
with DMARC reports on and expects the "removing the symbolic link" line,
no file at the link's target, and a regular map. To be run on the server
with the stage.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security audit 2026-10-17, finding A2 (high), stage 0; the mockup is
2c27275. A stolen global session could set its own password on the user
form - no current password asked, the session kept - and then pass the
backup's reauth with it, or add a second global user with a known
password. Now the user form calls reauth (the backup's check: bcrypt
against the signed-in user's own hash, under auth.AllowPasswordChange) when
it adds a user and when a save sets a password, changes the e-mail (reset
links go there) or changes the role, the own account included; deleting a
user asks too, refused on its own confirmation page (renderUserDelete, a
Flash on UserDelete). Name and reach alone are not asked. Missing or wrong:
401 on the same page, "Your account password is incorrect.", nothing saved.
Tests: TestUserFormAsksForTheAccountPassword (create, each of password,
e-mail, role, own password, reach alone, delete); the user-form tests send
the field (withAccountPassword gives root a real hash and h an auth
module). go vet, go test ./internal/web/... on Windows.
Docs: security.md § Backup and domain export, guide § Users, help word for
word with the mockup; CHANGELOG [Unreleased] Security; plan line ticked.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Full security audit at 44bf09d (2.14.3): four zone readers, machine checks,
the live installation read-only, probes from outside. No critical; one high
(A2: a stolen global session sets its own password on the user form and so
passes backup-reauth), seven mediums (M1, M2, M3, W1, I1, I2, A1), the rest
low and nits; "checked and sound" per zone; doc drift; a seven-stage plan
with hours and a recommendation. The host's own findings are in dev/, not
published.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
mixandClaude Opus 5.5