68b3a7b23f214229961d7d721bc220a4f365ea49
58
Commits
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ec08c8606b |
audit 2c: the From: parser port checked against OpenDKIM's signing itself
test / test (push) Canceled after 0s
The last check of the port, and the plan's last line of stage 2c. Through
Postfix the sender check refuses most lines before OpenDKIM sees them, so
TestPortAgainstOpenDKIM (internal/milter) talks to OpenDKIM directly:
test/upstream/opendkim-probe.sh starts OpenDKIM from the SelfPost image in
a throwaway container, with keys and a refile SigningTable for three
names, and the test plays it each From: line through go-milter's client,
as a client OpenDKIM trusts (127.0.0.1, InternalHosts' default). For each
line the d= of the signature OpenDKIM adds must be the domain the port
predicts - its address, the domain cut to DKIM_MAXHOSTNAMELEN, the whole
cut to MAXADDRESS, matched against "^.*@<domain>$" case-insensitive as
dkimf_apply_signtable() matches - or neither signs.
Run on the test server, 2026-10-15 (OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 from the
image): 385 lines - both shared files and lines composed from display
names plain, quoted, escaped and encoded, comments nested and open,
groups, lists, brackets, source routes, domain literals and quoted local
parts, with the other sender's name and the server's in each place - 385
agree, 287 signed. The two lines padded so that, cut at 256 bytes, they
end in "@other.e2e.test" are signed by OpenDKIM with other.e2e.test's key:
the danger the sender check's 256-byte rule (
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3584adcbc2 |
sender check: From: read with OpenDKIM's own parser; L8 closed
test / test (push) Canceled after 0s
Audit 2026-10-12, stage 2c, the owner's decision of 2026-10-14: the check
decides by the address OpenDKIM signs for, whatever a display name or a
comment holds.
internal/milter/mailparse.go ports libopendkim's dkim_mail_parse() with
dkim_mail_first_special(), dkim_mail_token() and
dkim_mail_matching_paren() from Debian's opendkim 2.11.0~beta2-8+deb12u1,
line for line: the '<' form, group and list punctuation, an '@' before the
first ':', ';' or ',' deciding where the address starts, source routes
dropped, quoted strings and domain literals kept with their delimiters,
comments skipped, whitespace between atoms one space, no encoded word
decoded; and the C's own quirks ("@d" gives d as the local part too).
testdata/mailparse_harness.c compiles the C from the image's source; the
test feeds it and the port 200 019 lines (the hand-written cases and
200 000 random ones over the specials) - 93 443 parse and agree byte for
byte, 106 576 fail and agree on the error (on an error the C leaves its
in-place result unterminated, and OpenDKIM uses neither part then).
judge(): one From: field and one address stay required (moreAfter: only
list or group punctuation may follow); what OpenDKIM cannot read is
refused (mlfi_eoh() would not sign it); the address is lower-cased in
ASCII only, as dkimf_lowercase() and Postfix's tables do. Found reading
dkimf_apply_signtable(): OpenDKIM matches its refile SigningTable against
"user@domain" printed into MAXADDRESS + 1 = 257 bytes, so a longer address
is matched cut short - a quoted local part padded to end there in
"@another.tenant" would be signed with that tenant's key while its real
domain is the application's. Such an address (over 256 bytes) is refused;
one that fits is matched whole. The display-name and comment scan, the
"one @ outside quotes" rule and the SigningTable reader (Signers) go; the
check asks for header values with their leading space as OpenDKIM does
(OptHeaderLeadingSpace; Postfix keeps a v2 milter's event mask, milter8.c
milter8_negotiate()).
L8 closed: refused or passed no longer depends on other domains of the
server; security.md's accepted risk is struck. The shared other-sender
lines are now held to "never signed for the other sender": unit test (a
passed line is read at the application's domain) and e2e (a passed line
arrives signed for the application's domain, none for the other).
Documents: architecture "How the header is read", security's sender
check paragraph, the guide; the help topic per
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fbd0acd035 |
audit 2c: the rest the sources contradict, and the documents
test / test (push) Canceled after 0s
Code and config: - C-M7: a DMARC report's explicit <pct>0</pct> stays 0; only an absent pct takes RFC 7489 § 6.3's default 100 (Pct *int). - C-D1: docs/development.md now tables the Debian versions the citations were read at (postfix 3.7.11-0+deb12u1, opendkim and libopendkim11 2.11.0~beta2-8+deb12u1, libmilter1.0.1 8.17.1.9-2+deb12u2, libsasl2-2 and sasl2-bin 2.1.28+dfsg-10, supervisor 4.2.5-1, logrotate 3.21.0-1 - read off the image with dpkg-query, 2026-10-15); the e2e stand's new checkCitedPackageVersions fails when the image it built differs. - C-E2: the e2e zone's SOA serial only grows (CoreDNS v1.14.6's file plugin reloads on a grown serial, not on mtime); Corefile comment says so; TestZoneSerialGrows. - C-K8, C-K9: the e2e compose and stage comments say how --project-directory and .env resolve. - D-arch:154: postfix-config.sh's "Postfix insists" comment says what TLS_README advises and that smtpd reads the key as root. - B-G7: inflight.go's reservationTTL comment: a dropped client does give ABORT (smtpd_proto() -> mail_reset() -> milter_abort()); the TTL is for smtpd dying or the milter connection breaking. - D-guide:301: the nginx fragment's first-certificate command now reaches certbot (--entrypoint certbot, --standalone, port 80 free), and the renewal loop passes --webroot -w /var/www/certbot - a standalone certificate would otherwise renew standalone while nginx holds port 80 (certbot docs, "Renewing certificates": the issuing plugin is used "unless you specify other plugins or options", and options of a successful renewal are saved). The register's proposal missed that. Documents: every D-arch, D-guide and D-sec claim the register's Answers E found false or partly true, rewritten - by three Sonnet agents, one per document, then reviewed: two proposals were obsolete after this stage's fixes and not used (a bounce's From: line - extract_from = "smtp" now; "Origin: null" - Referrer-Policy is same-origin now); a stand observation the agent had dated from a commit is now tied to the e2e test that checks it; the SQLite writers paragraph describes _txlock=immediate; the log tailer's rotation paragraph describes the minute's grace; the guide's nginx steps were put in working order (links and modes before `up`, no reconfigure step). "Deferred" is kept for Postfix's queue in the guide too. guide.md's CRLF from the agent normalised. Stand (2026-10-15, make e2e, exit 0, the version gate and zone serial test included); go vet and go test ./... pass on the server (24 packages). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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2e1544dac5 |
certbot: certs/ links into /etc/letsencrypt, mounted at the same path; the backup follows them
test / test (push) Canceled after 0s
C-A1, C-Q4, D-guide:258, :291, :722. certbot's live/<host>/*.pem are relative links into ../../archive/<host>/ (eff-certbot docs, "Where are my certificates?": point a server at them "or create symlinks"). The guide had `ln -s /etc/letsencrypt/live/<host> certs` and the nginx fragment mounted live/<host> alone: inside the container the links led into a directory it did not have - postfix-config.sh's [ -f ] false, no copy, Postfix without a certificate - and the panel's backup, reading certs/ through /selfpost-deploy, skipped links silently. Now certs/fullchain.pem and certs/privkey.pem are links to /etc/letsencrypt/live/<host>/, and /etc/letsencrypt is mounted read-only at the same path: a commented line in deploy/docker-compose.yml for the Apache scenario, mounted in the nginx fragment (./nginx/certbot-etc). The guide's steps add certbot's own commands for a server that is not root - chmod 0755 live archive, chgrp 998 + chmod 0640 the key, which certbot keeps on renewal - so the panel reads them (Health, backup). Postfix's side follows links already ([ -f ], cp, cmp, openssl). The vhost comment says the same. The backup table: links are followed by the panel's backup; a stopped tar stores them as links unless -h (GNU tar). internal/backup: addTree follows, for certs/ only, a link to a regular file and archives that file under the link's name; a link to nothing reachable is an error naming it and the mount. Tests: TestCertsLinksAreFollowed (certs/ -> live/ -> archive/, the archive holds the files; the tree gone, Check names the dangling link; Linux). Stand (2026-10-15, make e2e, exit 0): the stand mounts ./letsencrypt at /etc/letsencrypt; new certbot_layout_followed puts a new pair into letsencrypt/archive/, relative links in live/, absolute links in certs/, recreates the container: 465 serves the new serial, Health names no renewal waiting, and the full backup holds certs/*.pem as regular files with the archive's bytes. go vet and go test ./... pass on the server (24 packages); the Linux-only tests of this session run there and pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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9ca50d33fd |
web: Referrer-Policy same-origin; a password shown once emptied on pagehide
test / test (push) Canceled after 0s
D-B3. Fetch Standard § 3.2 "append a request `Origin` header": under Referrer-Policy no-referrer a request that is not GET/HEAD and not CORS - a form POST, a navigation - gets Origin "null". originAllowed() refuses "null" whenever Sec-Fetch-Site is absent, and Fetch Metadata § 3 sends Sec-Fetch-Site only to a potentially trustworthy URL: every form, sign-in included, failed in Safari before 16.4 and in any browser on a plain-HTTP panel at a name. same-origin nulls Origin only for a request not same origin with its URL and still sends no referrer to another site. The comments of the origin check say so. D-B13. noStore keeps the page out of HTTP caches (RFC 9111 § 5.2.2.5); a history mechanism "might honor" it (§ 6), and Pragma in a response "was never specified" (§ 5.4) - it goes. CopyField.Secret marks the password of out-app-created data-secret, and panel.js empties such fields on pagehide (HTML § 7.5.9, "unload a Document", step 10.2: fired whether or not the document is kept for history traversal). Measured 2026-10-15 in Chrome 152 (the desktop app's browser), a local probe page with Cache-Control: no-store and a data-secret field: Back reloads it (pageshow persisted=false, a new load), so this browser keeps no-store pages out of its back/forward cache; the handler, fired on the same page, empties the field. Firefox and Safari not measured. Tests: the header value; the created page has the password data-secret and the login not, no Pragma. Stand (2026-10-15, make e2e, exit 0): new form_post_with_the_browsers_origin - Referrer-Policy: same-origin on a page; a POST carrying the page's own Origin and no Sec-Fetch-Site, what a browser sends now, passes; one carrying Origin: null, what it sent before, is 403. (A first run failed where the e2e client and a view test scraped the old input markup; both read data-secret now.) go vet and go test ./... pass on the server (24 packages). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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98e09fef4a |
health: sockets dialled, the certificate Postfix serves, "deferred" only for the queue
test / test (push) Canceled after 0s
Audit 2026-10-12, stage 2c, "Health says what is served"; the pages of
ea8b6bf's mockup.
Sockets (A-38). A unix socket's file outlives a killed OpenDKIM or panel
and refuses every connect() (unix(7)); Health said "Listening" from a
stat. CheckSocket and CheckMilter's unix case now dial: refused is
"Nothing listens on the ... socket: the program that made it has
stopped", EACCES is unknown (the panel may not connect), anything else
"does not answer". The probe closes before a byte, which no milter logs:
libmilter takes the EOF as SMFIC_EOF without a line (sendmail
8.17.1.9-2+deb12u2, the image's libmilter1.0.1, libmilter/comm.c
mi_rd_cmd(), engine.c mi_engine() - its source is now in dev/upstream),
OpenDKIM's mlfi_close() has no connection to free, go-milter v0.4.1
returns quietly on io.EOF (session.go, HandleMilterCommands()). The page
polls every 5 s while in view, so this mattered.
Certificate (A-65). Postfix serves build/postfix-config.sh's copy,
refreshed by cert-reload every TLS_RELOAD_INTERVAL_SECONDS. The panel now
reads smtpd_tls_cert_file from postconf -h at its start (as the retry
policy) and TLS_RELOAD_INTERVAL_SECONDS; CheckServedCertificate checks the
served copy and, when the mounted file differs byte for byte (cert-reload's
own cmp -s), names it as Renewal: its expiry and mtime, two facts on the
card. Waiting is fine for the interval: a nearing expiry of the served one
is then no warning (an expiry still an error); past interval + 1 h it is a
warning pointing at cert-reload's lines. The notifier sends no expiry
notice while a renewal waits on time.
Wording (D-P1, D-P3, and the same for the spam filter): Sender check
note, help topics sender-check, upstream, filter, certificate - word for
word as in the mockup; the filter row's detail too.
Tests: stale socket file (Linux) refused for CheckSocket and CheckMilter;
CheckServedCertificate (same, waiting, late, expired + waiting, no served
path); intervalText; the card's facts; the notifier quiet while a renewal
waits, speaking once it is late. Stand (2026-10-15, make e2e, exit 0):
new health_shows_what_is_served - the three sockets dialled ok by the
panel's user; a certificate mounted without its key is refused by
cert-reload ("do not belong together") and the card shows the served
expiry, "Renewal expires" with the mounted one's, "Renewal mounted", and
"Postfix still serves the certificate above."; a matching pair is then
served again. go vet and go test ./... pass on the server (24 packages).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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d20009c0f0 |
sasldb2 changed through a copy renamed over it, never in place
test / test (push) Canceled after 0s
Cyrus SASL 2.1.28 opens sasldb2 with no Berkeley DB environment, so with
no locks (sasldb/db_berkeley.c, berkeleydb_open(): db_create(mbdb, NULL,
0)); saslpasswd2 puts and deletes in the file itself (_sasldb_putdata()),
while smtpd opens and closes it at every AUTH (_sasldb_getdata()) and the
backup copies it whenever it runs. Either could read a half-written page:
a spurious 535, or a torn sasldb2 in a backup whose restore breaks every
application's AUTH (assumptions C-S3, C-Q3).
SASLDB.Set and Delete now run saslpasswd2 on sasldb2.new - a byte copy of
the database, or no file when there is none yet (saslpasswd2 creates it,
DB_CREATE) - then chmod 0640, fsync, rename over sasldb2; a failed run
removes the copy and leaves the database; a copy a killed panel left is
removed first. A mutex keeps two changes of the panel from copying the
same old file. The backup needs no lock after all (the plan said one): it
reads each file through one descriptor, and a rename leaves that file
whole; the walk now leaves out a file that vanished between listing and
open (a writer's temporary file), while the SQLite snapshot's absence
stays an error. CHANGELOG also gains the entries of
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f2ad699473 |
supervision as supervisord does it: Postfix stopped, give-ups FATAL, reload's exit read
test / test (push) Canceled after 0s
C-P42. postfix-script's start-fg runs master as its child and master calls setsid() (Postfix 3.7.11, conf/postfix-script; src/master/master.c); supervisord signals the pid alone (supervisor 4.2.5, process.py, Subprocess.kill()). A stop of program postfix left master running - a restart then found "already running" - and a container stop cut Postfix off with SIGKILL. The wrapper now stays the parent of "postfix start-fg" and on TERM/INT runs "postfix stop", asking again while start-fg is still in its checks (master -t). stopwaitsecs=15. C-V6. The wrapper's give-up on the milter sockets came after the default startsecs, so it was EXITED and restarted for ever. startsecs is now MILTER_WAIT_TIMEOUT + 10, exported by the entrypoint as POSTFIX_STARTSECS and expanded by supervisord (options.py, processes_from_section(); a non-number MILTER_WAIT_TIMEOUT stops the start): a give-up is "Exited too quickly", BACKOFF, FATAL after startretries, crashexit. For those seconds after each start the program is STARTING (the healthcheck's 90 s start period covers it; the sender check counts no downtime then). C-V5. logrotate had startsecs=0, so a refused config restarted it every second for ever. startsecs=1: FATAL after startretries; crashexit reads the event's processname and leaves logrotate's FATAL on Server > Health. B-U2. "supervisorctl start" returns when a startsecs=0 program is RUNNING, not when it ends, and mapped "already started" to success. The panel now speaks supervisord's XML-RPC itself (internal/supervisor, RunOnce): startProcess without waiting, getProcessInfo until it leaves STARTING/RUNNING, exitstatus 0 or an error; a run in progress is waited out and one of its own follows. A failed reload while program postfix is not RUNNING is logged, not an error: the next master reads the files. C-V10: postfix-reload rests EXITED after a run; the e2e process check takes STOPPED or EXITED. C-P34: the dead "postfix set-permissions" branch goes - postfix check's create-missing builds the queue tree. Stand (2026-10-14, make e2e, exit 0; MILTER_WAIT_TIMEOUT=10 on the stand): new supervision_stops_postfix_and_gives_up - supervisorctl restart postfix writes postfix-script's "stopping the Postfix mail system" and leaves one master; with the panel's sockets removed, start answers "postfix: ERROR (spawn error)" (finish() sets spawnerr "Exited too quickly", onwait() reads it first) and Postfix comes up once the panel is back; a group-writable logrotate config ends FATAL with the container up; the panel's Reload configuration answers only after mail.log has "refreshing the Postfix mail system", postfix-reload EXITED. session_survives_restart sees the stop line for the container's restart. Measured: master's own "terminating on signal 15" never reaches mail.log (master TERMs its group, postlogd included, before it logs). go vet and go test ./... pass on the server (24 packages; new unit tests of RunOnce against a fake supervisord). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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e174537512 |
postfix config: port 25's size limit for cleanup too, no local delivery
Port 25 says it takes INBOUND_MESSAGE_SIZE_LIMIT (25 MiB by default) with smtpd -o message_size_limit, but cleanup writes the queue file under its own limit, main.cf's - never set, so DEF_MESSAGE_LIMIT, 10240000 (Postfix 3.7.11, src/cleanup/cleanup_init.c, cleanup_post_jail(), set_file_limit(); src/global/mail_params.h). A larger message went through DATA and was refused 552 (assumptions C-P31). cleanup now gets port 25's limit as a master.cf -o when it is larger than main.cf's; 465 and 587 keep main.cf's in smtpd's own DATA/BDAT checks. /etc/postfix outlives a restart, so the override is removed with postconf -PX first on every start. An empty mydestination left one local destination: an address literal of an interface the container listens on (src/global/resolve_local.c, resolve_local(), own_inet_addr()). local_transport is now "error:local mail delivery is disabled", as STANDARD_CONFIGURATION_README's null client has it (assumptions C-P8). Stand (2026-10-14, make e2e, exit 0): inbound_relay_delivers_and_refuses sends a 12 MB message through port 25 and finds it at the upstream, and counts it among the Inbound log's rows; new address_literal_is_not_local - probe@[127.0.0.1] from an application is refused at RCPT "550 5.1.1 ... local mail delivery is disabled" (smtpd's check_rcpt_maps() rejects what resolves to the error transport; before, local(8) took it). go vet and go test ./... pass on the server (23 packages). Tested together with the next commit (the log tailer); the two touch no common file. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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c8f669714e |
journal milter: recipients as Postfix logs them, once each
test / test (push) Canceled after 0s
The row's recipient has to be the address Postfix writes in to=<..> or orig_to=<..>, or the delivery line finds no row and the sweep closes it as bounced. Postfix 3.7.11 hands the milter the RCPT argument as the client wrote it (smtpd.c, milter_argv(); extract_addr() leaves it), go-milter v0.4.1 trims "<>" and drops the ESMTP parameters (session.go, case CodeRcpt) - so cleanAddress's cut at the first blank broke a quoted local part (B-G5). Postfix keeps the address in internal form (tok822: quotes off, backslash escapes taken) and logs it external (info_log_addr_form.c, quote_822_local(): quoted again only when not a dot-string); recipientAsLogged does the same, "ab"@x -> ab@x, "a b"@x stays. A recipient given twice in any case is one row: cleanup drops the duplicate, comparing folded (cleanup_out_recipient.c, been_here(), BH_FLAG_FOLD; A-31). A rewritten recipient is matched by orig_to=, which log_adhoc() writes only when it differs (A-9). The store's case-insensitive match stays, now with its reason from the source (D-S20). Stand (2026-10-14, make e2e, exit 0): new recipients_as_postfix_logs_them - RCPT TO "x y"@, "ab"@ and "X Y"@ sink.e2e.test give two rows, "x y"@sink.e2e.test and ab@sink.e2e.test, both sent. go vet and go test ./... pass on the server; a unit test drives the milter through go-milter's own client. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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0ed03b2094 |
log tailer: expiry, Postfix's time values and refusal lines as Postfix writes them
test / test (push) Canceled after 0s
Expiry (assumptions A-8). Postfix 3.7.11 logs the end of a message's queue lifetime once per message, "<id>: from=<..>, status=expired, returned to sender" (src/qmgr/qmgr_active.c, qmgr_active_done_25_generic()), with no line per recipient; the tailer waited for "to=..., status=expired", which no Postfix writes, and the sweep closed only queued rows, so such rows stayed deferred. The tailer now reads qmgr's line (ExpireMessage: each recipient's newest open row of the id becomes bounced); the sweep closes a deferred row too when Postfix no longer holds the message, and counts as missed only a final line (sent, bounced, expiry). The queue listing's '#' (forced expiry, showq_compat.c showq_message()) is read as a flag (B-PQ1). Time values (B-PQ10, B-PQ11): conv_time() ported - one number, one lower-case unit, the parameter's default unit when none (get_def_time_unit: d for the lifetimes, h for delay_warning_time), the rest ignored; postconf -h -x expands $name; bounce_queue_lifetime capped at maximal_queue_lifetime as qmgr_post_init() caps it, so LongestLifetime is the queue lifetime. Refusals (A-21, A-23, A-24, A-15): smtpd_whatsup() ends the NOQUEUE line with sasl_username=<login> on an authenticated session; the line is now matched to its row by client, login and sender, and a line without a login is no application's. The client= line's login ends at the comma. The "IPv6:" trim goes (namaddr is built from state->addr). A row recovered from cleanup's line says that line names the last recipient only. Stand (2026-10-14, make e2e, exit 0): new expired_message_is_closed - defer_transports=smtp makes the retry service defer the message, postsuper -e and postqueue -i force its expiry; mail.log has "<id>: from=<alerts@sender.e2e.test>, status=force-expired, returned to sender" and the row goes deferred -> bounced; refusals_show_postfixs_line passes with the login match. go vet and go test ./... pass on the server. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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55aef6e721 |
sender check: the sender map read and looked up as Postfix does it
Postfix 3.7.11 takes the owners of the first key mail_addr_find() finds -
the address, then without its extension, then @domain, each tried only
when the one before is absent (src/global/mail_addr_find.c,
mail_addr_find_opt()) - and compares the login with them by
strcasecmp_utf8() (src/smtpd/smtpd_check.c,
reject_auth_sender_login_mismatch()). The check accepted a From: address
when any of the three keys named the application: an application holding
@domain could write an address listed for another application of the
domain, which Postfix refuses it in the envelope, and have it signed
(assumptions B-PS1).
The table is now read as dict_thash_open() reads it: continuation lines,
owners split on commas and blanks (B-PS4), the key ending at the first
blank outside quotes, keys folded; a key given twice makes Postfix refuse
the whole table (no DICT_FLAG_DUP_* flag), and the check then defers too.
The writer folds keys, so two cases of one address cannot be two lines.
e2e on the stand (2026-10-14, make e2e, exit 0): the wildcard application
is refused billing@ - listed for app-list - in From: (550 5.7.1), and in
the envelope by Postfix at RCPT ("553 5.7.1 <billing@...>: Sender address
rejected: not owned by user"). go vet and go test ./... pass on the
server (23 packages).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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599149bf83 |
build, deploy, inbound, dmarc, backup, e2e: cite the source of what they rely on (assumptions part C)
Comments only, no behaviour changed. Each main.cf/master.cf parameter the
build sets, the wrapper's and the reload hook's reliance on Postfix 3.7.11
(postfix-script, master.5, postconf.5, cleanup_init.c, smtpd_peer.c,
README_FILES), supervisor 4.2.5 (process.py, options.py, events.rst),
logrotate 3.21.0, OpenDKIM's config, Cyrus SASL's sasldb, rspamd 3.11.1
(milter_headers.lua, multimap, the map watcher), Docker Compose, CoreDNS
and certbot now say where that is written. Measurements already there stay
measurements ("date not recorded" where none was); hand-composed fixtures
say so.
Contradictions left for their own commits: C-P31 cleanup's size limit,
C-P42 master outside supervisor's signal, C-V5/V6 startsecs, C-V10,
C-S3/Q3 sasldb written in place, C-Q4/A1 certbot's symlinks, C-R7 rspamd
skips local clients but the signature routine does not, C-P8, C-R4, C-R12,
C-M7, C-E2, C-K8/K9, C-D1.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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af130e268a |
findings of the reviews of audit stage 2b
Technical review (Opus) and security review (Fable) of 5be109b..5154bba;
reports in the session's scratchpad. Nothing above low from security; one
bug and three risks from the technical review. Migration 0009 is not
deployed, so it was extended.
- Bug: two refusals of one second swapped their NOQUEUE lines (each line
went to the newest lineless row). AttachRefusalLine now matches the
client address too (send_log.client_ip, written by the journal milter -
Postfix's line names the client and the sender, never the login: the
sasl_username part of the pattern never matched and could be fed by HELO,
security F1/F2), takes the nearest row in time and the oldest of equals,
and a line already on a row goes on no other (security F6).
- Waiting lines and recoveries lived only in memory while the saved offset
moved past them: a stop within 30 s lost them. The tracker now never saves
an offset past the oldest waiting item in its file (tracker.hold,
refusalLines.oldest) - for a recovery, the client= line that names its
login - so they are read again; the "once" guards make that harmless.
- A recovered row whose login the tailer did not see was nobody's: its
domain_id falls back to the envelope domain's.
- The fingerprint's file identity is the inode alone: the device number can
change across a host reboot and make the same log look rotated.
- A refused row carries its queue id; UpdateStatus's "newest row" now skips
refused rows, so a later message with that id does not flip it to sent.
- The alive mark: its age is read first and kept from then on, so asking
supervisord for 30 s cannot make it stale; the entrypoint removes it with
the sockets - a container restart is not the check's downtime, and a mark
from before would have counted the whole outage as "≈".
- Security F3: the sender check prints no ";" of the client's in the From:
text of its reply, and the tailer reads the envelope after the first ";"
- Postfix's own text.
- A refused row with a queue id and no stored lines says so (it was told the
mail.log text of 2.2.0); the fact's em dash is the house hyphen.
- Docs: architecture (client address, no login), guide § Health (warns on
either count), help topics log and sender-check (design
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ac985d03a8 |
sender check: connections and messages counted apart; downtime estimated when supervisord is silent (stage 2b)
Following the design commit
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65d916f26a |
logtail: a refusal the panel did not get to write is written from mail.log (stage 2b)
test / test (push) Canceled after 0s
The sender check answers 550 5.7.1 and writes the refused row through a
buffer a moment later; a panel stopped in between (a rollout, a kill) left
an application refused and a log that did not know it. A refusal at MAIL
FROM needs nothing: the journal milter writes its row before it answers.
- logtail.refusalLines remembers each queue id's login from smtpd's
"<id>: client=..., sasl_username=<login>" (4096 ids at most) and, on
cleanup's "<id>: milter-reject: END-OF-MESSAGE ...: 5.7.1 From: <line> -
<why>; from=<...> to=<...>", waits 30 s and hands it to
store.RecoverRefusal - an INSERT ... WHERE NOT EXISTS a refused row of that
queue id within two minutes: the row the panel wrote, or one recovered
before, means nothing is written. It is read from the saved offset on, so
a kill is covered as well as a clean stop - which a flush of the buffer at
shutdown would not.
- Migration 0009 (not deployed yet) gains send_log.recovered; the row is
written with the line's time, the login's domain id, reason "from", the
From: line as the check printed it (to the last " - " before ";").
- The message page: a fact "Written: from mail.log after a restart: the
panel stopped before it wrote the refusal".
Tests: store (not written when the panel wrote it; written once however
often); logtail (the login from client=, the From: line with a " - " in it,
nothing before the wait is over); view (the fact). e2e
refusal_recovered_from_the_log: a From: refusal, the panel stopped, its row
deleted and the tailer's saved place moved before the message's first line
(python3 in the container, as the panel's user - a kill cannot be timed to
that moment from outside); started again, the row is back, recovered, once.
Also fixed: handlers TestMessagePageOfARefusedMessage still expected the
old sentence; it failed on the server after
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e166a2ebd6 |
refused messages: the page shows what Postfix wrote (stage 2b, 0009)
The Delivery log box of every refused row said "This message never reached
the queue, so Postfix wrote no delivery lines for it" - untrue: Postfix
wrote a line for each. The owner, 2026-10-13: the box is required on every
message page. Pictured for him first (dev/shots, the refused variant of
out-message: wrong From with its queue id lines, rate-limited with the
NOQUEUE line); the variant has no mockup screen of its own - the guard ties
screens to pages, and its outline is out-message's.
- Wrong From: cleanup gives the message a queue id before the headers are
judged; the sender check reads {i} at end-of-headers and writes it on the
refused row. Its lines - stored under the id like any other's - are on the
page, but only those from 10 minutes before to 1 minute after the refusal
(store.SendLogLines for a rejected row): Postfix frees the id at once, and
a later message with it lends nothing. No mail.log fallback for a refused
row, for the same reason.
- Rate-limited and wrong client: refused at MAIL FROM, no queue id. Migration
0009 adds send_log.refusal_line; logtail.refusalLines matches smtpd's
"NOQUEUE: milter-reject: MAIL from ...; from=<...>" (not port 25's, not
CONNECT/EHLO) and store.AttachRefusalLine puts it on the newest refused row
of that sender (and login, when the line names it) within two minutes; a
line whose row is not written yet waits up to 30 s (retried at each pass).
- The page: the queue id fact says "given, the message was not queued" or
"none - refused at MAIL FROM, before one is given"; the box's caption is
"The line from mail.log for this refusal" for the latter; a row from
before says the line was not kept. LogLineLevel colours a refusal by its
reply: 5xx red, 4xx amber (IPv6 clients included). The id in the fact is
not muted as in the picture: the kit has no muted inline.
Tests: store (attach by sender, login, time; not a queued row, not one an
hour off; a refused row's lines are its own minutes); logtail (attach, wait
and retry, port 25 and other lines ignored); milter (the refused row carries
{i}); view (facts, caption, line levels); handlers (the line on the page,
the sentence without it). e2e refusals_show_postfixs_line: a client-address
refusal made there, and the pages of a wrong From, a rate-limited and a
wrong client refusal each show Postfix's line.
schema-migrations row 9, CHANGELOG [Unreleased], audit plan line ticked,
roadmap 25/62.
Evidence on the test server for this tree: make e2e exit 0 (the new case
in 5.4 s); go test ./... ok but for two schema tests, fixed after the run
(the schema at 0009) - store tests ok locally; the full run follows before
the push.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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ef18ef21a0 |
findings of the reviews of audit stage 2
test / test (push) Canceled after 0s
Technical review (Opus) and security review (Fable) of a59e3d4..cb5a4a2;
reports in the session's scratchpad. Nothing critical, high or medium; no
outright bug. Fixed:
- F2, F3 (0008 backfill, before it runs on the live database): rows are
filled by the rule new rows follow - the application's domain, then the
name's - and only by a domain and application that existed when the row
was written (created_at); the inbound log likewise. Test: the migration's
UPDATEs re-run on prepared rows (before the domain, after, null sender,
application gone, a stranger's name). Dry run on a copy of the live
database: 68/68 and 10/10 rows filled, none disagreeing with its login's
domain, integrity ok.
- V2, F4: an application's statistics and level-2 count are its login's
rows of its domain (appByLogin), and StatsWindow starts no earlier than
the entity's creation; the message page's "may send as" only for a login
still of the row's domain. Test: a login taken again in another domain
starts at zero.
- F7: MAIL FROM:<> is held to the domain limit of its login
(ApplicationByLogin fills DomainName).
- V3: an imported DKIM selector is held to DNS labels (validate.Selector).
- F5, F6: an imported auto limit's numbers are dropped and recalculated
right after the import; its mode is stored trimmed.
- V6: the store refuses a role that is neither global nor domain.
- F9: SaveUser keeps the stored hash when no new password is given (the
form no longer writes back the hash it read). F10: a reach naming a
domain deleted meanwhile is ErrNoSuchDomain, answered on the form.
- V4, F12: from-lines-other.txt - lines naming another sender ({other}) in
a quoted string, a quoted pair, capitals, a comment, an encoded word, a
quoted local part; the unit test wants each refused, the e2e
(lines_naming_another_sender_never_signed_for_it) wants each refused and
none signed for it. The passed list gained a.{DOMAIN}, a comment after
the angle address, a quoted local part, and "b@ {other}" - passed by
design (security.md), and the e2e shows it signed for the own domain.
- F13: e2e login_in_other_capitals_does_not_authenticate - AUTH with the
login upper-cased gets 535.
Not changed, written down: V1/F1 - L8 is half closed (refused or passed
still tells an application which domains are hosted here); security.md's
accepted risks and the CHANGELOG say so, and the owner is asked whether to
refuse every foreign address in a display name (changes the 2.4.0 rule).
F11 - deleting a domain rewrites its rows' domain_id (seconds at 1e5 rows),
accepted at this size. F8 (test cannot tell write-first from read-first;
the reviewer verified it with two stores, 30/30), V5, V7, P2: noted.
Evidence on the test server for this tree: go vet clean, go test ./... 23
packages ok, make e2e exit 0 with the three new cases.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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5747f0b25c |
sender check: the reply names no other domain (L8); which key signs, tested (stage 2)
L8: a From: line naming another sender of the server was refused with
"it names another sender of this server, <domain>" - a confirmation, to
whoever tries names, that the domain is hosted here. The reason now stops
before the domain; the line as written stays in the reply (the client's own
text) and on the refused message's page (header_from). Unit test: the reason
of every refusal names none of the server's other domains; e2e: the reason
of each sender-check refusal does not contain other.e2e.test.
Which key OpenDKIM signs with (owner, 2026-10-13): the check and OpenDKIM
read From: with two parsers, and their agreement was argued, never run.
internal/milter/testdata/from-lines-passed.txt holds the lines the check
passes for an application - bare and bracketed, quoted names with a comma,
escaped quotes and an address inside, an extension, three encoded charsets,
two folded lines, comments (nested too), a stranger's address in the name -
as Go-quoted strings with {domain}. The unit test wants each passed; the new
e2e case passed_from_lines_signed_for_their_domain_only sends each as app1
and wants every DKIM signature at the sink to be for the sender domain,
with one valid. All fifteen were. "(the shop) a@domain" - a comment before
the address, valid RFC 5322 - is refused by the check ("it must be one
address"); strict, not a hole, so it is not in the file. Groups are refused
too.
Audit plan lines ticked (two) with what was found, CHANGELOG [Unreleased],
roadmap 21/62.
Evidence on the test server for this tree (with
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60c7b85f84 |
findings of the reviews of audit stage 1
test / test (push) Canceled after 0s
Technical review (Opus) and security review (Fable) of 9efc9c7..a59e3d4; reports in the session's scratchpad. Fixed: - B1 (verified bug): store.UpdateStatus read before writing in its transaction; a commit by another connection in between (the dmarc-ingest process opens the same file) failed it at once with "database is locked" and the delivery line was lost. The first statement is now a write. - R3: a delivery line updated every row of its queue id and recipient; it now updates only the newest (Postfix reuses short ids). The sweep closes by row id (QueuedDelivery.ID, CloseUnreported(id)). - R4: a contradicted sweep keeps a mark, reason "reconcile-contradicted", instead of losing which row it was. - R1: contradicted cannot see a lost line (never read late). New counter reconcile_missed: at close, the sweep looks for the row's delivery line in mail.log and mail.log.1 (QueueLines). 0007 edited - it has run on no database but throwaway stands. - R2: queued_over_lifetime cannot measure "what removing the sweep would leave" while the sweep runs; its text now says rows stuck despite the sweep, and the rule uses closed - missed - contradicted. - cert-reload (R5, R6, R7, security medium/low): both files copied to .new and the copies checked as a pair before both are renamed; acts on the copy only when postconf says Postfix reads it; a failed reload is retried next pass; umask 077; says so when the mounted files cannot be read. The e2e case asserts Postfix reads the copy, the copy equals the mount, the key is 600 root. - Security low: a recipient with a quoted local part - the journal cut "a b"@x at the space, deliveryRe cut "a>b"@x at the ">" - matched no delivery line and was closed by the sweep. cleanAddress ends a bracketed address at the first ">" outside quotes; deliveryRe takes the recipient up to the ">, " before relay= (test fixtures given the relay= every real delivery line has). - Security low: postqueue -p's error carries at most 512 bytes of output. - Nits: addDeliveryLogDay refuses a column not on its list; the truncation test checks its message. - To stage 2b (page wording, mockup-first): the history step of a bounced row says the receiving server refused it, false for a row the sweep closed. To the owner when stage 2b is reached: since M13 the "deferred" figure counts whole messages too, which "Connections turned away" would not name. Found while verifying: the e2e's main positive path failed once with "553 not owned by user app1" - an smtpd idle from before the panel's reload took the connection in the reload's second. Measured on the stand (one-off probe, not committed): sending 0, 10, 40, 110 s after the save (two seconds at the soonest) always met an smtpd started after the reload. The e2e now waits for the sender map after each application it creates (waitForSenderMap: AUTH, MAIL, RCPT, RSET - no message, no row), and the level-1 case uses it instead of its own loop. Docs: architecture § Queue reconcile, schema-migrations (rows 7 and 8, chain head 8), CHANGELOG, audit plan (stage 1 note, the measured window, a new stage 2b line: 62 lines), roadmap 15/62. Evidence on the test server for this tree: go vet clean, go test ./... 23 packages ok, make e2e exit 0 (renewed certificate, hung panel, level 1 at 49/60). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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db36aa2c0e |
logtail: count the message a hung sender check defers in cleanup (audit M13)
Seen on the e2e stand, the panel frozen with SIGSTOP once DATA was
answered: the client gets 451 4.7.1 after 30 s, and the warning that names
the socket is cleanup's, not smtpd's:
postfix/cleanup[1339]: warning: milter unix:/run/selfpost/sender.sock:
can't read SMFIC_HEADER reply packet header: Connection timed out
postfix/cleanup[1339]: 7BCAF3C75DA0: milter-reject: END-OF-MESSAGE ...
4.7.1 Service unavailable - try again later; ...
The counter read smtpd lines only, so Health's "messages deferred" missed
the one case that tells a hung panel from a stopped one. milterLineRe now
takes smtpd and cleanup; cleanup's "milter unix:<socket>:" warning counts a
message each time (one cleanup process serves message after message, and the
first warning ends the message); smtpd keeps once per connection. The
composed fixture is replaced by the seen lines, with two messages through one
cleanup process and OpenDKIM hung in cleanup (not counted).
e2e panel_hung_mid_message_is_counted: freezes the panel after DATA's 354,
wants a 4xx at the end of DATA, logs what mail.log says, and waits for
Health's today count to grow. kill through sh -c: the image has no kill(1).
CHANGELOG [Unreleased], audit plan line ticked, roadmap 13/61.
Evidence on the test server for this tree (with the next commit's docs):
go vet clean, go test ./... 23 packages ok, make e2e exit 0 -
renewed_certificate_picked_up 1.2 s, panel_hung_mid_message_is_counted
31.7 s.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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7af37654a1 |
cert-reload: renew Postfix's copy of a renewed certificate (audit H2)
postfix-config.sh copies the mounted certificate and key into /etc/postfix/tls-internal at start (root-owned, key 0600) and Postfix reads the copy; cert-reload only ran `postfix reload` daily, which re-read the stale copy, so a certificate renewed while the container ran expired on 465/587 with the old one. postfix-cert-reload.sh now, every TLS_RELOAD_INTERVAL_SECONDS: compares the mount with the copy (cmp); when they differ and the certificate and key belong together (openssl public keys equal - a renewer writes them one after the other), writes each file beside its target, root-owned with the start's modes, renames it over the target, and reloads Postfix. Nothing changed - no reload. No copy (files missing at start) - the old periodic reload. Never exits non-zero. e2e renewed_certificate_picked_up: writes a new certificate into the stand's mount and waits (30 s) for port 465 to present its serial; compose.override.yml sets TLS_RELOAD_INTERVAL_SECONDS=2. supervisord.conf comment, architecture.md (process table, § Postfix TLS certs, the env knob), guide (after the proxies: picked up within a day). CHANGELOG [Unreleased], audit plan line ticked, roadmap 12/61. Evidence: GOOS=linux go vet in test/e2e clean; the server run of the stage follows before the push. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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96425dd515 |
e2e: a negative case passes only on its own refusal (audit stage 0)
sendResult.refusedAt(stage, code, text) and replyIs(err, code, text):
nil only for the server's reply with that code and text at that stage;
a reset, a timeout or another reply is described for the failure.
- level 1: only anvil's "450 4.7.1 Error: too much mail from", only after
a message of the loop was accepted. Held to that, it failed twice on
the stand, each time for a real reason:
1. waitForSMTPSReady took a TCP connect for readiness; Docker's port
proxy accepts before Postfix listens and then resets - the reset
once taken for the limit. It now waits for the TLS 220 greeting.
2. the first message then got "553 ... not owned by user l1app": an
smtpd idle from before the panel's postfix reload took the
connection with the old sender_login_maps. The level-1 limit had
never been what the case saw. The first message now waits (15 s at
most) for the map, failing at once on any other refusal.
Now: "level-1 limit tripped on attempt 51/60: 450 4.7.1 Error: too
much mail from 10.77.0.1".
- level 2: 451 4.7.1 at MAIL, and both MAIL FROM of one connection.
- sender mismatch: 553 at RCPT, "not owned by user".
- no AUTH and the relay case: 554 "Client host rejected: Access
denied" at RCPT; the relay case's comment claimed
reject_unauth_destination, which on 465 comes after the client
restriction - port 25 holds "554 Relay access denied".
- port 25: 550 5.1.1 for unknown recipients and report addresses.
- panel down: a 4xx reply (textproto), not just text starting with 4.
The product side (a second after an application is saved when its first
message can get 553) is written in the audit plan, not changed. Audit plan
line ticked with what was found, roadmap 7/61. No CHANGELOG line: tests only.
Evidence: make e2e on the test server for this tree, exit 0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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70b4eb5585 |
release: stamp the image with the release's version (audit H1)
test / test (push) Canceled after 0s
The e2e gate rebuilt selfpost:e2e through compose.override.yml with its
own VERSION=e2e, and that rebuild is the image release.yml pushed: every
published image printed "e2e", and the backup/restore version check
compared a backup's version with "e2e".
- compose.override.yml: VERSION: ${SELFPOST_E2E_VERSION:-e2e}.
- release.yml: the e2e step gets SELFPOST_E2E_VERSION = the release's
X.Y.Z; a new step before the push checks panel -version and
selfpost-backup -version of selfpost:e2e against it.
- e2e: image_stamped_with_version checks both binaries against
expectedVersion() (the variable, or "e2e" when unset).
- development.md, CHANGELOG [Unreleased], audit plan line ticked,
roadmap 1/61.
Evidence: make e2e on the test server for this tree with
SELFPOST_E2E_VERSION=2.4.2-stamp - exit 0, TestE2E/image_stamped_with_version
PASS, and `docker run --rm --entrypoint <bin> selfpost:e2e -version` prints
2.4.2-stamp for panel and selfpost-backup. GOOS=linux go vet in test/e2e
clean. Published images are left as they are.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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c817f0833c |
from-header-binding: what the reviews had left as found, and address extensions
test / test (push) Canceled after 0s
The owner on the three things the reviews' commit left as found: can they be fixed? They can. - Downtime that crossed a UTC midnight was all booked on the day of the restart: it is cut at the midnights between (byDay). - A message with the null envelope sender - a bounce an application writes itself - left a refusal row without a domain, which no domain administrator would see: the row takes the domain the login is bound to. - A log read again after an unclean stop counted its deferrals again: while the tailer catches up, a warning no later than the last one counted is passed over. The mark is kept to the fraction of a second the log gives. And on the check being stricter than Postfix for an address with an extension (invoices+x@ passed in the envelope, was refused in the header): it makes Postfix's second try now, the address without its extension. recipient_delimiter was the distribution's default; it is set in postfix-config.sh, since the check depends on it. e2e sends one through. Test server, this tree: go vet ok, go test 23 packages ok, make e2e ok (339 s). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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89fd0a6116 |
from-header-binding: findings of the technical and security reviews
test / test (push) Canceled after 0s
Both reviews were of
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c171fb5bc7 |
from-header-binding: the sender check, what it costs, its pages; guide, architecture, security
test / test (push) Canceled after 0s
A message's From: line is held against the application that sends it, under the rule Postfix holds the envelope sender to. OpenDKIM chooses the key by that line, so until now an application could have mail signed as another domain of the server or as the server itself. The check (internal/milter/sender.go) - A role of the panel on a socket of its own (SENDER_CHECK_SOCKET), first in smtpd_milters and strict: default_action=tempfail. The journal milter keeps its socket and stays fail-open. postfix-wrapper waits for the new socket. - It reads no database: what an application may send as comes from Postfix's own sender_login_maps, what the server signs for from OpenDKIM's SigningTable. Both are read again when they change; one that cannot be read defers mail. - One From: field, one address, allowed by the envelope's lookup; then no other name of the SigningTable may appear anywhere in the raw line. Refused: 550 5.7.1 naming the line, reduced to printable ASCII. - A refusal is a send-log row with reason "from" and the header address (migration 0006), written by another goroutine and not waited for. The journal's refusals record their reason too (limit, client), and the notifier takes only a limit's. What it costs (docs/plans/from-header-binding.md, Statistics) - The role marks itself alive every 2 s; at start the gap since the mark is downtime, counted from Postfix's start if later and not at all when supervisord says Postfix is not running. - The log tailer counts the connections Postfix turned away: a warning that names the socket, then milter-reject "Service unavailable" from the same smtpd. Seen on the stand: the client is refused from CONNECT on and leaves at AUTH (454), so no MAIL line is ever written. - sender_check_days, a row per UTC day, kept a year. Pages - Health: the card "Sender check", the socket's row, and the cards layout - boxes numbered by importance in two stacks read in rows; the left stack polls, the three readings of the right one are swapped in by id. - Outbound log: a refused row says why in its tag (wrong From, wrong client, rate-limited); the message's page shows the From: line and what the application may send as. - Help: topic "Sender check", word for word the mockup's. Found by the stand, fixed here: the names for the second look came from the sender bindings, and a domain with a key and no application yet was not among them. e2e: negative_journal_milter_fail_open is gone - it proved that mail passes with the panel down, which is no longer so. In its place sender_check_holds_the_from_line (another domain's From:, the hostname's, a stranger's, an address off the list, another sender in the display name - refused; own addresses - delivered) and panel_down_defers_mail (4xx with the panel stopped, the container alive, mail again after, downtime and one deferred message on Health, the card warning). Test server, this tree before the last cosmetic edits (a fixture row, a fact's size, docs): go vet ok, go test 23 packages ok, make e2e ok (337 s). Locally after them: internal/web/view ok. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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b905f3e560 |
panel-notifications: Account, Server > Settings, Server > Health, help; e2e
test / test (push) Canceled after 0s
The pages of the mockups accepted in
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815236a607 |
delivery-log-storage: e2e holds the page to its lines after a rotation
New step delivery_log_survives_rotation: the page of the first delivered message must list the line that opened its queue id and its delivery line, then mail.log is rotated with logrotate -f, the current file is checked to hold no delivery line, and the page must list both lines still. Before this feature the page searched the current file and would show none. The step runs after negative_level1_ratelimit: placed right after the first delivery it rotated away the "connect from" line the level-2 step reads from the current log, and that step failed. On the test server, for this tree: go vet clean, go test ./... 22 packages ok, make e2e ok (126 s). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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d398f488e2 |
inbound-antispam-panel: the filter signs what it judged
test / test (push) Canceled after 0s
Closes what the security review left as an accepted risk: with the
spam filter down - it is attached fail-open - nothing removes verdict
headers a sender wrote himself, and the inbound journal recorded his
verdict as the filter's. The owner asked whether rspamd could add a
header that proves the others are ours (2026-10-12) and agreed to a
signature: a fixed mark could be written by a sender as easily as the
verdict.
- inbound.FilterKey: a key of 32 random bytes, 64 hex characters, in
/data/antispam/filter.key, made on the first start with the relay
on. 0644 like the list files beside it: the filter is another user
in another container.
- deploy/antispam/rspamd/milter_headers.conf: a custom routine reads
the key through the directory the sidecar already mounts and adds
X-SelfPost-Filter, the HMAC-SHA256 of the message's queue id, hex;
a header of that name from the sender is removed.
- internal/milter/inbound.go: the verdict headers are kept as they
are read, and at end-of-message - when the queue id is known - they
count only if the signature fits (FilterSignature, hmac.Equal). No
key, no queue id, no signature or a wrong one: the row is that of
mail nobody judged (accept, selfpost, no detail).
The signature goes on to the upstream with the mail and is of no use
there: it fits one queue id.
Tried in a throwaway rspamd 3.11 container on the test server before
the Go side was written: the routine loads, signs
(2aa1ca6d... for key 0123...cdef and queue id 4A1B2C3D5E, the value
python's hmac gives and TestFilterSignatureIsWhatTheFilterWrites
pins), removes a sender's header of the same name, and adds nothing
without a queue id.
Tests: signed, unsigned, made-up, another message's, another key's,
the sender's followed by the real one, the next message on the
connection, no queue id; the key made once, read after, replaced when
damaged, left alone by the lists. e2e: filter.key is there, 644, 65
bytes.
docs/security.md: the accepted risk is replaced by a narrower one (the
key is readable on the host); Mail path describes the signature.
Checked on the test server, uncommitted tree: go vet ./... ok,
go test ./... ok (22 packages), make e2e ok.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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5f86457848 |
milter: the level-2 limit and the client IP list hold for every message
Security fix, outside the inbound antispam feature. Found by its
technical review (Opus, 2026-10-12), reproduced on the test stand
before the fix: over an application's level-2 limit, two MAIL FROM on
one connection were answered 451 and then accepted.
Cause. Postfix introduces a client to a milter once per connection.
The milter library (go-milter 0.4.1, session.go) replaces the milter's
session after any reply that is not "continue" - a refusal, or the
accept that used to end a message. The new session never saw Connect,
so it had no client address, and both checks passed a message without
one: overLimit returned early ("no client IP to key on") and
authIPAllowed did the same. So every message after the first on a
connection, and every MAIL FROM after a refused one, skipped the
level-2 limit and an application's client IP list. In the code since
1.9.0 for the list and longer for the limit.
Fix.
- build/postfix-config.sh: milter_mail_macros carries {client_addr},
so the address comes with every MAIL FROM; MailFrom reads it (both
spellings of IPv6) in the journal milter and the inbound journal
milter.
- overLimit no longer asks for a client address: a ceiling is on a
domain or an application.
- authIPAllowed refuses an application that has a client IP list when
no address is known.
- Body replies "continue" in both milters, which lets the message
through as "accept" did and keeps the session.
The inbound journal milter had the same cause with a smaller effect:
rows of a connection's later messages had no client address.
In the same file, the checks of INBOUND_ANTISPAM_MILTER and
INBOUND_JOURNAL_MILTER_SOCKET refuse any character outside their set
first: a glob's "*" matched anything after the first characters.
Tests: a session that never saw Connect is judged by the macro, a
listed and an unlisted address, no address, not an address; the limit
with no client address; the inbound milter answers only "continue".
test/e2e sends two MAIL FROM on one connection over the limit and
wants both refused.
Checked on the test server: e2e red before the fix on exactly that
check, green after; go vet ./... ok, go test ./... ok (22 packages).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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9d330bed77 |
inbound-antispam-panel: Inbound log, Why as a sheet; no Deny on a Postfix reject
Follows the two design commits before it (owner's decisions quoted there). Kit: a new component, Sheet / SheetRow (components.go), partials sheet_tag and sheet (components.html), its rules in panel.css as in theme.css, and its sample on the kit page next to status_tag. It is the browser's popover: no script. Inbound log: the Why column is gone; the decision tag opens a sheet with who decided, then either the filter's verdict and its symbols one a line (a detail the journal milter wrote) or the reply (a detail the tailer read from mail.log - it starts with its code), and the subject whole. The sheet's id is the journal row's. A row Postfix itself refused no longer links to the filter lists. Tests: the page fixture and view tests for the sheet's markup and content (TestWhyRows), the link rule, three Deny and two Allow on the mockup's six rows; e2e reads "Decided by" and "Reply" from the sheet and wants no sender link on the refused row. Seen: the fixture page with a sheet open, headless Edge at 1360 px - the same as the accepted drawing. Checked on the test server, uncommitted tree: go vet ./... ok, go test ./... ok (22 packages), make e2e ok. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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56c5dfee40 |
inbound-antispam-panel: Inbound > Log and Inbound > Filter lists
Step 6/12 of docs/plans/inbound-antispam-panel.md. Written by a Sonnet
subagent from the mockups, reviewed and corrected by me.
GET /inbound/log - the journal a page at a time (50), filtered by
domain, decision and day; QueryInboundSpam / CountInboundSpam with the
viewer's inbound domains as the scope. The global role reads all of it
and gets "Deny sender" / "Allow sender" links into the lists; a user
with the domain role reads the rows of the inbound domains assigned to
them, without the links. The plan said global-only for the journal;
the accepted mockup and 2.0's delegation of Inbound say otherwise -
recorded in the plan as built.
GET, POST /inbound/filter-lists and POST .../{id}/delete - global role,
404 otherwise. Add form (prefilled from the query), the two lists with
Remove as the kit's row action, and "Where the lists go" with the
filter's state and when the maps were last written
(Lists.LastWritten). A refused or duplicate entry is 422 with the
message and what was typed.
Server > Settings: "Keep inbound log rows, days" with the relay on.
Help: Inbound log, Filter lists. Navigation: Log for everyone who sees
Inbound, Filter lists for the global role (Shell.ShowFilterLists).
Status tags accept / reject / tempfail join the kit's mapping.
Tests: page fixtures for both screens, held to outlines.json; view and
handler tests (both roles, filters, paging, relay off, add / duplicate
/ invalid / delete, map file content, settings field, help). e2e reads
the journal from the page instead of the database and adds and removes
a deny entry through the panel, reading deny_domain.map after each.
Seen: both pages and Settings rendered from their fixtures and compared
with the mockups side by side (headless Edge, 1360 px) - same layout
and wording.
Checked on the test server, uncommitted tree: go vet ./... ok,
go test ./... ok (22 packages), make e2e ok.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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eea40bcd49 |
inbound-antispam-panel: filter lists, written as rspamd maps
Step 5/12 of docs/plans/inbound-antispam-panel.md.
Store: AddSpamListEntry, ListSpamListEntries, DeleteSpamListEntry.
internal/inbound/lists.go validates and normalises an entry - sender
address, sender domain, client address or network (canonical text, an
IPv4-mapped address as IPv4, /0 refused) - and writes the lists as six
map files under /data/antispam (ANTISPAM_DIR), each atomically, 0644 in
a 0755 directory: the filter is another user in another container. All
six are written on every change and on every start with the relay on,
empty ones included. An entry whose maps could not be written is taken
back out of the table. The writer refuses a stored value with
whitespace, a newline or # in it.
The plan's allow.map / deny.map became one file per list and entry
type: to rspamd an IP map and a sender map are different map types.
deploy/antispam/rspamd/multimap.conf holds the rules; the fragment
mounts it and ./data/antispam into the sidecar. Deny is a prefilter
reject, allow a symbol weighing -100. Tried in a throwaway rspamd 3.11
container on the test server:
- with allow as a prefilter accept, an address on both lists was
accepted and an IP on both was refused - the rule that ran first
decided; with the weight, deny won in all five mixed cases;
- IPv4, IPv6, address (any case), domain (not its subdomains) match;
- a rewritten file is reread in about ten seconds, no restart;
- files that appear after rspamd started are loaded the same way.
No page edits the lists yet (step 6).
Checked on the test server, uncommitted tree: go vet ./... ok,
go test ./... ok (22 packages), make e2e ok - with the relay on
/data/antispam is 755 and holds the six maps, 644, empty.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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27fd355e53 |
inbound-antispam-panel: refused inbound mail from mail.log; retention
Step 4/12 of docs/plans/inbound-antispam-panel.md. The log tailer writes an inbound_spam_log row for mail port 25 refused (internal/logtail/inbound.go): a "reject:" line of the port-25 smtpd is Postfix's own policy; a milter-reject / milter-hold / milter-discard line of cleanup is the filter's verdict. Only a recipient at an inbound domain is a row, so "Relay access denied" for a stranger's domain is not. The row is dated by its log line; the reply text is cut to 255 bytes of printable ASCII; a reply starting with 4 is a tempfail. To tell port 25 from 465 / 587 the listener now logs as postfix/inbound (syslog_name). cleanup logs under one name for every listener, so its verdict counts only for a queue id the port-25 smtpd was seen to open (4096 remembered). Lines are matched from the head, after timestamp and host: their tail is the sender's own text. Retention: PruneInboundSpam every six hours - older than the inbound_spam_log_retention_days setting (seeded from INBOUND_SPAM_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS, 90, range 7-365), then down to 10 000 rows. The setting has no field in the panel yet. Known limits, in architecture.md: a log line names one recipient, so a message refused at end-of-message is one row; a line re-read after an unclean stop would be a second row. Checked on the test server, uncommitted tree: go vet ./... ok, go test ./... ok (22 packages), make e2e ok - the unknown recipient at the inbound domain refused on port 25 has its row (reject by postfix), the stranger's domain has none. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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28ec784ae2 |
inbound-antispam-panel: inbound journal milter on port 25
Step 3/12 of docs/plans/inbound-antispam-panel.md. The panel serves a second milter while the inbound relay is on (internal/milter/inbound.go, socket INBOUND_JOURNAL_MILTER_SOCKET, default /run/selfpost/inbound-journal.sock). build/postfix-config.sh puts it last on port 25, after the optional antispam milter, with default_action=accept; postfix-wrapper.sh waits for its socket. At end-of-message it writes one inbound_spam_log row per recipient at an inbound domain - other port-25 recipients (DMARC report addresses) get none - and always accepts. With a filter attached it reads the verdict from X-Rspamd-Action and X-Spamd-Result (action, score, up to six weighted symbols, only what the patterns recognise, 255 bytes); without one those headers are the sender's and are not read. The plan named X-Rspamd-Score, which rspamd does not have. The antispam compose fragment mounts rspamd/milter_headers.conf into the sidecar so that it adds the two headers (checked in rspamd 3.11: both routines exist and remove a sender's own headers of those names). Store: InsertInboundSpam, IsInboundDomain. Checked on the test server, uncommitted tree: go vet ./... ok, go test ./... ok (22 packages), make e2e ok - the relayed message of inbound_relay_delivers_and_refuses has its journal row (accept by selfpost) and the DMARC report sent through the same listener has none. Not yet seen in a real run: a verdict written by rspamd reaching this milter. The e2e stand has no filter, and the test server's only inbound domain has no upstream, so it accepts no mail. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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dd0fefdcb7 |
backup: the panel's archive is the command's, private key included
Owner, 2026-10-11: the private key is needed, and a backup from the panel and one from the console have to be the same. The commit that made the panel's backup work skipped a file under certs/ the panel could not open - on the test server the private key, which the certificate hook leaves to root and Postfix's group. That gave an archive with a certificate and no key, and two kinds of archive. - Params.Unprivileged is gone. Nothing is left out on account of who makes the archive; the queue is out for everyone (previous commit). - When the panel cannot read a file under certs/, backup.Check says so before the download and the panel refuses with what to do on the host: chgrp 998 certs/privkey.pem && chmod 640. backup.UnreadableCert tells that case from any other failure. - 998 is the container's selfpost group, which holds the panel and Postfix. Its id was whatever groupadd gave; the Dockerfile now fixes it at the value it has always had, because an operator addresses it by number from the host. - Guide: method 1 is the same archive as method 2, with the permission the key needs and a note for whatever renews the certificate. Help and the box follow the design commit before this one. - e2e: the restore scenario first makes the key unreadable and expects the refusal naming the file and the way out, then takes the backup and expects the key in it; nothing is put back by hand before the restart. go vet ./internal/backup/ ./internal/web/handlers/: ok go test ./internal/backup/ ./cmd/... ./internal/web/...: ok make e2e on the test server: ok Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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b55b33ae92 |
e2e: full backup from the panel, restore into an empty directory
After the rate-limit checks the run takes a full backup through the panel, reads the archive through while the container can still say what went wrong, then removes data/, certs/, docker-compose.yml and .env, unpacks the archive into the project directory, puts the private key back (the panel's archive comes without it and without the queue, both asserted), and starts the stand again. What has to hold: manifest.json is consumed by the first start, the administrator signs in, the domain shows the same DKIM value, and a message sent with the application's old password reaches the sink and verifies against the record published before the backup. The port-25 scenarios then run on the restored installation. make e2e on the test server: ok. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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8496b289ec |
e2e: the run ends on port 25, with a report, junk and inbound mail
Until now the suite only read back the configuration generated for the two optional port-25 features. DMARC ingest shipped in 1.7.0 with a delivery service Postfix could not start, and nothing sent a report through it until a real one arrived on the test server on 2026-10-11. The last steps recreate the container with INBOUND_RELAY_ENABLE and DMARC_REPORTS_ENABLE on, over the same /data, and talk to port 25 as a stranger's mail server: - the container log has no postconf warning, the session survives; - a domain takes the SelfPost-hosted report address; a gzip report mailed to it appears under Outbound > DMARC reports; an address nobody chose is refused at RCPT; - a report on another domain and a message with no report are accepted, dropped with "dropped: ..." on their delivery lines, counted as two parse failures, absent from the queue and from the reports; - an inbound domain with the sink as upstream and one listed recipient: mail for it reaches the sink, another recipient and another domain are refused at RCPT. The stage directory now holds docker-compose.yml and .env, as an operator's project directory does (a full backup needs them; the restore scenario that uses it is not in this commit - the panel's full backup turned out not to work, see the next one). make e2e on the test server: ok. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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4dd46ea355 |
dmarc: a report is bounded, kept per domain, and ingested one at a time
Security review of the DMARC report path (Fable, 2026-10-11), which ran for the first time in 2.0.0. No Critical or High finding. Fixed: - Medium: a report was bounded only as 8 MiB of XML - some 160 000 records or one name of megabytes, all of it rows and table cells. At most 5 000 records (more is ErrRejected, dropped), text fields cut to 255 bytes on a character boundary, a record's count capped. - Medium: the cap of 500 reports was for the whole server, so a stranger filing under one domain's address evicted every other domain's reports. PruneDMARCReports counts per domain. - Low: the pipe service ran up to default_process_limit (100) commands at once against the panel's database; maxproc is 1. - Low: the reason logged for a dropped message carried the sender's bytes (header line, zip entry name) as they came; cut to 200 bytes and reduced to printable ASCII, zip entry names quoted. - Low: SELFPOST_DATA_DIR / SELFPOST_DB_PATH with whitespace or "$" would reach the command through export_environment as another path; refused at start when DMARC ingest is on. Left as they are, told to the owner: the parse-failure count is a lifetime figure shown under "This week"; a report larger than the command reads is dropped as unreadable; nested multipart is not searched. The hub's Retention line follows the design commit before this one. security.md: the review, and the accepted-risk entry says what a stranger can and cannot do now. The roadmap no longer calls the review pending. go vet ./cmd/... ./internal/dmarc/ ./internal/store/: ok go test ./cmd/... ./internal/dmarc/ ./internal/store/ ./internal/web/...: ok make e2e on the test server (with the port-25 scenarios of the next commit): ok Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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252e5d1cff |
dmarc-ingest: Postfix can run the command, and it is told the recipient
The first DMARC report to reach the test server (Google, 2026-10-11
09:41 UTC) was accepted on port 25 and then sat in the queue:
postfix/pipe: fatal: missing user= command-line attribute
postfix/qmgr: warning: private/dmarc-ingest socket: malformed response
Three things stood between an accepted report and the panel, all since
the feature shipped in 1.7.0 - no report had ever been delivered:
- The service was addressed as dmarc-ingest/unix-pipe. Its type is unix:
postconf -P answered "unmatched service_name/type" for flags=, user=
and argv= (the warnings in the container log at every start), which
are arguments of pipe(8) anyway and not -o parameters, and the service
stayed a bare "pipe". For the same reason postconf -MX never removed
it. It is dmarc-ingest/unix now, with the arguments in the service line.
- pipe(8) gives the command export_environment and nothing else, so the
command would have refused to run: it reads DMARC_REPORTS_ENABLE (and
the data directory, when it is not the default) from the environment.
Those are now named in export_environment.
- The command took the recipient from RECIPIENT, which local(8) sets and
pipe(8) does not. With no recipient the check that a report came to the
address of its own domain is skipped. It is now ${recipient} in argv,
one recipient per run.
When DMARC ingest is off the service and both parameters are removed.
e2e: every port-25 combination now asks Postfix for the service and the
two parameters (postconf -M / -h), and for their absence when ingest is
off - which is how the wrong type was found. make e2e on the test
server: ok. go test ./cmd/panel/ ./internal/dmarc/ ./internal/postfix/:
ok.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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36db4223f2 |
postfix-config: report addresses are relay recipients when the relay is on
Found by talking SMTP to port 25 of the test server once it answered again (2026-10-10): RCPT TO:<dmarc-reports+bs.mixdep.ru@selfpost.mixfed.ru> was refused with "550 5.1.1 User unknown in relay recipient table". With INBOUND_RELAY_ENABLE and DMARC_REPORTS_ENABLE both true the server's own name is a relay domain (for the reports) and relay_recipient_maps lists the relay's recipients only. smtpd_reject_unlisted_recipient applies after the restriction list, so the OK that check_recipient_access gives a report address does not help: every report was refused. The table of report addresses is added to relay_recipient_maps in that combination. Checked on the server by setting the parameter in the running container and reloading Postfix: the domain's report address is answered 250, the former server-wide mailbox and an unknown local part 550, a foreign domain and an inbound domain without recipients 554. e2e: the combined case requires relay_recipient_maps to name both tables. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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80748e6c94 |
postfix-config: no whitespace in the port-25 service's -o values
Seen in the System log of the test server (2026-10-10): on every
connection to port 25
postfix/smtpd: fatal: unexpected command-line argument:
texthash:/data/postfix/dmarc_recipients,reject_unauth_destination,...
postfix/master: warning: .../smtpd: bad command startup -- throttling
With DMARC_REPORTS_ENABLE=true the script wrote
-o smtpd_recipient_restrictions=check_recipient_access texthash:...,...
into master.cf. Master splits a service line on whitespace, so smtpd got
the option cut at the space plus a stray argument and died at start:
port 25 greeted nobody - no inbound relay, no DMARC reports. postconf -P
smtp/inet/smtpd_recipient_restrictions showed the cut value,
"check_recipient_access". The server's logs have it under the previous
image too (2026-10-09), so it is not from the redesign; postfix check
does not notice, and the e2e check compared the text of master.cf with
an expectation that had the space in it.
- The restriction list is written with commas only (Postfix splits it
on commas as well as whitespace).
- master_cf_set_smtp_inet_o stops the container on a value with
whitespace instead of writing it.
- e2e: for every option it checks, the port-25 case also asks
postconf -P and requires Postfix to read the same value.
Not fixed here: Postfix's start-time warnings "not owned by root" for
the queue directory and its pid/ - the entrypoint's recursive chown
again; harmless, logged at every start.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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088c8a5986 |
e2e: the panel can read the queue
A subtest that opens Outbound > Queue right after sign-in and expects postqueue's own line for an empty queue, not the page's "Could not read the mail queue". Seen on the test server after the 2.0 deployment: the Queue card said "Could not be read", and the panel's log had "postqueue: fatal: Connect to the Postfix showq service: Permission denied" on every poll. The fix follows in the next commit; this one is expected to fail on its own. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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2f1ec65b30 |
panel-redesign: Outbound log, message and the DMARC report pages on the kit
Stage 2, step 4. Written by Sonnet, reviewed by Opus.
- Five pages named after their mockups: out-log, out-message, dmarc,
dmarc-domain, dmarc-report, with typed page data
(view/outbound_log.go, dmarc.go), fixtures and tests. The engine
pages deliveries and delivery are gone with their templates; the
three DMARC templates are written anew. All five old names are off
legacy_pages.txt.
- The log polls its table (GET /outbound/log/fragment, as before); the
page count in the box foot follows out of band, and the filter in
the head is no longer swapped away while it is being chosen.
- Handlers pass typed data; routes, query parameters, filters, paging
and authorization are unchanged.
- Kit: Foot.ID / Foot.OOB (attributes only, as on Head) and Fact.Small,
the mockup's "sp-mono sp-small" value, for a report id and an rua
that wrapped mid-word in their column.
- test/e2e status scrapers match the new tag markup. Not run: no
Docker here.
Fixed on the way
- The DMARC domain page read a field its source rows do not have and
answered 500 as soon as the domain had a source. It builds the rows
from the store's rollup now, with a test.
Differences from the mockups, for the owner:
- the log has no Status filter (the store filters by domain and
application only); a refused message is "rejected", a neutral tag as
the mockup's "rate-limited" is;
- the message history keeps the panel's own wording with full dates and
has no "accepted from <IP>" step - the client address is not stored;
- dmarc: before the first report the box says "None yet" with what to
check; a quiet mailbox is an amber "quiet" tag;
- dmarc-domain: the stamp is pass / (pass + fail) rounded down, amber
on any failure, red when nothing passed, absent without mail;
- dmarc-report: the title has no year; "this relay" marks record rows
as well as sources.
Known and left as it is (not introduced here): the DMARC hub answers 404
to a domain administrator while the menu shows the entry and the plan
gives that role the reports of its own domains. Opening it needs the
report list to refuse an empty domain filter first - for the stage-3
security review.
Evidence
- docs/assets/panel-redesign/evidence/out-log.png, out-message.png,
dmarc.png, dmarc-domain.png, dmarc-report.png: 1440 px wide, headless
Edge, real templates served locally with their fixtures - NOT from
the container (no Docker on this machine).
- panel/audit.js on the five pages at 1440 and 1280: 784 texts checked,
problems: [].
- Polling of the log was exercised in a browser against a local
fixture server with document.hidden overridden: four polls, one
table and one foot after each, the filter untouched.
- go test -count=1 ./internal/web/... ./cmd/panel
ok internal/web
ok internal/web/auth
ok internal/web/handlers
ok internal/web/validate
ok internal/web/view
ok cmd/panel
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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acdfaaecd7 |
panel-redesign: Outbound domains, domain, settings, application on the kit
Stage 2, step 3. Written by Sonnet, reviewed by Opus.
- Six pages named after their mockups: out-domains, out-domain,
out-domain-settings, out-app, out-app-created, out-domain-delete,
with typed page data (view/outbound.go, outbound_app.go), fixtures
and tests. The engine pages dashboard, domain_detail and
domain_delete are gone with their templates and are off
legacy_pages.txt. GET .../settings has its own handler.
- Handlers pass typed data; routes, POST targets, field names,
validation, authorization (both roles, another tenant's id is a 404)
and Cache-Control: no-store on the password page are unchanged.
- Kit, attribute only: Action.Confirm writes data-confirm on a POST
action's form (panel.js already reads it).
- test/e2e/panel_client.go scrapes the new markup (copy fields, the
application row's Edit link). Not run: no Docker here.
Fixes found on the way
- Report address of a domain that follows another user's default: the
select had one "inherit" option, selected, so saving the form
untouched moved the domain to whoever saved it. It now offers that
user's default as "keep" (selected, saves nothing) and "My default
instead" as the change, as the mockup draws it; "keep" on a domain
that does not follow someone else is refused.
- panel.js: syncShowWhen stopped at the first matching rule, so the
auto-limit fields were never toggled with the limit mode. Every
matching rule applies now.
Differences from the mockups, for the owner:
- application rows carry Edit only. New password and Delete are POSTs,
and the kit has no link-styled POST control for a table row; both are
in the application page's head with a confirmation. Drawing them in
the row needs a design: change (as Sign out was);
- the application login is read-only on edit (the handler refuses a
rename); the submit says Create application on the empty form;
- multiplier bounds are the store's 1.5-5, default 2.5;
- "Recalculate" buttons exist where the stored limit is automatic;
- a domain administrator has no add box and no Delete; Delete domain is
global-only on the domain page and on settings;
- a fourth record, Report authorization, appears when the report
address is on another domain; record states missing / weak / not
checked are tags with the explanation under the value;
- refusals are the kit flash above the first box, and those of the
settings forms now show on the settings page; successful saves still
redirect to the domain page;
- the export checkbox is ticked by default, as drawn.
Evidence
- docs/assets/panel-redesign/evidence/out-domains.png, out-domain.png,
out-domain-settings.png, out-app.png, out-app-created.png,
out-domain-delete.png: 1440 px wide, headless Edge, real templates
served locally with their fixtures - NOT from the container (no
Docker on this machine). Taken before the report-address fix, which
does not change what the fixture renders.
- panel/audit.js on the six pages at 1440 and 1280 (text inside
[hidden] blocks skipped): 866 texts checked, problems: [].
- go test -count=1 ./internal/web/...
ok internal/web
ok internal/web/auth
ok internal/web/handlers
ok internal/web/validate
ok internal/web/view
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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b6feac2200 |
panel-redesign: the application form is one POST, under its domain
Stage 1, step 4 (plan § Routes).
Service (internal/app)
- Settings{Mode, Addresses, AuthIPRestrict, AuthAllowedIPs, Limit} is what
the form holds besides the login. CreateWithSettings creates the
application with all of it and removes it again if a later write fails;
SaveSettings validates the sender rule first and, if a later write
fails, puts back what it had already changed. The form produces a whole
application or leaves things as they were.
- Limit.Mode "" is "use the domain limit"; auto takes its ceiling from a
recalculation the caller supplies.
Routes and handlers
- GET, POST /outbound/domains/{id}/applications/new
GET, POST /outbound/domains/{id}/applications/{aid}
POST .../{aid}/password, .../{aid}/ratelimit/recalc, .../{aid}/delete
replace POST /domains/{id}/applications and the six /applications/{aid}/*
routes. lookupDomainApplication answers 404 when the application is not
in the domain named by the path - also when the caller may open that
domain.
- A generated password is the response to its POST only (no GET path) and
is sent with Cache-Control: no-store.
- The login is not renamed by the form; a changed login is a 400.
Old domain page: the three per-application forms (mode, IP restriction,
limit) are one form with one Save; "Remove limit" became the "Use the domain
limit" choice. The e2e client follows (edited, not run here).
Tests: service - create and save in every limit mode, and all-or-nothing on
a refused sender rule, a failed recalculation and a failed sender-map
rebuild; handlers - the form's parsing, one POST creating sender + IPs +
limit, four kinds of refused form creating nothing, save, the no-store
header on both password pages, and five application routes against another
tenant's application addressed through its own domain and through the
caller's.
With @routes removed by hand TestRoutesFollowNavigation now reports only
GET /server/health (step 5).
go test ./... green except the two Windows-only failures in internal/domain
and internal/logtail.
Roadmap 14/27.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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bd746c61d7 |
panel-redesign: paths follow the menu; Account and Server settings split
Stage 1, step 3 (plan § Routes). BREAKING: every panel URL changes and the
old paths are removed without redirects.
Routes (web.go)
- /status -> /overview; /domains -> /outbound/domains with the domain's
settings actions under .../settings/ (reports, ratelimit, export);
/deliveries -> /outbound/log; /mail-queue -> /outbound/queue; /dmarc ->
/outbound/dmarc; /inbound -> /inbound/domains; /system-log ->
/server/log; /backup -> /server/backup (import under it); /users ->
/server/users; recheck and reload under /server/health/.
- One fragment name: <page>/fragment everywhere.
- Everything under /server/ is registered through server(), which wraps
the handler in globalOnly: the subtree is guarded once, where a new
route cannot forget it. Handlers keep their own requireGlobal.
- GET / leads to /overview, /outbound/domains or /inbound/domains.
- The /account -> /settings redirect is gone with /settings.
Account and Server > Settings
- handlers_account.go: GET /account and three POSTs - profile (username,
e-mail; no password asked, as designed), password (current password,
rate-limited like a sign-in, signs out other sessions), dmarc (the
user's default: hosted / account / custom / none, each validated).
This replaces step 1's bridge through the old Settings form.
- handlers_settings.go is the instance's page only: log retention and the
read-only rate limits, global role.
- One legacy template serves both pages by a flag until stage 2 gives each
its own: a new legacy page cannot be added to the ratchet.
Still to come inside stage 1, and why @routes stays on the ratchet:
- step 4: the application routes (one POST, under the domain);
- step 5: GET /server/health.
With @routes removed by hand TestRoutesFollowNavigation reports exactly
those and nothing else - no template links to a path the router lacks.
Old templates, tests and the e2e client are retargeted. The e2e module was
edited but not run here (no Docker, and its dependency could not be
downloaded on this machine).
Tests: Account (page, profile, password, DMARC default in every mode, a
domain administrator's own row only), Server settings (saved without a
password, range, global only), the /server/ subtree answered 404 by the
router for a domain administrator with All on both lists and for no
principal.
go test ./... green except the two Windows-only failures in internal/domain
and internal/logtail.
Roadmap 13/27.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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7ef7f75246 |
release: 1.9.2: Review pass: port-25 milters, DMARC validation, rate-limit fix
Review pass over `1.4.0`…`1.9.1`: port 25 no longer shares the submission milter chain, DMARC reports are validated before they are stored, and the auto rate limit is correct for a non-default level-1 window. Schema migration `0010` (index only). Upgrading is a tag bump. Added: - SQLite migration `0010_send_log_app_login_index.sql` — - DMARC aggregate reports are accepted as **zip** as well as gzip or plain XML - e2e: `checkPort25ConfigCombinations` regenerates the Postfix configuration Changed: - README hero line and a **Positioning** block in `docs/product.md` record the Fixed: - The setup account's password is hashed at bcrypt cost `12` like every other - Login/setup rate limiter: protecting blocked buckets from eviction is now - `postqueue -p` output is bounded to 4 MiB (the timeout alone left the size of - [schema-migrations.md](docs/schema-migrations.md): the schema section was - postqueue reader is now time-bounded: `postqueue -p` runs under a 5-second … (11 more in CHANGELOG) Changed: - [roadmap.md](docs/roadmap.md) now carries everything the 2026-08-19 code - Extracted `internal/configsafe` — the empty-value and forbidden-character - Build, deploy and migration comments no longer cite the archived - Dropped the `parseDomainRateLimitForm` / `parseAppRateLimitForm` pass-through - Extracted shared helpers: `internal/atomicfile` (atomic temp-write+rename) and … (7 more in CHANGELOG) Removed: - Unused legacy asset `docs/assets/icon.png` (superseded by the four brand SVGs - Plan documents for already-shipped features: `domain-stats-auto-ratelimit`, Full detail: CHANGELOG.md (1.9.2). |
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7b8685d038 |
release: 1.9.0: Per-application client IP allow-list and rate-limit overrides
Application sending controls: client IP allow-list for authorization, and level-2 rate limits that override the domain ceiling per application. Added: - Per-application **client IP allow-list** on the domain page: when enabled, - SQLite migration `0009_application_auth_ips.sql` (moves legacy trusted IPs Changed: - Application level-2 rate limit **overrides** the domain limit for that login - Domain export/import carries `auth_ip_restrict` / `auth_allowed_ips`; legacy - Panel help, Settings, and [guide.md](docs/guide.md) describe override semantics - [guide.md](docs/guide.md): full-backup section documents all four capture Full detail: CHANGELOG.md (1.9.0). |