faa3c11ae7ff6a0a93a2d2d329f5901acedc6a3e
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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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  mixandClaude Opus 5.5
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faa3c11ae7 |
panel-dkim-signing stage 2: OpenDKIM removed
test / test (push) Waiting to run
The panel's signer is the only one. Gone: the opendkim package and its
configuration, the syslog-relay and opendkim programs, /dev/log and
/run/opendkim, the reload by USR1 through supervisord
(internal/supervisor/supervisor.go), internal/syslogrelay, the port of
OpenDKIM's From: parser (internal/milter/mailparse.go and its probe,
harness and test/upstream scripts), OPENDKIM_SOCKET and OPENDKIM_DIR.
Keys: internal/domain/keys.go (Keys, NewKeys, DKIM_DIR=/data/dkim) keeps
the keys and writes a selector table, /data/dkim/selectors ("<name>
<selector>"), which the signer reads in place of the KeyTable - it reads
no database, as the sender check reads none. The table is written before
the signer serves (EnsureServerSigned moved there from the notifier).
Keys and table 0600, directories 0700, the panel's. The entrypoint copies
/data/opendkim/keys once, as the panel user, into /data/dkim.new renamed
when whole, and stops the start if the copy fails; /data/opendkim is left
for a rollback to 2.7.x.
Sender check: one RFC 5322 address as a mail program reads it, held
against the bindings; the 256-byte refusal and the texts naming OpenDKIM
go. Allowed() folded the domain through strings.ToLower, which makes the
Kelvin sign a "k" - the comparison with OpenDKIM's reading had hidden it;
it folds ASCII only now.
Health: two dkim-signer rows (applications, notifications) in Milter
sockets, opendkim out of the liveness set; the card no longer takes any
row with a note for the spam filter. Texts as in the design commit.
KILL stays in deploy/docker-compose.yml: measured on the test server,
root without it cannot signal a process of another uid - supervisord
stopping the panel, Postfix's master its children. The plan's "only use
was the reload" was wrong; the comment now gives the real uses.
e2e: one signature, the panel's, verified by dkimpy; the /data/dkim modes;
the OpenDKIM log and process checks, testNeverSignedForAnother and the
cited opendkim, libopendkim11 and libmilter1.0.1 go.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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mixandClaude Opus 5.5
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3584adcbc2 |
sender check: From: read with OpenDKIM's own parser; L8 closed
test / test (push) Canceled after 0s
Audit 2026-10-12, stage 2c, the owner's decision of 2026-10-14: the check
decides by the address OpenDKIM signs for, whatever a display name or a
comment holds.
internal/milter/mailparse.go ports libopendkim's dkim_mail_parse() with
dkim_mail_first_special(), dkim_mail_token() and
dkim_mail_matching_paren() from Debian's opendkim 2.11.0~beta2-8+deb12u1,
line for line: the '<' form, group and list punctuation, an '@' before the
first ':', ';' or ',' deciding where the address starts, source routes
dropped, quoted strings and domain literals kept with their delimiters,
comments skipped, whitespace between atoms one space, no encoded word
decoded; and the C's own quirks ("@d" gives d as the local part too).
testdata/mailparse_harness.c compiles the C from the image's source; the
test feeds it and the port 200 019 lines (the hand-written cases and
200 000 random ones over the specials) - 93 443 parse and agree byte for
byte, 106 576 fail and agree on the error (on an error the C leaves its
in-place result unterminated, and OpenDKIM uses neither part then).
judge(): one From: field and one address stay required (moreAfter: only
list or group punctuation may follow); what OpenDKIM cannot read is
refused (mlfi_eoh() would not sign it); the address is lower-cased in
ASCII only, as dkimf_lowercase() and Postfix's tables do. Found reading
dkimf_apply_signtable(): OpenDKIM matches its refile SigningTable against
"user@domain" printed into MAXADDRESS + 1 = 257 bytes, so a longer address
is matched cut short - a quoted local part padded to end there in
"@another.tenant" would be signed with that tenant's key while its real
domain is the application's. Such an address (over 256 bytes) is refused;
one that fits is matched whole. The display-name and comment scan, the
"one @ outside quotes" rule and the SigningTable reader (Signers) go; the
check asks for header values with their leading space as OpenDKIM does
(OptHeaderLeadingSpace; Postfix keeps a v2 milter's event mask, milter8.c
milter8_negotiate()).
L8 closed: refused or passed no longer depends on other domains of the
server; security.md's accepted risk is struck. The shared other-sender
lines are now held to "never signed for the other sender": unit test (a
passed line is read at the application's domain) and e2e (a passed line
arrives signed for the application's domain, none for the other).
Documents: architecture "How the header is read", security's sender
check paragraph, the guide; the help topic per
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mixandClaude Opus 5.5
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b113e72c71 |
milter, postfix, app, domain: cite the source of what they rely on (assumptions part B)
Comments only, no behaviour changed. go-milter v0.4.1 (session.go: one session per connection, replaced after a non-continue reply; macros per stage), Postfix 3.7.11 (milter8.c, smtpd_check.c reject_auth_sender_login_mismatch(), mail_addr_find.c, showq_compat.c, mail_conf_time.c, mail_params.h), Cyrus SASL 2.1.28 (saslpasswd.c, plugins/sasldb.c: deleting a missing login is not an error), OpenDKIM 2.11.0~beta2 (opendkim-db.c, opendkim-genkey), Berkeley DB 5.3 db_dump, rspamd 3.11.0. Comments that claimed what the source denies are corrected (sasldb keeps the password as given, not hashed; an embedded newline is kept, not truncated; rspamd sorts symbols by absolute weight); fixtures say seen or composed. The sender check's From: parsing gets no citations: it is replaced by the port of OpenDKIM's dkim_mail_parse next. Contradictions left for their own commits: B-G5 cleanAddress, B-PS1 first key wins, B-PQ1 the forced-expire flag, B-PQ10/PQ11 Postfix's time units. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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mixandClaude Opus 5.5
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ef18ef21a0 |
findings of the reviews of audit stage 2
test / test (push) Canceled after 0s
Technical review (Opus) and security review (Fable) of a59e3d4..cb5a4a2;
reports in the session's scratchpad. Nothing critical, high or medium; no
outright bug. Fixed:
- F2, F3 (0008 backfill, before it runs on the live database): rows are
filled by the rule new rows follow - the application's domain, then the
name's - and only by a domain and application that existed when the row
was written (created_at); the inbound log likewise. Test: the migration's
UPDATEs re-run on prepared rows (before the domain, after, null sender,
application gone, a stranger's name). Dry run on a copy of the live
database: 68/68 and 10/10 rows filled, none disagreeing with its login's
domain, integrity ok.
- V2, F4: an application's statistics and level-2 count are its login's
rows of its domain (appByLogin), and StatsWindow starts no earlier than
the entity's creation; the message page's "may send as" only for a login
still of the row's domain. Test: a login taken again in another domain
starts at zero.
- F7: MAIL FROM:<> is held to the domain limit of its login
(ApplicationByLogin fills DomainName).
- V3: an imported DKIM selector is held to DNS labels (validate.Selector).
- F5, F6: an imported auto limit's numbers are dropped and recalculated
right after the import; its mode is stored trimmed.
- V6: the store refuses a role that is neither global nor domain.
- F9: SaveUser keeps the stored hash when no new password is given (the
form no longer writes back the hash it read). F10: a reach naming a
domain deleted meanwhile is ErrNoSuchDomain, answered on the form.
- V4, F12: from-lines-other.txt - lines naming another sender ({other}) in
a quoted string, a quoted pair, capitals, a comment, an encoded word, a
quoted local part; the unit test wants each refused, the e2e
(lines_naming_another_sender_never_signed_for_it) wants each refused and
none signed for it. The passed list gained a.{DOMAIN}, a comment after
the angle address, a quoted local part, and "b@ {other}" - passed by
design (security.md), and the e2e shows it signed for the own domain.
- F13: e2e login_in_other_capitals_does_not_authenticate - AUTH with the
login upper-cased gets 535.
Not changed, written down: V1/F1 - L8 is half closed (refused or passed
still tells an application which domains are hosted here); security.md's
accepted risks and the CHANGELOG say so, and the owner is asked whether to
refuse every foreign address in a display name (changes the 2.4.0 rule).
F11 - deleting a domain rewrites its rows' domain_id (seconds at 1e5 rows),
accepted at this size. F8 (test cannot tell write-first from read-first;
the reviewer verified it with two stores, 30/30), V5, V7, P2: noted.
Evidence on the test server for this tree: go vet clean, go test ./... 23
packages ok, make e2e exit 0 with the three new cases.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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