mixandClaude Opus 5.5 96425dd515 e2e: a negative case passes only on its own refusal (audit stage 0)
sendResult.refusedAt(stage, code, text) and replyIs(err, code, text):
nil only for the server's reply with that code and text at that stage;
a reset, a timeout or another reply is described for the failure.

- level 1: only anvil's "450 4.7.1 Error: too much mail from", only after
  a message of the loop was accepted. Held to that, it failed twice on
  the stand, each time for a real reason:
  1. waitForSMTPSReady took a TCP connect for readiness; Docker's port
     proxy accepts before Postfix listens and then resets - the reset
     once taken for the limit. It now waits for the TLS 220 greeting.
  2. the first message then got "553 ... not owned by user l1app": an
     smtpd idle from before the panel's postfix reload took the
     connection with the old sender_login_maps. The level-1 limit had
     never been what the case saw. The first message now waits (15 s at
     most) for the map, failing at once on any other refusal.
  Now: "level-1 limit tripped on attempt 51/60: 450 4.7.1 Error: too
  much mail from 10.77.0.1".
- level 2: 451 4.7.1 at MAIL, and both MAIL FROM of one connection.
- sender mismatch: 553 at RCPT, "not owned by user".
- no AUTH and the relay case: 554 "Client host rejected: Access
  denied" at RCPT; the relay case's comment claimed
  reject_unauth_destination, which on 465 comes after the client
  restriction - port 25 holds "554 Relay access denied".
- port 25: 550 5.1.1 for unknown recipients and report addresses.
- panel down: a 4xx reply (textproto), not just text starting with 4.

The product side (a second after an application is saved when its first
message can get 553) is written in the audit plan, not changed. Audit plan
line ticked with what was found, roadmap 7/61. No CHANGELOG line: tests only.

Evidence: make e2e on the test server for this tree, exit 0.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-14 14:10:47 +03:00

SelfPost

SelfPost

Self-hosted SMTP relay with a web panel — one Docker image, no provider.

Postfix, OpenDKIM, and a small Go panel run together under supervisord; you configure domains, DKIM keys, and SASL applications once, then point your apps at the SMTP endpoint.

SelfPost sends mail straight to the internet from your own IP, with per-domain DKIM signing. No mailboxes or webmail. An optional inbound relay (backup-MX / forwarder on port 25) forwards to an upstream; it does not store mail.

For: operators who run their own VPS or home server and want a simple relay they control, without a third-party SMTP provider.

Key properties: one container, multi-domain DKIM, SASL per application, send log and DNS checks in the panel, encrypted backups.

Features

  • Outbound SMTP (465/smtps; optional 587 submission) with per-domain DKIM signing
  • Optional inbound relay on port 25 (backup-MX / forwarder; off by default)
  • Optional DMARC aggregate report ingest on port 25 (off by default)
  • In-panel Help: a page of topics, opened from the ? in the head of a box
  • Per-application client IP allow-list for SMTP AUTH (optional)
  • Web panel grouped by mail direction — Overview, Outbound (domains, log, queue, DMARC reports), Inbound, Server (health, system log, backup, users, settings)
  • Multi-domain relay — each SASL application is bound to one sending domain
  • DNS status checks (PTR, SPF, DKIM, DMARC) with in-panel re-check
  • Two-level rate limiting — IP backstop (Postfix), per-domain ceilings, and trusted-IP app overrides
  • Full-server backup and single-domain export/import (optional password encryption)
  • Single Docker image; production data in a ./data bind mount (the quick start below uses a named Docker volume instead)

Documentation

Document Contents
Operator guide Reverse proxy, environment variables, DNS, IP warmup, panel operations, rate limiting, backup/restore, ports, image tag
Product boundaries Purpose, deployment assumptions, out-of-scope items, multi-domain model
Architecture As-built technical design
Security design Mandatory requirements, accepted risks, the CSRF ADR
Development Building, testing, docs rules, model routing, commits
Roadmap Open work (1.x+) — direction, not commitments
CHANGELOG Release history

Found a vulnerability? Do not open an issue — SECURITY.md has the private reporting channel and the scope.

Repository: https://github.com/mixeme/selfpost — source, issues, releases, and the ghcr.io/mixeme/selfpost image.

Requirements

Providing these is the operator's job — SelfPost cannot fix a blocked port or a missing PTR record for you. Details: Operator guide.

Platform

  • Docker + Compose v2 on the host
  • A reverse proxy in front of the panel (SelfPost never terminates HTTPS itself)
  • Rough sizing: 1 vCPU, 512 MB–1 GB RAM, 8–10 GB disk (send log and rotated mail.log are the main growth drivers; both sit in the ./data volume, and both are capped — 90 days and 14 files by default)

Network and IP

  • Static IP address
  • Outbound TCP port 25 unblocked (many consumer/cloud hosts block it by default)
  • PTR/rDNS for that IP pointing at your mail hostname (SELFPOST_HOSTNAME)
  • Reasonable starting IP reputation — a fresh IP still needs warmup

Per sending domain

For every domain you add in the panel:

  • SPF TXT record authorizing this server
  • DKIM TXT record (value shown on the domain page)
  • DMARC _dmarc TXT record

See Domain-level DNS in the operator guide.

Per inbound domain (optional)

Only if you turn on inbound relay (INBOUND_RELAY_ENABLE=true):

  • MX record pointing at SELFPOST_HOSTNAME (keep any existing primary MX if this host is backup-MX)

See Inbound relay in the operator guide.

Quick start

First boot — create the admin account. On a fresh container SelfPost prints a one-time setup URL (valid ten minutes). Open it in a browser to choose the administrator username and password. Until you do, the panel has no login. Production deploy: Full deployment in the operator guide.

One container, panel at http://127.0.0.1:8080 — no reverse proxy, no TLS files, no compose files. Good for clicking through the UI on your machine; outbound mail will not reach the real internet without DNS, PTR, and port 25.

The 2.x line is not published on ghcr.io yet (the newest image there is 1.3.0). Until it is, build the image from this checkout under the name the commands below and deploy/docker-compose.yml use; Docker then takes the local image and pulls nothing:

docker build -f build/Dockerfile --build-arg VERSION=2.4.1 \
  -t ghcr.io/mixeme/selfpost:2.4.1 .
docker run --rm -d --name selfpost-try \
  -p 127.0.0.1:8080:8080 \
  -e SELFPOST_HOSTNAME=mail.local.test \
  -e PANEL_COOKIE_SECURE=false \
  -v selfpost-try-data:/data \
  ghcr.io/mixeme/selfpost:2.4.1

Get the setup URL (pick one):

docker logs selfpost-try 2>&1 | grep -m1 'http'
docker exec selfpost-try cat /data/setup-token

The printed URL is https://mail.local.test/setup/<token>. For this local trial rewrite it to http://127.0.0.1:8080/setup/<token> (same path token; PANEL_COOKIE_SECURE=false so the cookie works over plain HTTP). Open it before it expires.

When finished:

docker rm -f selfpost-try && docker volume rm selfpost-try-data

More detail (limitations, optional throwaway TLS for local SMTP): Local trial in the operator guide.

Reference deploy

Production layout: one docker-compose.yml, a .env, persistent ./data, and TLS PEM files at ./certs (read by Postfix on 465/587). The panel is reached only through a reverse proxy on 443 — port 8080 is bound to localhost in the default compose file.

Full walkthrough — fetching the base files, setting up a reverse proxy and TLS (Apache/nginx/Caddy/Traefik), starting the container, and wiring up DNS — lives in the operator guide's Full deployment section, with proxy-specific commands under Reverse proxy.

The compose file always publishes 465, 587, and 25; Postfix listens on 587 only when SUBMISSION_ENABLE=true, and on 25 when INBOUND_RELAY_ENABLE=true and/or DMARC_REPORTS_ENABLE=true (see Ports). Bump the pinned image tag deliberately when upgrading, never :latest (why). Optional variables (TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDR, rate limits, retention): see Environment variables.

License

Copyright © 2026 Mikhail Yenuchenko.

AGPL-3.0. The AGPL closes the "SaaS loophole": if you run a modified version as a network-accessible service, you must make the modified source available to its users — not only when you distribute copies of the code. Third-party notices: NOTICE.

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