Files
selfpost/internal/dmarc/parse.go
T
mixandClaude Opus 5.5 4dd46ea355 dmarc: a report is bounded, kept per domain, and ingested one at a time
Security review of the DMARC report path (Fable, 2026-10-11), which ran
for the first time in 2.0.0. No Critical or High finding. Fixed:

- Medium: a report was bounded only as 8 MiB of XML - some 160 000
  records or one name of megabytes, all of it rows and table cells. At
  most 5 000 records (more is ErrRejected, dropped), text fields cut to
  255 bytes on a character boundary, a record's count capped.
- Medium: the cap of 500 reports was for the whole server, so a stranger
  filing under one domain's address evicted every other domain's
  reports. PruneDMARCReports counts per domain.
- Low: the pipe service ran up to default_process_limit (100) commands
  at once against the panel's database; maxproc is 1.
- Low: the reason logged for a dropped message carried the sender's
  bytes (header line, zip entry name) as they came; cut to 200 bytes and
  reduced to printable ASCII, zip entry names quoted.
- Low: SELFPOST_DATA_DIR / SELFPOST_DB_PATH with whitespace or "$" would
  reach the command through export_environment as another path; refused
  at start when DMARC ingest is on.

Left as they are, told to the owner: the parse-failure count is a
lifetime figure shown under "This week"; a report larger than the
command reads is dropped as unreadable; nested multipart is not searched.

The hub's Retention line follows the design commit before this one.
security.md: the review, and the accepted-risk entry says what a
stranger can and cannot do now. The roadmap no longer calls the review
pending.

  go vet ./cmd/... ./internal/dmarc/ ./internal/store/: ok
  go test ./cmd/... ./internal/dmarc/ ./internal/store/ ./internal/web/...: ok
  make e2e on the test server (with the port-25 scenarios of the next
  commit): ok

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-11 17:40:31 +03:00

252 lines
7.1 KiB
Go

package dmarc
import (
"archive/zip"
"bytes"
"compress/gzip"
"encoding/xml"
"fmt"
"io"
"strings"
"time"
"unicode/utf8"
)
// ParsedReport is the structured form of a DMARC aggregate XML payload.
type ParsedReport struct {
Reporter string
ReportID string
ContactEmail string
PeriodBegin time.Time
PeriodEnd time.Time
Domain string
PolicyP string
PolicySP string
PolicyPct int
PolicyADKIM string
PolicyASPF string
Records []ParsedRecord
PassCount int
FailCount int
}
// ParsedRecord is one <record> row from the aggregate XML.
type ParsedRecord struct {
SourceIP string
Count int
Disposition string
SPFResult string
DKIMResult string
HeaderFrom string
}
type feedbackXML struct {
XMLName xml.Name `xml:"feedback"`
Metadata struct {
OrgName string `xml:"org_name"`
Email string `xml:"email"`
ReportID string `xml:"report_id"`
DateRange struct {
Begin int64 `xml:"begin"`
End int64 `xml:"end"`
} `xml:"date_range"`
} `xml:"report_metadata"`
Policy struct {
Domain string `xml:"domain"`
P string `xml:"p"`
SP string `xml:"sp"`
Pct int `xml:"pct"`
ADKIM string `xml:"adkim"`
ASPF string `xml:"aspf"`
} `xml:"policy_published"`
Records []struct {
Row struct {
SourceIP string `xml:"source_ip"`
Count int `xml:"count"`
Policy struct {
Disposition string `xml:"disposition"`
DKIM string `xml:"dkim"`
SPF string `xml:"spf"`
} `xml:"policy_evaluated"`
} `xml:"row"`
Identifiers struct {
HeaderFrom string `xml:"header_from"`
} `xml:"identifiers"`
} `xml:"record"`
}
// What a report may hold. The XML comes from anyone who knows a report address,
// and eight megabytes of it (maxAggregateXML) fit some 160 000 empty records or
// one name of eight megabytes - every one of them a row or a table cell later.
// A real report has tens of records, a few thousand from the largest
// receivers, and no field longer than a line.
const (
maxReportRecords = 5000
maxFieldLen = 255
maxRecordCount = 1_000_000_000
)
// field trims a text value of the report and cuts it to maxFieldLen bytes, on
// a character boundary.
func field(s string) string {
s = strings.TrimSpace(s)
if len(s) <= maxFieldLen {
return s
}
s = s[:maxFieldLen]
for len(s) > 0 && !utf8.ValidString(s) {
s = s[:len(s)-1]
}
return s
}
// ParseAggregate decodes gzip- or zip-compressed, or raw, DMARC aggregate XML.
func ParseAggregate(raw []byte) (ParsedReport, error) {
data, err := decompress(raw)
if err != nil {
return ParsedReport{}, err
}
var doc feedbackXML
if err := xml.Unmarshal(data, &doc); err != nil {
return ParsedReport{}, fmt.Errorf("dmarc xml: %w", err)
}
if doc.Metadata.ReportID == "" || doc.Policy.Domain == "" {
return ParsedReport{}, fmt.Errorf("dmarc xml: missing report_id or domain")
}
if len(doc.Records) > maxReportRecords {
return ParsedReport{}, fmt.Errorf("dmarc xml: %d records, more than the %d a report may hold", len(doc.Records), maxReportRecords)
}
// Cut, not refused: a domain name is at most 253 bytes, so a longer one
// names nothing this relay sends for and is turned away as such.
out := ParsedReport{
Reporter: field(doc.Metadata.OrgName),
ReportID: field(doc.Metadata.ReportID),
ContactEmail: field(doc.Metadata.Email),
PeriodBegin: time.Unix(doc.Metadata.DateRange.Begin, 0).UTC(),
PeriodEnd: time.Unix(doc.Metadata.DateRange.End, 0).UTC(),
Domain: strings.ToLower(field(doc.Policy.Domain)),
PolicyP: field(doc.Policy.P),
PolicySP: field(doc.Policy.SP),
PolicyPct: doc.Policy.Pct,
PolicyADKIM: field(doc.Policy.ADKIM),
PolicyASPF: field(doc.Policy.ASPF),
}
if out.PolicyPct == 0 {
out.PolicyPct = 100
}
for _, rec := range doc.Records {
row := ParsedRecord{
SourceIP: field(rec.Row.SourceIP),
Count: rec.Row.Count,
Disposition: field(rec.Row.Policy.Disposition),
SPFResult: field(rec.Row.Policy.SPF),
DKIMResult: field(rec.Row.Policy.DKIM),
HeaderFrom: field(rec.Identifiers.HeaderFrom),
}
if row.Count <= 0 {
row.Count = 1
}
// Bounded so that the sums of a report cannot wrap around.
if row.Count > maxRecordCount {
row.Count = maxRecordCount
}
if dmarcRecordPasses(row) {
out.PassCount += row.Count
} else {
out.FailCount += row.Count
}
out.Records = append(out.Records, row)
}
return out, nil
}
func dmarcRecordPasses(r ParsedRecord) bool {
return strings.EqualFold(r.SPFResult, "pass") || strings.EqualFold(r.DKIMResult, "pass")
}
// maxAggregateXML bounds the decompressed payload, so a small archive cannot
// expand into an unbounded allocation.
const maxAggregateXML = 8 << 20
// decompress unwraps the container the reporter used. Both are seen in the
// wild: most senders gzip the XML, some (notably several Microsoft and Yahoo
// endpoints) ship it as a single-entry zip.
func decompress(raw []byte) ([]byte, error) {
switch {
case len(raw) >= 2 && raw[0] == 0x1f && raw[1] == 0x8b:
return gunzip(raw)
case len(raw) >= 4 && raw[0] == 'P' && raw[1] == 'K' && raw[2] == 0x03 && raw[3] == 0x04:
return unzip(raw)
}
return raw, nil
}
func gunzip(raw []byte) ([]byte, error) {
zr, err := gzip.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(raw))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("dmarc gzip: %w", err)
}
defer zr.Close()
data, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(zr, maxAggregateXML))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("dmarc gzip read: %w", err)
}
return data, nil
}
// unzip returns the first .xml entry of a zip archive. Directories and any
// other members are skipped rather than trusted.
func unzip(raw []byte) ([]byte, error) {
zr, err := zip.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(raw), int64(len(raw)))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("dmarc zip: %w", err)
}
for _, f := range zr.File {
if f.FileInfo().IsDir() || !strings.HasSuffix(strings.ToLower(f.Name), ".xml") {
continue
}
rc, err := f.Open()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("dmarc zip open %q: %w", field(f.Name), err)
}
data, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(rc, maxAggregateXML))
rc.Close()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("dmarc zip read %q: %w", field(f.Name), err)
}
return data, nil
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("dmarc zip: no xml entry")
}
// TightenPolicyHint summarises whether raising p= looks reasonable.
func TightenPolicyHint(pass, fail int, sources []SourceHint) string {
total := pass + fail
if total == 0 {
return "No messages in the reporting window yet."
}
failPct := float64(fail) * 100 / float64(total)
if fail > 0 {
for _, s := range sources {
if s.FailCount > 0 && !s.ThisRelay {
return "A third-party source is not aligned. Do not tighten p= until that sender is fixed or removed."
}
}
}
if failPct <= 2 && pass > 0 {
return "Alignment looks strong. Tightening p= may be reasonable."
}
if fail > 0 {
return "Some failures remain. Review sources before tightening p=."
}
return "Alignment looks clean for this window."
}
// SourceHint is a panel-facing rollup row with relay detection.
type SourceHint struct {
SourceIP string
PassCount int
FailCount int
ThisRelay bool
}