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mix 967d3d95de release: 1.9.1: Port-25 Postfix startup with inbound/DMARC/antispam flags

Port-25 Postfix startup when inbound relay, DMARC ingest, or the inbound antispam milter are enabled. Schema-migration reference and roadmap plans for inbound antispam and quarantine. Upgrading from 1.9.0 is a tag bump; no migration.
Added:
  - [docs/plans/inbound-antispam-panel.md](docs/plans/inbound-antispam-panel.md) —
  - [docs/plans/inbound-quarantine.md](docs/plans/inbound-quarantine.md) — candidate
  - [docs/schema-migrations.md](docs/schema-migrations.md) — living reference for the
Changed:
  - [docs/roadmap.md](docs/roadmap.md) — `inbound-antispam-panel` (agreed, 1/12)
  - [docs/development.md](docs/development.md) — plan checklists may override
  - [docs/development.md](docs/development.md), [docs/roadmap.md](docs/roadmap.md),
Fixed:
  - `build/postfix-config.sh`: enabling inbound relay, DMARC ingest, and/or the

Full detail: CHANGELOG.md (1.9.1).

2026-09-22 15:24:53 +03:00

2.8 KiB

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Plan: inbound-quarantine

Status: candidate — design TBD; needs explicit agreement before any code
Version: TBD (1.x MINOR if opt-in and backward-compatible; may warrant 2.x if it changes inbound storage or backup contract).

Goal (draft)

Let the operator hold suspicious inbound mail instead of only accept/reject at the milter — review in the panel, then release to the configured upstream, delete, or add sender to allow/deny lists.

This is a product boundary question, not a settled design. The item exists so we can compare approaches before committing.

Why it is separate from inbound-antispam-panel

inbound-antispam-panel.md covers metadata (journal + lists). Quarantine implies storing message bodies (or a durable reference to them) under /data, retention, release workflow, and a wider attack/backup surface — closer to "mini-mailbox" than pure relay.

Open questions (to decide before a checklist)

Where mail lives
- SelfPost store under /data/quarantine/ (panel owns lifecycle), or
- delegate to rspamd/Redis and panel only proxies release (less storage in SelfPost, tighter rspamd coupling).
What "release" means
- inject into Postfix as a new delivery to the domain's upstream transport;
- or manual download only (no automatic forward).
Retention and caps
- max age, max total bytes, per-domain limits; interaction with backup size.
RBAC
- global admin only vs domain-admin for assigned inbound domains.
Threat model
- malware in stored MIME, path traversal on extract, quota DoS on busy MX.
Product fit
- does this violate product.md "no mailboxes" if we only hold spam suspects briefly? Explicit product decision required.

Context (as-built)

Inbound relay forwards or rejects; no local delivery (inbound-relay.md).
Optional INBOUND_ANTISPAM_MILTER — external rspamd may quarantine on its own today, without panel integration.
DMARC p=quarantine is unrelated (outbound policy for receivers).

Likely out of scope (until revisited)

IMAP/webmail for quarantined mail.
End-user self-service quarantine (non-admin recipients).
Outbound quarantine.

Dependencies

inbound-relay.md (shipped).
Sensible to decide after or alongside inbound-antispam-panel.md (journal/lists), but not blocked on it for design discussion.

Done when (placeholder)

TBD once approach is chosen. Minimum bar would include: opt-in flag, panel list/detail, release or discard action, retention, backup inclusion documented, security review.

Implementation checklist

None yet — expand this plan after the open questions above are answered.

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