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selfpost/docs/plans/inbound-quarantine.md
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mix 967d3d95de release: 1.9.1: Port-25 Postfix startup with inbound/DMARC/antispam flags
Port-25 Postfix startup when inbound relay, DMARC ingest, or the inbound antispam milter are enabled. Schema-migration reference and roadmap plans for inbound antispam and quarantine. Upgrading from 1.9.0 is a tag bump; no migration.
Added:
  - [docs/plans/inbound-antispam-panel.md](docs/plans/inbound-antispam-panel.md) —
  - [docs/plans/inbound-quarantine.md](docs/plans/inbound-quarantine.md) — candidate
  - [docs/schema-migrations.md](docs/schema-migrations.md) — living reference for the
Changed:
  - [docs/roadmap.md](docs/roadmap.md) — `inbound-antispam-panel` (agreed, 1/12)
  - [docs/development.md](docs/development.md) — plan checklists may override
  - [docs/development.md](docs/development.md), [docs/roadmap.md](docs/roadmap.md),
Fixed:
  - `build/postfix-config.sh`: enabling inbound relay, DMARC ingest, and/or the

Full detail: CHANGELOG.md (1.9.1).
2026-09-22 15:24:53 +03:00

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Markdown

# Plan: inbound-quarantine
**Status:** candidate — design TBD; needs explicit agreement before any code
**Version:** TBD (`1.x` MINOR if opt-in and backward-compatible; may warrant `2.x`
if it changes inbound storage or backup contract).
---
## Goal (draft)
Let the operator **hold suspicious inbound mail** instead of only accept/reject
at the milter — review in the panel, then release to the configured upstream,
delete, or add sender to allow/deny lists.
This is a **product boundary question**, not a settled design. The item exists
so we can compare approaches before committing.
## Why it is separate from inbound-antispam-panel
[inbound-antispam-panel.md](inbound-antispam-panel.md) covers **metadata**
(journal + lists). Quarantine implies **storing message bodies** (or a durable
reference to them) under `/data`, retention, release workflow, and a wider
attack/backup surface — closer to "mini-mailbox" than pure relay.
## Open questions (to decide before a checklist)
1. **Where mail lives**
- SelfPost store under `/data/quarantine/` (panel owns lifecycle), or
- delegate to rspamd/Redis and panel only proxies release (less storage in
SelfPost, tighter rspamd coupling).
2. **What "release" means**
- inject into Postfix as a new delivery to the domain's upstream transport;
- or manual download only (no automatic forward).
3. **Retention and caps**
- max age, max total bytes, per-domain limits; interaction with backup size.
4. **RBAC**
- global admin only vs domain-admin for assigned inbound domains.
5. **Threat model**
- malware in stored MIME, path traversal on extract, quota DoS on busy MX.
6. **Product fit**
- does this violate [product.md](../product.md) "no mailboxes" if we only
hold spam suspects briefly? Explicit product decision required.
## Context (as-built)
- Inbound relay forwards or rejects; no local delivery ([inbound-relay.md](inbound-relay.md)).
- Optional `INBOUND_ANTISPAM_MILTER` — external rspamd may quarantine on its
own today, without panel integration.
- DMARC `p=quarantine` is unrelated (outbound policy for receivers).
## Likely out of scope (until revisited)
- IMAP/webmail for quarantined mail.
- End-user self-service quarantine (non-admin recipients).
- Outbound quarantine.
## Dependencies
- [inbound-relay.md](inbound-relay.md) (shipped).
- Sensible to decide **after** or **alongside**
[inbound-antispam-panel.md](inbound-antispam-panel.md) (journal/lists), but
not blocked on it for design discussion.
## Done when (placeholder)
TBD once approach is chosen. Minimum bar would include: opt-in flag, panel
list/detail, release or discard action, retention, backup inclusion documented,
security review.
## Implementation checklist
None yet — expand this plan after the open questions above are answered.