Files
selfpost/test/e2e/dkim_from_test.go
T
mixandClaude Opus 5.5 ef18ef21a0
test / test (push) Canceled after 0s
findings of the reviews of audit stage 2
Technical review (Opus) and security review (Fable) of a59e3d4..cb5a4a2;
reports in the session's scratchpad. Nothing critical, high or medium; no
outright bug. Fixed:

- F2, F3 (0008 backfill, before it runs on the live database): rows are
  filled by the rule new rows follow - the application's domain, then the
  name's - and only by a domain and application that existed when the row
  was written (created_at); the inbound log likewise. Test: the migration's
  UPDATEs re-run on prepared rows (before the domain, after, null sender,
  application gone, a stranger's name). Dry run on a copy of the live
  database: 68/68 and 10/10 rows filled, none disagreeing with its login's
  domain, integrity ok.
- V2, F4: an application's statistics and level-2 count are its login's
  rows of its domain (appByLogin), and StatsWindow starts no earlier than
  the entity's creation; the message page's "may send as" only for a login
  still of the row's domain. Test: a login taken again in another domain
  starts at zero.
- F7: MAIL FROM:<> is held to the domain limit of its login
  (ApplicationByLogin fills DomainName).
- V3: an imported DKIM selector is held to DNS labels (validate.Selector).
- F5, F6: an imported auto limit's numbers are dropped and recalculated
  right after the import; its mode is stored trimmed.
- V6: the store refuses a role that is neither global nor domain.
- F9: SaveUser keeps the stored hash when no new password is given (the
  form no longer writes back the hash it read). F10: a reach naming a
  domain deleted meanwhile is ErrNoSuchDomain, answered on the form.
- V4, F12: from-lines-other.txt - lines naming another sender ({other}) in
  a quoted string, a quoted pair, capitals, a comment, an encoded word, a
  quoted local part; the unit test wants each refused, the e2e
  (lines_naming_another_sender_never_signed_for_it) wants each refused and
  none signed for it. The passed list gained a.{DOMAIN}, a comment after
  the angle address, a quoted local part, and "b@ {other}" - passed by
  design (security.md), and the e2e shows it signed for the own domain.
- F13: e2e login_in_other_capitals_does_not_authenticate - AUTH with the
  login upper-cased gets 535.

Not changed, written down: V1/F1 - L8 is half closed (refused or passed
still tells an application which domains are hosted here); security.md's
accepted risks and the CHANGELOG say so, and the owner is asked whether to
refuse every foreign address in a display name (changes the 2.4.0 rule).
F11 - deleting a domain rewrites its rows' domain_id (seconds at 1e5 rows),
accepted at this size. F8 (test cannot tell write-first from read-first;
the reviewer verified it with two stores, 30/30), V5, V7, P2: noted.

Evidence on the test server for this tree: go vet clean, go test ./... 23
packages ok, make e2e exit 0 with the three new cases.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-14 16:17:57 +03:00

137 lines
4.6 KiB
Go

package e2e
import (
"bytes"
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strconv"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/emersion/go-msgauth/dkim"
)
// fromLines reads one of the files of From: lines the sender check's unit
// test reads too, with the placeholders put in: {domain} the application's,
// {other} another sender of the server, each also in capitals, and
// {other_qp} with its dots as quoted pairs.
func fromLines(repoRoot, file, domain, other string) ([]string, error) {
raw, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(repoRoot, "internal", "milter", "testdata", file))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var out []string
for _, line := range strings.Split(string(raw), "\n") {
line = strings.TrimSpace(line)
if line == "" || strings.HasPrefix(line, "#") {
continue
}
s, err := strconv.Unquote(line)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s: %w", line, err)
}
out = append(out, strings.NewReplacer(
"{domain}", domain, "{DOMAIN}", strings.ToUpper(domain),
"{other_qp}", strings.ReplaceAll(other, ".", `\.`),
"{other}", other, "{OTHER}", strings.ToUpper(other),
).Replace(s))
}
return out, nil
}
// testSignedForItsDomainOnly: the sender check and OpenDKIM read From: with
// two parsers, and that they agree was argued, never run (audit 2026-10-12,
// stage 2). Every From: line the check passes for an application is sent as
// that application, and what arrives must be signed for its domain - with a
// signature that validates - and for no other: a line the check reads as the
// application's own and OpenDKIM as another sender's would be signed with
// that sender's key.
func testSignedForItsDomainOnly(t *testing.T, sc *scenario) {
lines, err := fromLines(h.repoRoot, "from-lines-passed.txt", senderDomain, otherDomain)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
for _, line := range lines {
token := uniqueToken("dkimfrom")
res := attemptSend(sendAttempt{
authLogin: sc.appLogin, authPassword: sc.appPassword,
from: "alerts@" + senderDomain, headerFrom: line, to: recipient,
subject: "e2e " + token, body: "which key signs this",
})
if !res.ok() {
t.Errorf("From: %q was refused: %v", line, res.firstErr())
continue
}
raw, err := findSinkMessage(h.stageDir, token, 30*time.Second)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("From: %q never reached the sink: %v", line, err)
continue
}
verifications, err := dkim.VerifyWithOptions(bytes.NewReader(raw), &dkim.VerifyOptions{LookupTXT: lookupTXTFunc()})
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("From: %q: dkim verify: %v", line, err)
continue
}
valid := false
for _, v := range verifications {
if v.Domain != senderDomain {
t.Errorf("From: %q was signed for %s", line, v.Domain)
}
if v.Domain == senderDomain && v.Err == nil {
valid = true
}
}
if !valid {
t.Errorf("From: %q has no valid signature for %s (%d signature(s))", line, senderDomain, len(verifications))
}
}
}
// testNeverSignedForAnother: the lines that name another sender of the server
// are refused by the check; whatever happens to one, nothing arrives signed
// with that sender's key (review of audit stage 2).
func testNeverSignedForAnother(t *testing.T, sc *scenario) {
lines, err := fromLines(h.repoRoot, "from-lines-other.txt", senderDomain, otherDomain)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
for _, line := range lines {
token := uniqueToken("dkimother")
res := attemptSend(sendAttempt{
authLogin: sc.appLogin, authPassword: sc.appPassword,
from: "alerts@" + senderDomain, headerFrom: line, to: recipient,
subject: "e2e " + token, body: "which key signs this",
})
if err := res.refusedAt("DATA", 550, "5.7.1 From:"); err == nil {
continue
}
t.Errorf("From: %q was not refused by the check: %v", line, res.firstErr())
raw, err := findSinkMessage(h.stageDir, token, 15*time.Second)
if err != nil {
continue
}
verifications, _ := dkim.VerifyWithOptions(bytes.NewReader(raw), &dkim.VerifyOptions{LookupTXT: lookupTXTFunc()})
for _, v := range verifications {
if v.Domain == otherDomain {
t.Errorf("From: %q arrived signed for %s", line, otherDomain)
}
}
}
}
// testLoginCaseMatters: SASL compares the login byte for byte, so an
// application's login in other capitals does not authenticate. Every lookup on
// the mail path is by the exact login and relies on that (review of audit
// stage 2, F13).
func testLoginCaseMatters(t *testing.T, sc *scenario) {
res := attemptSend(sendAttempt{
authLogin: strings.ToUpper(sc.appLogin), authPassword: sc.appPassword,
from: "alerts@" + senderDomain, to: recipient, subject: "e2e " + uniqueToken("case"), body: "x",
})
if err := res.refusedAt("AUTH", 535, ""); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("AUTH as %s: %v", strings.ToUpper(sc.appLogin), err)
}
}