mixandClaude Opus 5.5 ec08c8606b
test / test (push) Canceled after 0s
audit 2c: the From: parser port checked against OpenDKIM's signing itself
The last check of the port, and the plan's last line of stage 2c. Through
Postfix the sender check refuses most lines before OpenDKIM sees them, so
TestPortAgainstOpenDKIM (internal/milter) talks to OpenDKIM directly:
test/upstream/opendkim-probe.sh starts OpenDKIM from the SelfPost image in
a throwaway container, with keys and a refile SigningTable for three
names, and the test plays it each From: line through go-milter's client,
as a client OpenDKIM trusts (127.0.0.1, InternalHosts' default). For each
line the d= of the signature OpenDKIM adds must be the domain the port
predicts - its address, the domain cut to DKIM_MAXHOSTNAMELEN, the whole
cut to MAXADDRESS, matched against "^.*@<domain>$" case-insensitive as
dkimf_apply_signtable() matches - or neither signs.

Run on the test server, 2026-10-15 (OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 from the
image): 385 lines - both shared files and lines composed from display
names plain, quoted, escaped and encoded, comments nested and open,
groups, lists, brackets, source routes, domain literals and quoted local
parts, with the other sender's name and the server's in each place - 385
agree, 287 signed. The two lines padded so that, cut at 256 bytes, they
end in "@other.e2e.test" are signed by OpenDKIM with other.e2e.test's key:
the danger the sender check's 256-byte rule (3584adc) closes is real, and
the test now asserts it.

Measured while writing it: OpenDKIM answers a step it is done with by
accepting the message and then nothing more, and go-milter v0.4.1's client
needs read timeouts set in ClientOptions (the defaults apply only to its
default options) - the probe reads every step's action.

The differential test of the parser and this probe are now scripts in the
repository, test/upstream/mailparse-diff.sh and opendkim-probe.sh, both
run from it on the server: 200 019 lines agree with the C, 385 with the
signing. go vet and go test ./... pass on the server (24 packages). Stage
2c's plan lines are all ticked; roadmap 49/81.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-15 03:07:54 +03:00

SelfPost

SelfPost

Self-hosted SMTP relay with a web panel — one Docker image, no provider.

Postfix, OpenDKIM, and a small Go panel run together under supervisord; you configure domains, DKIM keys, and SASL applications once, then point your apps at the SMTP endpoint.

SelfPost sends mail straight to the internet from your own IP, with per-domain DKIM signing. No mailboxes or webmail. An optional inbound relay (backup-MX / forwarder on port 25) forwards to an upstream; it does not store mail.

For: operators who run their own VPS or home server and want a simple relay they control, without a third-party SMTP provider.

Key properties: one container, multi-domain DKIM, SASL per application, send log and DNS checks in the panel, encrypted backups.

Features

  • Outbound SMTP (465/smtps; optional 587 submission) with per-domain DKIM signing
  • Optional inbound relay on port 25 (backup-MX / forwarder; off by default)
  • Optional DMARC aggregate report ingest on port 25 (off by default)
  • In-panel Help: a page of topics, opened from the ? in the head of a box
  • Per-application client IP allow-list for SMTP AUTH (optional)
  • Web panel grouped by mail direction — Overview, Outbound (domains, log, queue, DMARC reports), Inbound, Server (health, system log, backup, users, settings)
  • Multi-domain relay — each SASL application is bound to one sending domain
  • DNS status checks (PTR, SPF, DKIM, DMARC) with in-panel re-check
  • Two-level rate limiting — IP backstop (Postfix), per-domain ceilings, and trusted-IP app overrides
  • Full-server backup and single-domain export/import (optional password encryption)
  • Single Docker image; production data in a ./data bind mount (the quick start below uses a named Docker volume instead)

Documentation

Document Contents
Operator guide Reverse proxy, environment variables, DNS, IP warmup, panel operations, rate limiting, backup/restore, ports, image tag
Product boundaries Purpose, deployment assumptions, out-of-scope items, multi-domain model
Architecture As-built technical design
Security design Mandatory requirements, accepted risks, the CSRF ADR
Development Building, testing, docs rules, model routing, commits
Roadmap Open work (1.x+) — direction, not commitments
CHANGELOG Release history

Found a vulnerability? Do not open an issue — SECURITY.md has the private reporting channel and the scope.

Repository: https://github.com/mixeme/selfpost — source, issues, releases, and the ghcr.io/mixeme/selfpost image.

Requirements

Providing these is the operator's job — SelfPost cannot fix a blocked port or a missing PTR record for you. Details: Operator guide.

Platform

  • Docker + Compose v2 on the host
  • A reverse proxy in front of the panel (SelfPost never terminates HTTPS itself)
  • Rough sizing: 1 vCPU, 512 MB–1 GB RAM, 8–10 GB disk (send log and rotated mail.log are the main growth drivers; both sit in the ./data volume, and both are capped — 90 days and 14 files by default)

Network and IP

  • Static IP address
  • Outbound TCP port 25 unblocked (many consumer/cloud hosts block it by default)
  • PTR/rDNS for that IP pointing at your mail hostname (SELFPOST_HOSTNAME)
  • Reasonable starting IP reputation — a fresh IP still needs warmup

Per sending domain

For every domain you add in the panel:

  • SPF TXT record authorizing this server
  • DKIM TXT record (value shown on the domain page)
  • DMARC _dmarc TXT record

See Domain-level DNS in the operator guide.

Per inbound domain (optional)

Only if you turn on inbound relay (INBOUND_RELAY_ENABLE=true):

  • MX record pointing at SELFPOST_HOSTNAME (keep any existing primary MX if this host is backup-MX)

See Inbound relay in the operator guide.

Quick start

First boot — create the admin account. On a fresh container SelfPost prints a one-time setup URL (valid ten minutes). Open it in a browser to choose the administrator username and password. Until you do, the panel has no login. Production deploy: Full deployment in the operator guide.

One container, panel at http://127.0.0.1:8080 — no reverse proxy, no TLS files, no compose files. Good for clicking through the UI on your machine; outbound mail will not reach the real internet without DNS, PTR, and port 25.

The 2.x line is not published on ghcr.io yet (the newest image there is 1.3.0). Until it is, build the image from this checkout under the name the commands below and deploy/docker-compose.yml use; Docker then takes the local image and pulls nothing:

docker build -f build/Dockerfile --build-arg VERSION=2.5.1 \
  -t ghcr.io/mixeme/selfpost:2.5.1 .
docker run --rm -d --name selfpost-try \
  -p 127.0.0.1:8080:8080 \
  -e SELFPOST_HOSTNAME=mail.local.test \
  -e PANEL_COOKIE_SECURE=false \
  -v selfpost-try-data:/data \
  ghcr.io/mixeme/selfpost:2.5.1

Get the setup URL (pick one):

docker logs selfpost-try 2>&1 | grep -m1 'http'
docker exec selfpost-try cat /data/setup-token

The printed URL is https://mail.local.test/setup/<token>. For this local trial rewrite it to http://127.0.0.1:8080/setup/<token> (same path token; PANEL_COOKIE_SECURE=false so the cookie works over plain HTTP). Open it before it expires.

When finished:

docker rm -f selfpost-try && docker volume rm selfpost-try-data

More detail (limitations, optional throwaway TLS for local SMTP): Local trial in the operator guide.

Reference deploy

Production layout: one docker-compose.yml, a .env, persistent ./data, and TLS PEM files at ./certs (read by Postfix on 465/587). The panel is reached only through a reverse proxy on 443 — port 8080 is bound to localhost in the default compose file.

Full walkthrough — fetching the base files, setting up a reverse proxy and TLS (Apache/nginx/Caddy/Traefik), starting the container, and wiring up DNS — lives in the operator guide's Full deployment section, with proxy-specific commands under Reverse proxy.

The compose file always publishes 465, 587, and 25; Postfix listens on 587 only when SUBMISSION_ENABLE=true, and on 25 when INBOUND_RELAY_ENABLE=true and/or DMARC_REPORTS_ENABLE=true (see Ports). Bump the pinned image tag deliberately when upgrading, never :latest (why). Optional variables (TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDR, rate limits, retention): see Environment variables.

License

Copyright © 2026 Mikhail Yenuchenko.

AGPL-3.0. The AGPL closes the "SaaS loophole": if you run a modified version as a network-accessible service, you must make the modified source available to its users — not only when you distribute copies of the code. Third-party notices: NOTICE.

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