efaf016c5f
test / test (push) Has been cancelled
The panel now suggests policy-only DMARC by default, lets operators configure a default and per-domain report address, and DNS-checks hub _report._dmarc records. Future in-panel report ingestion is tracked as dmarc-reports in the roadmap. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
152 lines
4.9 KiB
Go
152 lines
4.9 KiB
Go
package web
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import (
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"fmt"
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"strings"
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"unicode"
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)
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// minAdminPasswordLen is the floor for the administrator password. The panel is
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// public (security.md), so this is deliberately not tiny.
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const minAdminPasswordLen = 12
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const (
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minUsernameLen = 3
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maxUsernameLen = 64
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)
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// minSecretFilePasswordLen is the floor for the password protecting an
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// encrypted backup or domain export. Such a file is offline and can be attacked
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// at leisure, so the floor matches the administrator password's rather than the
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// weaker "any password is better than none".
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const minSecretFilePasswordLen = minAdminPasswordLen
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// validateUsername enforces a strict server-side whitelist (security.md):
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// letters, digits, dot, dash, underscore. Client validation is never trusted.
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func validateUsername(u string) error {
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if len(u) < minUsernameLen || len(u) > maxUsernameLen {
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return fmt.Errorf("username must be %d-%d characters", minUsernameLen, maxUsernameLen)
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}
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for _, r := range u {
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if r > unicode.MaxASCII || (!isASCIILetterOrDigit(r) && r != '.' && r != '-' && r != '_') {
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return fmt.Errorf("username may contain only letters, digits, '.', '-' and '_'")
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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// validateAdminPassword enforces a minimum length. Composition rules beyond
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// length tend to reduce entropy in practice, so length is the sole gate.
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func validateAdminPassword(p string) error {
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if len(p) < minAdminPasswordLen {
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return fmt.Errorf("password must be at least %d characters", minAdminPasswordLen)
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}
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return nil
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}
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func isASCIILetterOrDigit(r rune) bool {
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return (r >= 'a' && r <= 'z') || (r >= 'A' && r <= 'Z') || (r >= '0' && r <= '9')
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}
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const maxDomainLen = 253 // RFC 1035 limit on a fully-qualified name
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// normalizeDomain lower-cases and trims a domain name. Domain names are
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// case-insensitive, and the generated OpenDKIM tables/keys use the canonical
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// lower-case form, so we normalise before both validation and storage.
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func normalizeDomain(name string) string {
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return strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(name))
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}
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// validateDomain enforces a strict server-side whitelist for sending-domain
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// names (security.md). The result is safe to write verbatim into the OpenDKIM
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// KeyTable/SigningTable and to use as a filesystem path segment: only
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// lower-case letters, digits, '.' and '-' are allowed, in valid DNS label
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// shape. Input must already be normalised with normalizeDomain.
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//
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// This is deliberately stricter than "any string DNS might accept" — no
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// leading/trailing dots or hyphens, no empty or over-long labels, and at least
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// two labels so single-word hostnames cannot be registered as sending domains.
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func validateDomain(name string) error {
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if name == "" {
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return fmt.Errorf("domain is required")
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}
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if len(name) > maxDomainLen {
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return fmt.Errorf("domain must be at most %d characters", maxDomainLen)
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}
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labels := strings.Split(name, ".")
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if len(labels) < 2 {
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return fmt.Errorf("domain must include at least one dot (e.g. example.com)")
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}
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for _, label := range labels {
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if err := validateDomainLabel(label); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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func validateDomainLabel(label string) error {
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if len(label) == 0 {
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return fmt.Errorf("domain must not contain an empty label")
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}
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if len(label) > 63 {
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return fmt.Errorf("each domain label must be at most 63 characters")
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}
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if label[0] == '-' || label[len(label)-1] == '-' {
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return fmt.Errorf("domain labels must not start or end with '-'")
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}
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for i := 0; i < len(label); i++ {
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c := label[i]
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lower := c >= 'a' && c <= 'z'
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digit := c >= '0' && c <= '9'
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if !lower && !digit && c != '-' {
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return fmt.Errorf("domain may contain only lower-case letters, digits, '.' and '-'")
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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// freemailDomains lists public mail hosts that cannot publish _report._dmarc
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// authorisation for third-party sending domains.
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var freemailDomains = map[string]struct{}{
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"gmail.com": {},
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"googlemail.com": {},
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"outlook.com": {},
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"hotmail.com": {},
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"live.com": {},
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"yahoo.com": {},
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"icloud.com": {},
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"me.com": {},
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"proton.me": {},
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"protonmail.com": {},
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}
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// validateEmail checks a DMARC rua= mailbox. Empty is allowed (policy-only).
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func validateEmail(addr string) error {
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addr = strings.TrimSpace(addr)
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if addr == "" {
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return nil
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}
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at := strings.LastIndex(addr, "@")
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if at <= 0 || at >= len(addr)-1 {
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return fmt.Errorf("enter a valid email address")
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}
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local := addr[:at]
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domain := normalizeDomain(addr[at+1:])
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if err := validateDomain(domain); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("email domain is invalid: %w", err)
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}
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for _, r := range local {
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if r > unicode.MaxASCII {
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return fmt.Errorf("email address must be ASCII")
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}
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if !isASCIILetterOrDigit(r) && r != '.' && r != '-' && r != '_' && r != '+' {
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return fmt.Errorf("email address contains invalid characters")
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}
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}
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if _, blocked := freemailDomains[domain]; blocked {
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return fmt.Errorf("use an address on a domain you control; public mail hosts cannot receive authorised DMARC reports")
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}
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return nil
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}
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